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GRAMMATICAL NOTES ON GREEK EPIC FORMS

I

ALLEN, Sikes, and Halliday in their note on *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 478–9

> σεμνά, τά τ' οὔ πως ἔστι παρεξ[ίμ]εν [οὔτε πυθέσθαι]
> οὔτ' ἀχέειν· μέγα γάρ τι θεῶν σέβας ἰσχάνει αὐδήν.

refer ἀχέειν to a present ἄχέω, the existence of which was first argued by Buttmann in his *Lexilogus* (English translation, pp. 178–82). The other passages which they adduce in support are:

1. *Hymn. Hom. Pan.* 18

> θρῆνον ἐπιπροχέουσ' ἀχέει μελίγηρυν ἀοιδήν.

Here Ilgen first proposed the word-division ἐπιπροχέουσ' ἀχέει, which has been generally accepted. In this passage, as in that quoted above, the non-observance of *ϝ-* is not surprising, but it should have been noticed by Allen, etc., in the appropriate sections of their Introduction, pp. xcviii and ci.

2. Hes. *Scut.* 92–93

> ἦ που πολλὰ μετεστεναχίζετ' ὀπίσσω
> ἦν ἀάτην ἀχέων· ἦ δ' οὐ παλινάγρετός ἐστιν.

Emendation (e.g. ὀχέων Mazon) is unnecessary. It is at least possible that the form here should be referred to ἀχέω 'grieve' and ἀάτην be taken as the object of μετεστεναχίζετ(ο) in 92; cf. *Od.* iv. 261 ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον.

3. Eur. *Phoen.* 1040

> βροντᾷ δὲ στεναγμὸς ἀχά τ' ἦν ὅμοιος.
> (ἀχά Musgrave, αχαι Pap., ἰαχά uel ἰαχᾶ codd.)

It is not clear why this passage is cited by Allen, etc. The syntax requires a noun, the strophic correspondence an initial long syllable. Musgrave's ἀχά fulfils both requirements.

4. Ion fr. 39 Nauck

> ἐπὶ δ' αὐλὸς ἀλέκτωρ Λύδιον ὕμνον ἀχέων

Since the passage is lyric, it is reasonable to assume ἄχέων, and the metre provides no obstacle; indeed Λύδιον . . . ἄχέων gives the very satisfactory rhythm – ∪ ∪ – ∪ – ∪ –.

5. Hesych. μέγ' ἀχήσεται· μέγα βοήσει and 6. Moschion 187 ἀχήσεται (*sic*). If Hesychius is quoting an epic formula, the neglect of the digamma is noteworthy. Though the former of these examples is cited in L. and S.[9] s.v. ἀχέω

(B) as *Trag. Adesp.* 237, neither should be adduced in support of a verb ἄχέω, for a reason which will appear below.

7. *Il.* xviii. 160

στάσκε μέγα ἰάχων· ὀπίσω δ' οὐ χάζετο πάμπαν

with Schol. A

ἡ διπλῆ περιεστιγμένη, ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει μέγα ἀχέων· πρὸς τί δὲ λυπούμενος ἑστήκει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰάχων καὶ ἐπεγκελευόμενος τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸν νεκρόν ;

Schulze[1] thinks Zenodotus' reading may have been ἐαχών (i.e. ϝεϝαχών), a reduplicated strong aorist to ἰάχω which he is inclined to see also in *Il.* xi. 463 ἄϊεν ἰάχοντος (i.e. ἐαχόντος).

Of the passages cited as parallels by Allen, etc., it seems that only one—*Hymn. Hom. Pan.* 18—gives prima facie support for a present ἄχέω 'shout, utter'. It was first shown by W. Schulze[2] that there existed in the epic language a strong aorist to the reduplicated present (ϝ)ι(ϝ)άχω of which the indicative *ἴϝαχον or *ἔϝϝαχον appears as ἴαχον without trace of initial ϝ-, and the participle is perhaps attested in *Il.* xix. 424 ἐν πρώτοισι (ϝ)αχών (vulg. ἐν πρώτοις ἰάχων), Hesych. ἄχουσα (leg. ἀχοῦσα)· κρανγάζουσα. To this strong aorist, as to many others,[3] corresponds a future in -ήσομαι, and it is therefore to ἰάχω, not to ἄχέω, that ἀχήσομαι should be referred in the grammars and lexica. Clearly, then, the infinitive ἀχέειν of *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 479 belongs not to a present ἄχέω but to the strong aorist of ἰάχω, and is parallel to the aorist infinitives of the preceding line.

There remains only one clear example of a present ἄχέω. What is its lexical status? Presents in -έω are often found associated with strong aorists and with futures in -ήσω -ήσομαι[4]; sometimes they alternate with other present-formations, and in such cases both forms may have an equal claim to antiquity (e.g. μέδομαι, Goth. *mitan* by the side of μεδέων, L. *medeor*, O.Irish *midiur*), or one may be a secondary development. Some presents in -έω seem, indeed, to have represented not fully established members of the vocabulary but momentary analogical formations, sometimes called into being, like many epic forms, by metrical needs; a good example is the imperfect εἴλκεον of *Il.* xvii. 395. It is therefore reasonable, so long as no further evidence is available, to consider the ἀχέει of *Hymn. Hom. Pan.* 18 not as an established form justifying the separate entry of a verb ἄχέω in the lexicon, but as a form momentarily substituted for ἰάχει according to a well-established pattern. That such an ἄχέω never became a regular constituent of the Greek vocabulary is not surprising in view of its being a homophone of ἀχέω 'grieve', with which it shared a wide range of possible contexts. The doubt over the interpretation of Hes. *Scut.* 93 and the scholiast's misunderstanding of Zenodotus' reading in *Il.* xviii. 160 show how difficult it would have been for the two verbs to maintain an independent existence side by side.

II

It is well known that the perfect ἔοικα in Attic and other dialects shows, besides reduplicated forms, unreduplicated forms similar to those of οἶδα.

[1] *K.Z.* xxix (1888), p. 247, n. 3.

[2] Ibid., pp. 230 ff.

[3] Cf. Magnien, *Les Formes du futur grec* (1912), p. 235; Risch, *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache* (1937), pp. 296–7; Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* (1942), p. 446.

[4] Risch, p. 264; Chantraine, pp. 347–8.

Schwyzer[1] notes as unreduplicated the Attic εἰκώς (ϝεικώς; cf. (ϝ)εἰδώς) with its feminine εἰκυῖα, to which has been extended the *e*-grade of the masculine; the weak grade originally characteristic of the feminine is seen in the Homeric ἐϊκυῖα (ϝεϝικυῖα), a reduplicated form. The masculine εἰκώς seems to be attested only once in the epics, in *Il.* xxi. 254. Its first syllable being *in thesi*, it might represent ϝεϝικώς, in which case it would not be identical with the Attic form but a passing analogical formation based on the feminine. Ionic and Lesbian show an unreduplicated οἶκα, and in Ionic the *o*-grade of the singular indicative has been extended to the participle οἰκώς. W. Schulze[2] supposes that the Ionic forms were originally reduplicated; that in Hdt. οἶκα replaced ἔοικα through the analogy of the participle, in which, he thinks, the loss of initial ε- was phonetic: cf. οὐσίη by ἐών, ἐοῦσα. In view of the number of unreduplicated forms attested, this somewhat involved explanation is unnecessary. The Attic pluperfect ᾔκειν and the infinitive εἰκέναι are presumably unreduplicated, parallel to ᾔδειν, εἰδέναι, while Attic ἐῴκει represents *ἠϝοίκεε, an unreduplicated formation with long augment before ϝ-. The Homeric ἐῴκει, when initial ϝ- is implied, may continue a reduplicated *ϝεϝοίκεε without augment and with -ῳ- from the Attic orthography, but the ἐπεῴκει of *Od.* xxiv. 295 is usually taken as identical with the Attic form[3]. Just as, however, ἐπέοικε seems to be often a disguise for, for example, τε ϝέϝοικε, so here ὣς ἐπεῴκει may conceal ὣς ἐϝεϝοίκει. Finally, Homeric ᾕϊκτο, generally taken as an unreduplicated pluperfect middle with long augment, *ἤϝικτο, was interpreted by Schulze as a reduplicated athematic aorist ἐϝέϝικτο with short augment[4]. His argument is based on the clearly aorist meaning of the form in *Od.* xiii. 288, on the parallel use of ᾕϊκτο in *Od.* xvi. 157, xx. 31 and εἴσατο in *Il.* ii. 791, xx. 81, and on the persistence of the aorist meaning even in late epic. He quotes Euphorion fr. 74 Scheidweiler

ὅς ῥά τε πᾶσιν ἔϊκτο θαλάσσιος ἠύτε Πρωτεύς

and still later examples could be adduced, e.g. Quint. Smyrn. xii. 411

μαινομένῳ δ' ἤϊκτο, καὶ ἔδρακε διπλόα πάντα.

But if Schulze is right in holding that the form is an athematic aorist, it does not follow that it is reduplicated. *ἤϝικτο can be an aorist of the same type as ἔλεκτο, ἔμικτο, πάλτο, etc. Indeed, if we can accept O. Szemerényi's ingenious explanation (given to me verbally) of ἔοικα as a semantic development of the verb seen also in O.Ind. *viś-* 'enter', we can compare directly with an aorist *(ἤ)ϝικτο the Vedic athematic aorist, 3rd pers. plur. mid. *(a)viśran.*

In general the epic language shows a greater proportion of reduplicated forms of ἔοικα as well as a greater extension of the *o*-grade than Attic. Yet a few traces suggest that at an early stage in the development of the epic language there existed unreduplicated forms not attested even in Attic. The feminine participle εἰκυῖα in Homer can be read as ϝεϝικυῖα in all but two passages:

1. *Il.* xxiii. 66

πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' εἰκυῖα.

On this passage W. Leaf comments that εἰκυῖα 'may represent ϝικυῖα on the false analogy of ϝιδυῖα, which the MSS. almost invariably turn into εἰδυῖα'. This is a sharp-sighted observation, but there is no need of analogy, false or otherwise, since ϝικυῖα is precisely the form on which is based, with analogical

[1] *Griech. Grammatik*, i (1939), pp. 766–7, 540–1. [2] *Kleine Schriften*, p. 690. [3] Chantraine, p. 479–80. [4] *Kl. Schr.*, p. 305, n. 2.

e-grade, the Attic *εἰκυῖα*. A rather more hazardous speculation is suggested by the fact that one manuscript, Allen's vi[5], gives *οἰκυῖα*, ostensibly the Ionic form. Chantraine[1] admits a bare possibility of a 'trace dans notre vulgate d'un emploi de O à l'initiale pour signifier le digamma', namely in *Οἰλεύς*, *Οἰλιάδης*, and *Οἴτυλον*. For example, in *Il.* xii. 365, where the vulgate has *αὐτίκ' Οἰλιάδην*, Zenodotus read *αὐτίκ' ἄρ' Ἰλιάδην*; both readings look like attempts to mend the apparent hiatus in an earlier text *αὐτίκα Οἰλιάδην*, in which *o* will have been an abnormal spelling for *ϝ*; so in Hdt. *Ὀαξός* for the Cretan *ϝαξος*. In the same way *κάλ' εἰκυῖα|οἰκυῖα* could be equally well explained as attempts to mend an earlier *κάλα οἰκυῖα* with *o* denoting *ϝ*.

2. *Od.* v. 337

αἰθυίῃ δ' εἰκυῖα ποτῇ ἀνεδύσετο λίμνης.

This verse is commonly considered to be an interpolation. There seems to be no very cogent reason for this view. The scholiast remarks *οὐκ ἐφέρετο ἐν τοῖς πλείοσι· Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀθετήσεως διστάζει, γράφει δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑπεδύσατο. ἐν δέ τισιν ἀνεδύσατο. ἔοικε δὲ ὁ στίχος ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον εἰρημένων ὑπό τινος ἐμβεβλῆσθαι.* Here *τῶν ὕστερον εἰρημένων* presumably refers to the subsequent verse 353. Van der Valk, in his *Textual Criticism of the Odyssey*, p. 184, adopts an attitude of reserve towards the question of 337. On p. 261 he remarks that it was 'omitted by some ancient mss., as it allegedly gave too simple a picture of the gods'. On these grounds, why was not 353 also omitted? Perhaps the stumbling-block was in the words *ποτῇ ἀνεδύσετο*, which describe a manner of flight more often seen among the gannet and other divers of the northern seas than among the birds of the Mediterranean. 337 in fact gives a less conventional and better observed picture of the bird's flight than the verse of which it has been supposed to be an imitation. Indeed, 353 is banal compared with 337 and, if one of the two verses is to be condemned, its removal would be less damaging, since the return of Leucothea to the sea has been described in the preceding line, whereas without 337 there is nothing to describe her emergence. In either case, whether 337 is an interpolation or not, it can still provide evidence about the constitution of the epic language, and it is easy to suppose that the spelling *δ' εἰκυῖα* masks an original formula *δὲ ϝικυῖα*.

Not only the perfect *ἔοικα* but also the present in *-σκω* formed to the same root shows alternative sets of forms with and without reduplication, e.g. *Il.* xvi. 41

αἴ κ' ἐμὲ σοὶ ἴσκοντες ἀπόσχωνται πολέμοιο

and, on the other hand, e.g. *Il.* v. 181

Τυδεΐδῃ μιν ἔγωγε δαΐφρονι πάντα ἐΐσκω.

The digamma is constantly observed in these forms save in two passages, *Od.* ix. 321 and xi. 363, for which is postulated a third set of forms *ἐ(ϝ)ίσκω*, etc., presumably with prothetic vowel.[2] The number of words with initial *ϝ-* for which Homer presents alternative forms with and without prothesis[3] makes this assumption quite reasonable. There is, however, another possibility in the case of *Od.* ix. 321

αὐανθέν· τὸ μὲν ἄμμες ἐΐσκομεν εἰσορόωντες.

Since the sense of the verb is clearly imperfect, it is appropriate to take the

[1] Pp. 116–17.
[2] Chantraine, pp. 129, 182.
[3] Chantraine, pp. 181–3.

ἐ- as the augment and ἐἴσκομεν as the augmented imperfect of (ϝ)ίσκω, not as an unaugmented imperfect of ἐ(ϝ)ίσκω. It might perhaps be objected that before many or most verbs with initial ϝ- the augment was ἠ-, and that the long augment is in fact attested for the verb in question by the aorist ἤϊκτο, by Attic forms with quantitative metathesis (e.g. ἐᾠκει for *ἠϝοίκεε), and above all by the imperfect ἤϊσκε of *Il.* xxi. 332

Ξάνθον δινήεντα μάχῃ ἠΐσκομεν εἶναι

and *Od.* iv. 247

ἄλλῳ δ' αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἤϊσκε.

But the long augment is by no means invariable before ϝ-,[1] and in both passages in which ἤϊσκε occurs its long initial syllable is *in thesi*, while in the latter it contributes to forming a double-spondaic ending to a verse which as it stands has only one dactyl. It is therefore in both verses possible and in one also advantageous to read ἐ(ϝ)έ(ϝ)ισκε, the augmented imperfect of the reduplicated form.

In *Od.* xi. 363

ὦ 'Οδυσεῦ, τὸ μὲν οὔ τί σ' ἐΐσκομεν εἰσορόωντες

no such simple solution is possible; to read σε (ϝ)ίσκομεν would give a diaeresis after the third foot. Rather than assume prothesis for this one form alone, however, it could be seen as an instance of the neglect of ϝ- arising through the later adaptation of formulae in which ϝ- had originally been observed.

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PINDAR, *ISTHMIA*, i. 41[2]

TURYN's text (*Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*, Cracow, 1948) is as follows:

40 . . . ὁ πονήσαις δὲ νόῳ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει.
εἰ δ' ἀρετᾷ κατάκειται πᾶσαν ὀργάν,
ἀμφότερον δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις,
χρή νιν εὑρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπον
μή φθονεραῖσι φέρειν
45 γνώμαις.

The reading of 41 given in the text was defended by Boeckh, who translated: 'si quis virtuti omnibus modis incumbit et operam dat'. Schroeder followed suit (*Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, Bergk, Leipzig, 1900, i, p. 348): 'Nihil mutandum; nam egregie dicitur εἰ δ' ἀρετᾷ κατάκειται (ὁ πονήσαις scilicet . . .) πᾶσαν ὀργάν, "in virtute" (i.e. in laude equestri potius quam in studiis civilibus, quae leniter modo perstrinxerat P.) "si collocatus atque occupatus est toto pectore"; en quantum distet κατακεῖσθαι a vulgari quod desiderant ἐγκεῖσθαι ("sectari")! dativus ἀρετᾷ est loci, sicut apud τίθημι P. i. 40, τίθεμαι N. x. 89.// de apodosi liberiore quadam ratione protasin excipiente cf. N. vii. 90.'

Schroeder's explanation still holds the field, but is open to serious objections.

(*a*) κατακεῖσθαι is elsewhere quite neutral in meaning: 'lie outstretched, flat'. Schroeder rightly avoids the equation with ἐγκεῖσθαι *incumbere*. His own translation, however, comes to much the same thing; for, if *collocatus* is near

[1] Chantraine, pp. 479–80.

[2] I acknowledge with gratitude advice given to me by Professor D. S. Robertson and Mr. Hugh Lloyd-Jones.

enough the mark (it is not an exact equivalent), his *occupatus* implies an active sense of which there is no vestige in κατακεῖσθαι itself.

(*b*) Even if κατάκειται *were* active, it could hardly be accompanied by an accusative of respect, *πᾶσαν ὀργάν toto pectore*. Words that denote parts of the body, senses, faculties, mental and physical attributes, etc., occur frequently as accusatives of this kind. *Ὀργή* 'emotion', 'passion', lies outside this class, however, and is not so used. *Pectore* is in any case a dubious rendering of *ὀργάν*; the Latin word implies purposeful, controlled action, the Greek an involuntary impulse.

We have no right to force on the passage an interpretation that is contrary to the normal sense and usage of these words. The only meaning that 41 as it stands can properly bear is: 'and if in (by, with) prowess he (it)lies flat in all (every) passion . . .'. This is patently absurd. Accordingly the text must be re-examined. This task may be confined to 41, for the text and meaning of the apodosis are not in doubt: '. . . it is right to bestow on those who have achieved prowess (*νιν* = *ἀρετάν*) noble praise with minds free from hatred.'

Lines 40–52 describe how a man may recover his lost reputation. In such a context the obvious reference of *πᾶσαν ὀργάν* is to the *hostility* which a disgraceful act rouses in the minds of other people. The following *μὴ φθονεραῖσι γνώμαις*, expressing the negation of such hostility, is then in antithesis to *πᾶσαν ὀργάν*. Hence it appears that the verb of the protasis should signify the *removal* of hostility.

Κατάκειται will not serve this purpose; but κατατάκει will. We have only to suppose that κατάκειται arose from simple metathesis of syllables, followed by the addition of final *ι*, or from omission of *τά*, followed first by its insertion above the line and next by its reintroduction to the line after *κει* with the addition of final *ι*. The verb *τήκειν* and its compounds are applied frequently in a metaphorical sense to persons exhausted by emotion; they can also be applied to the dissolving of emotion itself. The frequency of the figure is attested by Aristotle, *Phys.* iv. 221[a]30–31 καθάπερ καὶ λέγειν εἰώθαμεν ὅτι κατατήκει ὁ χρόνος; see also L.–S.[9] s.vv. *τήκω*, *ἐκτήκω*, *κατατήκω*, *συντήκω*. Plato, *Rep.* iii. 411 b 2 ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμόν, represents music as melting down the iron of the human spirit, and it is quite possible that in the present passage Pindar thought of hostility being melted like iron (see L.–S.[9] s.vv. σιδήρεος I. 2, σίδηρος I. 2).

The protasis then reads: 'and if by prowess he obliterates every passion, alike through generosity and through perseverance . . .'. This meaning is satisfactory in itself; but there is an awkward tautology between ὁ πονήσαις and πόνοις. Moreover, the transition from κατατάκει sing. to εὑρόντεσσι plur. is syntactically rough, and the sense-connexion is unsatisfactory inasmuch as the apodosis practically repeats the protasis. Even if syntactical irregularities occur in Pindar's verses (*Nem.* vii. 90 quoted by Schroeder seems, however, to be of a different order), we should not insist on retaining this one if the manuscripts offer a well-attested alternative which avoids it. The force of the condition is surely that the protasis states a universal truth (*πᾶσαν*) and the apodosis its application to individuals (*εὑρόντεσσι*). This antithesis is not apparent if ὁ πονήσαις is subject of the protasis; but it is established if for *ἀρετᾷ* we read *ἀρετά*, the first reading of B and even of the scholia that interpret the word as a dative or nominative plural. We thus obtain the following sense: 'and if (it is true that) prowess obliterates every passion . . .'; i.e. if a disgraced man not

merely tries hard but achieves outstanding success in a gentlemanly pursuit, that success wipes out his disgrace and a poet must not hesitate to give him due praise.

The dative ἀρετᾷ might have arisen through a visual error, by confusion with the ending of κατάκειται; but once κατάκειται was accepted it was almost inevitable that ἀρετᾷ should be deliberately adopted if any sense were to be extracted from the line. The scholiast's attempt to convert ἀρετᾷ to ἀρεταί, making a *schema Pindaricum* with κατάκειται, is a subsequent development which resulted from the difficulty of combining κατάκειται (ὁ πονήσαις) with εὑρόντεσσι. Even before κατατάκει was corrupted, however, ἀρετᾷ might have arisen through the attraction of δαπάναις and πόνοις in the next line. Since the scholia do not discuss κατάκειται itself but are intent on its relation with ἀρετᾷ, ἀρεταί, ἀρετά, it is to be assumed that κατατάκει had disappeared without trace at an early date. It would be unwise to conclude from the silence of the scholiasts that Aristarchus, who is reported to have preferred ἀρετᾷ, *must* also have read κατάκειται. It seems likely, however, that he did so; i.e. κατάκειται may be a pre-Alexandrian variant.

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DIKE AND ARES

In *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XX, 1952, ll. 30 ff. of fr. 9(*a*) of No. 2256 raise a mythological problem of which Lobel emphasizes the difficulty: the fragment (unlike most in the volume) is quite certainly from a play of Aeschylus, since its line 28 is fr. 377 N².

The lines run as follows: the speaker is *Δίκη*.

30 τέκμαρ δὲ λέξω τῶι τόδ' εὐδερκὲ[ς] φερε[
ἔθρε[ψ.] παῖδα μάργον ὃν τίκτει[
Ἥρα μιγεῖσα Ζηνὶ θυμοιδ[
δ]ύσαρκτ[ο]ν, αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἐνῆ[ν] φρ[ον]ήματι,
].υκτα τῶν ὁδοιπόρων βέλη
35].δως ἀγκύλαισιν ἁρταμῶν
] ?ν ἔχ[αι]ρε κἀγέλα κακόν
]ν ὄζοι φόνος
]μουμένη
].ιπρ[.....]γον χέρα
40]οῦν ἐνδίκως κικλήσκεται
]νιν ἔνδικ[.....].ος

Lobel's note on l. 31 thus states the difficulty: ' παῖδα: if the text is right, there is no choice but to take Ares as meant, but the objections to this, both general, that a major god should be adduced as a signal example of transgression punished, and in detail, as noted below, seem to me so great that I have cast about for a means of escaping this conclusion. I have found nothing plausible.'

The points of detail here mentioned amount roughly to this, that the language of ll. 34 ff., in the words of Lobel's note on l. 34, suit 'not Ares but some highway robber of the same sort as Sinis'.

I suggest that these objections lose much of their force if we make two suppositions: first, that Dike is leading up to an account of the trial of Ares for the murder of Halirrhothius, and second, that the closing lines of the fragment describe Ares not as a mature god but as a δύσαρκτος child, playing the pranks

of a highway robber. Aeschylus, like Homer, seldom shows much tenderness for this hateful god, whose food, as Eteocles says in the *Septem*, is the blood of men.

The trial of Ares by the twelve gods on the Areopagus was mentioned by Hellanicus of Lesbos (frr. 69 and 82 Müller = 38 and 169 Jacoby) and described by Euripides at some length in *Electra* 1254–63 and more briefly in *I.T.* 945 f. It is, indeed, implicitly rejected by Aeschylus in *Eum.* 681 ff., but in such matters a tragic poet had no need to follow the same tradition in different trilogies, and, had he recognized this trial of Ares in the *Oresteia*, he could not have shown that of Orestes as the inauguration of the Areopagus Court.

On Dike's lips the trial of Ares would serve less as 'a signal example of transgression punished' (especially if, as in Apollodorus iii. 14. 2, he was acquitted) than as a signal example of the lofty impartiality of divine justice, which had not shrunk from arraigning a major god.

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CULEX 272–6

nec timuit Phlegethonta, furens, ardentibus undis
nec maesta obtenta Ditis ferrugine regna
defossasque[1] domos ac Tartara nocte cruenta
obsita nec faciles Ditis sine iudice sedes,
iudice qui uitae post mortem uindicat acta.

Verse 275 is commonly regarded as a perversion of Virg. *Aen.* vi. 431:

nec uero hae sine sorte datae, sine iudice, sedes:
quaesitor Minos urnam mouet; ille silentum
consiliumque uocat uitasque et crimina discit.

Löfstedt[2] translates 'and the seats of Dis not easily accessible without a judge', and, like Leo[3] and others, sees in the 'very perplexing' expression *Ditis sine iudice sedes* a clumsy imitation of *Aen.* vi 'which rendered his own expression not only intricate but very awkward and, in fact, hardly understandable'. Jachmann,[4] too, comments '*sine iudice* in diesem Zusammenhang unverständlich'. Norden, again, on *Aen.* vi. 431 refers to the 'sehr verschrobenem Ausdruck' in the *Culex*. And recently Professor Fraenkel[5] to the same effect.

Now it is indeed the case that the Latin poets in imitating their more illustrious predecessors were sometimes guilty of insipidity, infelicity, or even absurdity. Verse 275, however, represents something worse: it is not sense and it is not Latin. In such a case it is pertinent to reflect that the text of the *Culex* is notoriously corrupt; indeed, in Housman's words, 'great part of it is now

[1] *defossasque* VWB[2] Leo, *nec fossasque* most MSS. Vollmer, *ecfossasque* Ellis. Klotz (*Hermes*, lxi, 1926, 32, n. 1) suggests that *nec . . . -que* may represent a vulgar pleonasm, a view which is rejected by Löfstedt (*Synt.* ii. 223, n. 2). Certainly the presence of *nec* at the beginning of both 272 and 273 was conducive to corruption in 274.

[2] *Eranos*, xlvii, 1949, 153.

[3] Leo comments 'unum hoc certissimum exemplum est expressae Aeneidis, eo certius illud quo contortiorem imitatio sermonem effecit', and explains '*nec faciles Ditis sine iudice sedes* idem est quod *et Ditis sedes non sine iudice faciles*: si sine iudice essent, faciles essent'; an interpretation which appears to be itself in need of elucidation. Plésent interprets much as Löfstedt. Fairclough (Loeb) translates 'and the abodes of Dis, easy of entry were there not a judge'.

[4] *Gnomon*, iv, 1928, 578.

[5] *J.R.S.* xlii, 1952, 5.

double-Dutch, and Latin no more'.[1] It is certainly difficult to believe that any poet capable of the Latin tongue could have written 275 in its transmitted form. We must, however, look for some more convincing solution than Scaliger's conjecture *Dictaeo iudice*, all too readily accepted by Ribbeck, Baehrens, and others. For Phillimore's *aditu* there is likewise little to be said.

Now if we take the words *(non) facilis*, *sedes Ditis*, and *iudex*, and consider their most probable relation to each other, it at once occurs to us that *non facilis* properly belongs to *iudex* (cf. Sen. *N.Q.* iv. 5. 1 *faciliori iudici*), a supposition which receives strong support from the following line; we should, accordingly, read *nec facili* (i.e. *et non facili*).[2] That the Corsinian manuscript (*Γ*), to which Vollmer refers as taken 'ex codice optimo et uetusto', reads for no apparent reason *facilem* can hardly be without significance; *facilem* may have been written for *facili* owing to the influence of the preceding accusatives;[3] *faciles* of the other manuscripts may represent a later stage.

If we next consider the relation between *sedes Ditis* and *iudex*, it is natural to assume that Minos is being represented as judge in the abodes of Dis. Such a meaning is provided if we read *sub* for *sine*. I suggest, therefore, that the poet wrote *nec facili Ditis sub iudice sedes*, i.e. 'and the abodes of Dis subject to no complaisant judge, a judge who calls to reckoning the deeds of life after death'.[4] Cf. Sen. *Herc. F.* 578 ff. 'deflent et lacrimis difficiles dei, | et qui fronte nimis crimina tetrica | quaerunt ac ueteres excutiunt reos | flentes Eurydicen iuridici sedent'. The corruption of *sub* into *sine* may be accounted for by our assuming that a copyist on coming to the words *sub iudice sedes* substituted *sine i. s.*, either in absence of mind because the similar verse-ending in the related Virgil passage sprang to his mind, or because he found the latter written in the margin of his manuscript and was influenced accordingly.[5]

Here it may be of interest if I adduce a passage from Paulinus of Nola, which has not yet been explained (or, apparently, even suspected), but which becomes intelligible if we assume the presence of this type of error, viz. *Carm.* 16. 219–23, which I print according to Hartel's text:[6]

> ut nouus in lucem iam desperantibus exit
> et patria tamquam rediuiuus in urbe uidetur
> et multi dubitant agnoscere et ante rogantes,
> uerane, te, facies? aiunt, tune ille beatus,
> redderis qui[7] tanto nobis post tempore, Felix?

Felix reappears after a long absence and reveals himself to his astonished

[1] *C.R.* xvi, 1902, 339. Cf. Ellis, p. xi: '(*Culicis*) multis . . . uitiis laborantis, praecipue in prooemio . . . et uu. 260–380, quibus uix ulla pars horum opusculorum interpretes magis detinuit exercuitque.'

[2] Cf. Manil. iv. 736 ff. 'nec te, Bacche, pari donantem munere terras | atque alias aliis fundentem collibus uuas, | cinnama nec totis passim nascentia campis' (= '*et te munere non pari donantem*' and '*et cinnama non totis*' Housman, q.v. ad loc. and on i. 656 and ii. 41), Luc. i. 72 'nimioque graues sub pondere lapsus | nec se Roma ferens' (= *et Roma se non ferens*), id. i. 85, etc.

[3] Cf. the next verse (276), where for *uitae —acta Γ* has *uitem* ($Γ^1$)*—actam*.

[4] Minos assigns the *sedes*; cf. 374 ff. 'Phlegethonta . . ., quo, maxime Minos, | conscelerata pia discernis uincula sede. | ergo iam causam mortis, iam dicere uitae | uerberibus saeuae cogunt ab iudice Poenae' (*sub* Scaliger).

[5] For examples of this type of error see Havet, *Manuel*, §§ 1087 ff.

[6] *Corp. Script. Eccl. Lat.* xxx, 1894. The poems are also printed in Migne's *Patrol.*, vol. lxi, according to the text mainly of Lebrun.

[7] So Hartel regardless of metre. For *qui* the codd. read: *heu qui* ADQ, *aeui* GR, *heu* cett. (so ed. princ., Lebrun). The right reading must, I think, be *huc*; cf. *Carm.* xvii. 318 'huc ad nos animo recurre'. The commas after *beatus* and *tempore* should be deleted.

friends. Now what can be the construction and meaning of *uerane, te, facies* in 222? Hartel's punctuation suggests that he regards *te* as the object of *rogantes*; but apart from the odd position of *te* the second person is entirely inappropriate.[1] No one seems to have realized that the poet has here borrowed from Virg. *Aen.* iii. 309 ff.,[2] where Andromache proclaims her surprise on being suddenly confronted with Aeneas:

> labitur et longo uix tandem tempore fatur:
> 'uerane te facies, uerus mihi nuntius adfers,
> nate dea? uiuisne? . . .'

Here the construction is clear enough, *te* being the object of *adfers*; but in the Paulinus *te* has no construction. Some may, indeed, insist that the poet has here thrown in a bit of Virgil without a thought for grammar. Paulinus was, however, an accomplished poet and could write with the greatest fluency and command of language. In his numerous imitations of the classical poets he adapted and varied according to his needs. That he could be guilty of the solecism to which I have referred seems incredible. I suggest rather that *te* is a copyist's error for *tu* and that we should read *uerane tu facies* (sc. *es*).[3] Here, too, it seems fair to assume that a copyist was misled by the Virgil and altered the text accordingly. A good parallel for the error occurs in Virg. *Georg.* iv. 566 'Tityre, *te* patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi', where G reads *tu* for *te* owing to a reminiscence of *Ecl.* i. 1 'Tityre, *tu* patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi'.[4]

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REVIEWS

URDUMMHEIT AND AFTERWARDS

E. R. Dodds: *The Greeks and the Irrational.* (Sather Classical Lectures, Vol. 25.) Pp. ix+327. Berkeley: University of California Press (London: Cambridge University Press), 1951. Cloth, 37*s.* 6*d.* net.

That the contribution made by the Greeks to the advancement of human thought was immense is well known. Probably no nation, certainly no ancient nation, has ever had so comparatively large a proportion of intelligent members, and no intellects have yet reached a higher level than those of the foremost Hellenic thinkers. But all this is so familiar that we are in danger, perhaps, not of forgetting but certainly of under-emphasizing a fact well known to all folklorists and to all careful students of classical antiquity. In Greece, as in every body of human beings, small or great, the percentage of really intelligent persons was minute. The vast majority, there as elsewhere, had essentially the minds of savages, sluggish to invent, slow to receive new ideas from others, incapable of clear, logical criticism of anything. It therefore must have been

[1] Lebrun's punctuation leaves us no wiser: 'et ante rogantes, | uerane te facies? (aiunt) . . .'.

[2] Omitted from Hartel's list of sources (p. 384).

[3] Verses 222–3 will then run:
'uerane tu facies?' aiunt, 'tune ille beatus
redderis huc tanto nobis post tempore Felix?'

[4] Havet, l.c.

the case that the majority held all manner of unfounded traditional beliefs, often so vague that they were rather of the nature of feelings and could hardly be put into words, and generally quite unreasonable, therefore little noticed in the literature we have, which is, at least the bulk of it, the work of the small reasoning minority. It is therefore well that a man of Professor Dodds's learning and insight should have devoted some time to the study of this uncritical and uncharacteristic part of Greek mentality, and put as much of it as could be got into eight lectures and a moderate number of notes before a larger audience than listened to him in the lecture-room at Berkeley.

He begins with Homer, and here now and again separatism raises its head for a moment, even that poor ghost, the Telemacheia, squeaking and gibbering once or twice. But such phantoms are not allowed to affect the argument. He concentrates on the excuse which Agamemnon makes at the reconciliation with Achilles for his outrageous conduct, and this gives the chapter its title, 'Agamemnon's Apology'. Besides the necessary discussion of ἄτη which this involves, there is interesting mention made of such things as μένος and the way in which on occasion it is 'breathed' or 'put into' someone, or simply 'given' him by a supernatural agency; of the curious doings of the θυμός; of the non-intellectual use of the verb οἶδα, and other matters of interest to anyone who wants a complete picture of man as conceived by Homer and his audience. Lest it be said that we have to do with phrases which had become mere figures of speech (as when we say that someone is guided by his heart, his conscience, or his better nature, without imagining that these are independent and separate forces residing somewhere within him), there is a good discussion (pp. 13 f., founded, with due acknowledgement, on an article of Nilsson's) of the psychological condition of the people of that age. I emphatically agree with the general conclusion (p. 18):

> Behind the term 'Homeric religion' there lies something more than an artificial machinery of serio-comic gods and goddesses . . . we shall do it less than justice if we dismiss it as an agreeable interlude . . . between the presumed profundities of an Aegean Earth-religion about which we know little, and those of an 'early Orphic movement' about which we know even less.

Having thus shown that Homeric nobles were not the pure intellectuals which some exaggerated accounts of them offer us, the author passes to the transition, as he phrases it, using a technicality of some American anthropologists, 'from shame-culture to guilt-culture', meaning the passage from a state of society and thought in which the chief sanction of conduct is public opinion, the fear of disapproval or ridicule if the established pattern of behaviour is departed from, to one in which the wrongdoer fears rather the wrath of a supernatural power, conceived on occasion as φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες. He has far too much sense to suppose that this transition was either sudden or complete, in Greece or out of it, but that it did take place between the Homeric and archaic periods he considers, and I think rightly, to be a fact. Some ancient copies of Homer made Phoinix think for a moment of killing his father when they quarrelled, but 'one of the immortals put an end to my wrath, for he set in my θυμός the talk of the people and the many reproaches of men' (Il. ix. 458–61, rejected by Aristarchos and some modern editors, rightly or wrongly). Had Phoinix been a contemporary, say, of Archilochos he would rather have suffered from a lively sense of sin at entertaining such thoughts. Oidipus, in the Epic tradition before the *Thebais* (p. 36), was certainly unfor-

tunate in his marriage and had much to endure, but was far from being the sin-laden and polluted creature from whom the Chorus of the *O.C.* shrink in horror. Hence this chapter has relatively much to say of such interesting things as μίασμα and the consequent need of purification, also of a topic which is perhaps not considered sufficiently by writers on Greek religion and *Religiosität*, the occasional mention of something very like tempting fiends who lure men to their ruin (p. 39). Also, there is a good, if brief, treatment of the individual δαίμων, who seems to have nothing to do with character, whatever Herakleitos might say in protest (p. 42). To explain the appearance of these phenomena the author is not content with the reasons usually given, such as the disturbed condition of the times. He is inclined rather to suppose (pp. 45 ff.) that the gradual loosening of family ties had much to do with it, bringing about (p. 47) 'infantile conflicts whose echoes lingered in the unconscious mind of the adult', as paternal authority began to weaken, and consequently the 'unacknowledged desires' which according to modern psychological orthodoxy are a great source of feelings of guilt. I hasten to add that Dodds is no bondslave of any psychological doctrine and claims no possession of a key either to all mythologies or to all cultures: 'the evolution of a culture is too complex a thing to be explained without residue in terms of any simple formula, whether economic or psychological, begotten of Marx or begotten of Freud' (p. 49).

The third chapter is paradoxically entitled 'The Blessings of Madness', and, with characteristic blending of ancient and modern thought, or their juxtaposition to explain one another, it has for its motto a dictum of E. M. Forster that 'in the creative state a man is taken out of himself', and begins by quoting Plato's remarks on madness from the *Phaedrus* (244 a ff.). This leads to an account of what the ancients at various times thought about madness and how they interpreted such phenomena as multiple personality. The later distinction between 'divine' and ordinary madness is also discussed, and due attention paid to the two principal types of 'possession', the Apolline and the Dionysiac, concerning both of which Dodds has interesting things to say. The Pythia is appropriately compared to a modern trance-medium (p. 73) and her honesty, whatever may be thought of that of her official interpreters, rightly insisted upon (p. 74). The influence of Delphoi and its later loss of influence are discussed (p. 75) in reference to the social background, and excellently accounted for.

> The crushing sense of human ignorance and human insecurity . . . would have been unendurable without the assurance which such an omniscient divine counsellor could give.... And, when the importance of Delphi declined . . . the main reason was not, I suspect, that men had grown (as Cicero thought) more sceptical, but rather that other forms of religious reassurance were now available.

And one of the many good things said about the cult of Dionysos is that, especially as Lysios, he was 'the god who by very simple means, or by other means not so simple, enables you for a short time to *stop being yourself*, and thereby sets you free' (p. 76). Much else contained in this chapter and the notes belonging to it (the notes throughout the book are emphatically worth reading) is here omitted from considerations of space.

Chapter IV discusses 'Dream-Pattern and Culture-Pattern', i.e. the relation between both the form dreams take and the attitude of the dreamers towards them on the one hand and the traditional beliefs and practices of the community in which they live on the other. Here he takes occasion (p. 104) to

correct a too schematic account which I gave a quarter of a century ago of the various ways in which dreams are interpreted in pre-scientific stages of culture. Naturally, a considerable part of the chapter is devoted to incubation-dreams, particularly those in the cult of Asklepios. The material is familiar enough, the treatment fresh and interesting.

In Chapter V, 'The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism', Dodds brings forward a theory which is well worth careful consideration. It is that the numerous *θεῖοι ἄνδρες*, who play such a prominent part in the traditions of the Archaic period especially, are the result of a contact, via the colonization of and trade in the Black Sea area, with the southernmost fringe of actual shamanism, familiar to moderns especially from the Siberian data. Inevitably he has something to say about Pythagoras and his followers, and also something about Orphism; a humorous passage (p. 147) laments the amount he once knew about this subject and now knows no longer, as a result of studying modern works, especially those of Festugière and Linforth. Very properly he finds a reason for the prevalence of such doctrines not only in the rational want of a solution for the intellectual problem of evil, but in 'a deeper psychological need—the need to rationalise those unexplained feelings of guilt which . . . were prevalent in the Archaic Age' (p. 151). It would be unfair to summarize an argument already pressed into little space; the whole chapter demands careful reading and reflection. Incidentally, by Puritanism the author means any doctrine which exalts the soul and contemns the body.

With the next two chapters, 'Rationalism and Reaction in the Classical Age' and 'Plato, the Irrational Soul, and the Inherited Conglomerate', we are again on familiar ground, with the material interestingly handled and some new points of view introduced. The phrase 'inherited conglomerate' is due to Gilbert Murray and means the resultant of the various forces, rational and irrational, which had worked on the Greek community in the past and left their mark on the minds and habits of thought of individuals, as happens in all societies. Such matters as the prevalence alongside each other of the rationalism of the Sophists and their disciples and successors and the use of magic and so forth are well outlined, as is also the way in which Plato went beyond the too purely intellectual view of moral and other problems. The last chapter is entitled 'The Fear of Freedom' and deals chiefly with the later Hellenistic and the Imperial periods. The author is here a little handicapped by the leisurely way in which, it is obvious, his book went through the press. He could not yet use the second volume of Nilsson's *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (p. 245), Cumont's *Lux Perpetua* (p. 266, n. 85), or Campbell Bonner's *Studies in Magical Amulets* (p. 268, n. 103). Without these helps, however, he handles the subject excellently, from a point of view suggested by T. H. Huxley's remark, which forms the motto of the chapter, 'A man's worst difficulties begin when he is able to do as he likes'. A moderately optimistic sketch of the modern position as compared with the ancient closes the chapter, and there are two appendixes, taken with some revisions from published articles by the author.

There are a few slips in small details, or misprints. P. 6, line 13, Homer is made to speak Doric (*ἄταν* for *ἄτην*). P. 127, n. 52, for 'Jason's' read 'Pelias's'; Phrixos' name is also misspelled. P. 173, n. 108, 'Plut.' had better be in square brackets. P. 200, n. 61, for *'Εκάτεια* read *'Εκάταια*. P. 256, n. 12, *maestitiam* is misspelled.

But by far the worst fault is pointed out by the author himself (p. 236). Of

the period from Homer to, say, Proklos, he has 'covered about one-third' and also has 'left many gaps' in what he has covered. Considering his wide and deep knowledge and his acuteness of mind, to say nothing of his sympathetic understanding of intellects less clear than his own, is it not his manifest duty to write at least one more volume on the subject and supply the missing two-thirds *plus*?

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AESCHYLUS EXPLAINED

ANTONIO MADDALENA: *Interpretazioni Eschilee*. Pp. vi+163. Turin: Edizioni di Filosfia, 1951. Paper, *L.* 700.

THE challenge implicit in the title of this book is not taken up. Though there is no lack of references to recent work in German, French, and English, the name of Wilamowitz is barely mentioned. It is no part of the aim of the writer to interpret crucial passages or to discuss the problems that beset the study of Aeschylus. Instead he provides a continuous paraphrase and running commentary on the seven plays which does for them much what Méautis did for the *Oresteia*. The interpretation is of the general significance rather than of particular difficulties. As the book contains nothing in Greek type it is presumably intended mainly for those who know Aeschylus in translation, though the notes contain references to books and articles which would prove forbidding to such readers. Maddalena gives a clear and generally reliable, though somewhat repetitive, account of the plays, which should be widely useful, but it is a little unsatisfactory that a book on this scale containing on its large, closely printed pages something in the neighbourhood of 100,000 words, should indicate the text that is being translated only by such vague statements as that it is based mainly on the work of Valgimigli. For in no other ancient author are problems of text and interpretation so inextricably involved.

Maddalena begins his exposition with the *Oresteia*, as being the fullest and maturest statement of Aeschylean thought, and then traces its earlier development from the *Supplices* onwards. In general, the account follows conventional lines, which is nothing against it. The most novel and the most questionable feature is the emphasis on pity or compassion. The justice of the Erinyes and the justice of Zeus and Apollo as represented before the court of the Areopagus are contrasted as cruel and compassionate justice. It is as cruel and compassionate that Zeus and Prometheus are opposed to each other. The understanding that comes by suffering is declared to reveal itself as compassion, and it is this, in the last resort, that provides the Aeschylean solution to the problem of divine justice. It is quite true that Prometheus pitied man, and that the Areopagus was more merciful than the Erinyes, but it is not clear that Aeschylus intended its chief significance to be found in the fact that it was merciful. It had other important advantages.

The account is generally free from exaggeration and excess of subtlety, though one may doubt whether triple-bodied Geryon at *Ag.* 870 really reflects Clytaemnestra's desire to strike her husband three times. It may be logical to visualize the action of the *Agamemnon* as taking place in the courtyard of the

palace, that of the *Choephori* in front of the palace, but it is unlikely that ancient production paid any attention to the distinction. In the *Choephori* too much is made of the alleged reluctance of Orestes, of which there are few signs until he is face to face with his mother, while little attempt is made to bring out the difference in age and experience between the two children and the Chorus, who are composed not merely of handmaidens but of captives, and possibly of captives from Troy. In the chapter on the *P.V.* more emphasis might have been placed on the rawness of Zeus, the new ruler, since this accounts for the untempered severity of his rule. The general interpretation here given is quite in accord with this.

The problems connected with the relation of the plays, apart from the *Oresteia*, to the tetralogies to which they belonged are touched on in the notes but not discussed.

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GREEK LITERATURE

H. C. Baldry: *Greek Literature for the Modern Reader.* Pp. ix+321. Cambridge: University Press, 1951. Cloth, 18*s.* net.

This book is intended to provide an introduction to Greek literature for those with little or no knowledge of the ancient world. It is no watered-down version of a conventional text-book; indeed the amount of information about authors and the contents of their works is limited, much of it conveniently arranged in tabular form. Professor Baldry has tried to make ancient literature comprehensible by showing it in its setting, social, political, and economic. To achieve this within the limits of his space he has had to deal in summary fashion with a number of complicated topics, for his background is the whole Greek world from Homer to Alexander. It requires courage for a scholar to undertake the amount of simplification required, and Baldry has been remarkably successful in giving a homely, unpretentious, but balanced account of his large subject. Trial on the sort of reader for whom the book is intended suggests that it will be found both stimulating and satisfying.

The writer of such a book must get his effects by broad strokes. There is no room for the hesitations and qualifications which the many specialists, whose ground Baldry covers, would be tempted to introduce into accounts of their subjects. We attend the performance of the *Oresteia* in 458 B.C. There are women among the audience; at the end of Clytaemnestra's description of the beacons there is a deafening burst of applause; the parodos is performed to the flute, in spite of *Frogs* 1285; the actors are mounted on buskins with soles 'several inches thick'. There are some questionable statements here, but they matter little provided that the picture is clear and vivid, as it is.

Brevity is a more serious obstacle in the account of ancient society. Baldry is much concerned about slavery. For readers who regard Athens as the realization of the Golden Age on earth his emphasis will not be misplaced. But they are no longer very common, and one who is already aware that slavery was universal in ancient civilizations may get the impression that it was unusually sinister in Greece. The description of the settlement after Chaeronea,

'there was to be no confiscation of property, no new division of land, no wholesale emancipation of slaves' (p. 16), suggests that Philip and the Athenians did a deal at the last moment with a view to keeping the lower orders in their place, a view, if view it is, which seems inadequately based on [Demosthenes] xvii. Again, the leisure of the Platonic circle is to be accounted for not only by the 'growing slave population' but by the simplicity of Greek life.

A consequence of examining the root before the flower is that the attention given to the flower may seem rather scanty. More space is given to the Homeric world and the Homeric question than to Homer, the structure of whose epics is cursorily described. But this is probably right. Those who wish to know more of Homer will be in a position to begin reading him. It is not intended to supply a substitute for reading poetry; and one reason why this book is more alive than the ordinary textbook is that it does not contain long lists of the contents of ancient works. Baldry has done well also in excluding the orators; they may indeed have value for connoisseurs of style and as sources for historians, but they are dead for the ordinary reader. A little more might however have been said about the Alexandrians, who share a short chapter with New Comedy.

There are a few points which should be corrected in another edition, and statements which the author might modify on second thoughts. P. 27, the reader who has heard of no prose dialogues but those of Plato might imagine that these were acted. P. 31, the comparison of modern texts with ancient papyri suggests, not that editors have been uniformly successful, but that the serious corruptions took place before the papyri were written. P. 43, it is implied that the Achaeans already burned their dead when they first entered Greece. P. 60, it is undesirable to introduce ballad poetry as a parallel to epic; in the long run the association proves misleading. P. 134, strictly speaking Athens had only three festivals of Dionysus, as the Rural Dionysia were confined to districts outside Athens. P. 145, the statement that the introduction of the first actor was a democratic innovation intended to make the choral rites more intelligible to the populace is so very speculative, compared with the rest of the passage in which it stands, that some indication ought to be given that it is a mere guess. P. 151, Aristotle never mentions the number of performers in a tragic chorus. P. 164, Sophocles was not victorious with 96 plays, as only 18 of his victories were at the Dionysia; the others were presumably at the Lenaea with not more than three plays a time. P. 174, 'Sometimes Euripides denies the gods: more often he accepts them as an evil reality'. He accepts the forces that go under such names as Aphrodite and Dionysus as real, and partly evil, but hardly as gods. And it is at least likely that he accepted some sort of power under the name of *αἰθήρ* as divine and not evil. P. 177, the *Cyclops* is far from being 'without the intrusion of ideas', cf. 316–41, and *El.* 737–46 is incompatible with the suggestion, p. 181, that there would have been a riot in the theatre if Euripides had used the 'sacred chorus' to express his own views. P. 189, the audience which saw the *Peace* had enjoyed immunity from Spartan invasion for several years. P. 256, Xenophon's 'long account of Cyrus the Elder' hardly reveals the *Cyropaedia* as a work of fiction.

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FRAGMENTA HISTORICORUM GRAECORUM

FELIX JACOBY: *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker.* Dritter Teil: Geschichte von Städten und Völkern. B: Autoren über einzelne Städte (Länder). Nr. 297–607. Pp. 8*+779. Leiden: Brill, 1950.

THERE is not much that a reviewer of this part of a great work can do other than express his admiration for Dr. Jacoby's vast learning, tireless industry, and indomitable perseverance and courage. We have had for a long time to rely on C. Müller's *Fragmenta* (and, as Dr. Jacoby reminds us, on Lenz-Siebelis for the Atthidographi), and very reliable they were; but here we have it so much better: all much more clearly arranged—for example, for each author, first the quotations from named and numbered books (as *Φιλόχορος ἐν ᾱ Ἀτθίδος*), together with indications where other fragments belong, then the rest of the quotations in the order of their probable distribution into books—we have much new material, and we have a better text and an apparatus criticus; and, what is very valuable, a longer context for the quotations than Müller gave. The most important group of authors in this volume is that of the Atthidographi, and those whose value is most increased are Clidemus, Androtion (how many of us knew that *perhaps* he wrote a book on horticulture?), Craterus (thanks to *A.T.L.*), and Philochorus (no longer divided between two heavy volumes, as in *F.H.G.*), particularly Philochorus. The *Städte u. Länder* (this latter means groups of cities, as in Sicily, and more or less close federations, as Achaea and Boeotia) are arranged alphabetically, the authors chronologically within each state; we have full cross-references for all who wrote about more than one state: which means, for example, under most states, a heading 'Aristoteles, *τῶν δεῖνα Πολιτεία*', though all *his* fragments are deferred to vol. iv of the whole work. There is a full concordance with *F.H.G.*, and an index of all the authors whose fragments Jacoby has so far published. Besides the named authors we are also given *Sammelzitate*, as from *οἱ τὰ περὶ Ἄργους ἱστοροῦντες*, and other such anonymities, which include much from Pausanias, Strabo, and Diodorus. We have the full text of the *Anagraphe* from Lindos, and the historical inscriptions of Magnesia and Priene; and, as well, some fragments from chronicles in verse (e.g. Eumelos of Corinth) which, I should have thought, have no place here. What more can we do than express our gratitude?

The arrangement of the whole work—the distribution of all the authors—was a difficult task, and perhaps no two scholars would agree in everything; I at least cannot see the use of putting Stesimbrotus in II B (writers of *Spezialgeschichte* within the class of *Zeitgeschichte*) and Ion of Chios here, in III B, even though he wrote a *Χίου κτίσις* of which two of the three fragments seem to be more in the tone of his *ἐπιδημίαι* than of local chronicles (it will be remembered that Jacoby, like Müller, rightly gives all the fragments of one author together, so that most of what we have here of Ion is from the *ἐπιδημίαι*), or Idomeneus, *περὶ τῶν Ἀθήνησι δημαγωγῶν* (which Jacoby cleverly conjectures to have been his title), with the Atthidographi, or, more important, Hellanikos in I and Duris in II A (*Hellenika*), yet Philistus and Timaeus here in III B, instead of in II with Ephorus, Theopompus, and their like. Jacoby himself has to divide his group lxix, Sicily and Magna Graecia, into (A) *Gesamtdarstellungen u. politische Geschichte* (where Philistus and Timaeus come, and Antiochus as well), (B) *Ktiseis, Periegesen, Wunderbücher, u.a.*, and (C) *Einzelne Städte*, which shows where

the distinction should be made; and when he repeats in this volume all the fragments of Hellanicus' *Atthis* (and his *Thessalica*), he is very sensibly collecting all *Atthides* together, which is a great help, but at the same time giving away the case for grouping Hellanicus with Hecataeus. To take less important cases, it is not immediately easy to see why Polemon is not here (he is to be in IV), though Heliodorus is, nor why the references to the *Δηλιακοί* of [Aeschines], Hyperides, Lycurgus, and [Dinarchus] are included; it is in principle doubtful if it is right to print Diodorus v. 2–23 as appendix to Timaeus (as F 164), and 64–80, and a good deal of Strabo, as appendix to *τὰ Κρητικά*, and surely wrong, even as an appendix to Sicily and Magna Graecia in general, to print, in a corpus of fragments of lost historians, Herodotus v. 44–45 and vii. 153–6, 167–70 and Thucydides vi. 1–5 (and iii. 88), because the passages include phrases such as *λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίῃ οἰκημένων*. Where are we to draw the line between what is and what is not to be excerpted from Herodotus? Is the whole of Book ii to be reprinted in III c? We ask similar questions about the verse-writers: references to Tyrtaeus in Aristotle, Plutarch, and Pausanias are included; but nothing of Solon. Aristotle's *Πολιτεῖαι*, as stated, are to be in IV; so are Critias, Dicaearchus, and Proxenus, who wrote *Λακώνων Πολιτεῖαι*, but not Persaeus, Sphaerus, and others who did the same and are here in III B. Yet one must refer to Jacoby's defence of his arrangement in the preface to Part II.

There are a few queries about the text which are worth mentioning, partly on grounds of principle, partly because Jacoby (tireless man!) includes a large number of corrigenda to previous volumes, and may want to do the same in the next. Philochorus, F 121 (from Schol. Ar. *Pac.* 605), crit. n.: we do not need a list of emendations to Aristophanes; and the statement 'der verkürzende Excerptor hat zwei Citate zusammengeschoben: vielleicht', etc., belongs to the commentary which is to come. The emendations of *Πυθοδώρου* and *Σκυθοδώρου* are (rightly) accepted in the text and indicated only by round brackets, (*Θε*) and (*Π*), and the briefest of crit. nn.; this is as it should be, but in F 131 *Ἀλκαίου* is also a correction with no brackets to warn us. F 34 *τρίτῳ ἔτει* is marked with an obelus as corrupt, with Clinton's conjecture *τρίτῳ μηνί* given in the apparatus; but the obelus can be justified only on two assumptions, that the statement in the text is, almost certainly, wrong and that Philochorus must have been accurate; and neither is justified. (Contrast F 123, where †$\overline{\iota\gamma}$ is correct.) In F 46 *ἐν τ Ἀτθίδος* is altered (probably enough) by Jacoby to *ἐν ἕκτῃ Ἀ.*, but with no obelus; in F 64 b *ἑπτά* is left in the text, and the note says simply, 's. Komm.'—which is wise, but does it only mean that the figure is to be defended? In F 69, on the other hand, we have †*Δημοσθένους*, but no crit. n. at all; in F 129 *ν̄ τριήρεις* (without obelus), from an Aristophanes scholion where (according to Jacoby) R has *λ̄ τριήρεις* and V no mention of them. At F 143, another Aristophanes scholion, it is hardly made clear what the manuscript readings are; and, in the explanation given, it is to be noted that *πέμπτῳ ἔτει* ought to be *ἕκτῳ ἔτει* (409–8 to 404–3). In any case, though we have the fragments which come from these scholia, in much better, or at least clearer, texts than in Müller, we must still wait for the work of Mervyn Jones before they can be trusted with confidence. One further matter: we are given a short list of *sigla*: this does not include ( ), and [ ] is said to mean *athetesen*—it does not, alas, when the text is from a papyrus or an inscription.

The printing and get-up of this very long book deserve all praise. The few

misprints of any importance which I noticed may be given: p. 78. 2, ΓΗ for ΓΒ; p. 115. 19(*b*), ἦν for ἦν; p. 116. 13, a stroke to indicate the end of a line of papyrus is missing before *Βούτης* (see crit. n.); p. 238. 4, *τῶν* missing before *νεῶν*; p. 601. 9, 'p. 596 b' should be 'p. 586 b'; p. 603. 7, *τῆς δέ* for *τῆσδε*; p. 607. 16, 'DIOGR' for 'DIODOR.' Two slips by the author: p. 135. 10, no cross-reference to the fragment of Callistratus, and it is not given in either of the two Callistrati of this volume (*ὁ Ἀριστοφάνειος* and Domitius); p. 203. 10, 'the great event which humbled Persia' (Plut. *Cim.* 13. 4) should be given as the battle of Eurymedon, not the campaign in Cyprus of 449–448, even if Jacoby thinks Plutarch wrong—it is clear what Plutarch meant, for he mentions Ephialtes' expedition after it—or at least he should reserve opinion for the commentary.

It is over fifty years since Jacoby first published work on Greek, especially Attic, chronology and antiquities; with much other work to his credit as well he has lived to see his labours nearly completed. Much of it must have seemed to him a rather thankless task; innumerable are the tiresome citations for events or dates of very little significance; they are in all, as he rightly emphasizes, but a small fragment of the whole, and the majority of the citations are quite arbitrary. The Chronicle of Lindos, a chance discovery, revealed to us new names of ancient antiquaries, and many others must be lost for ever. Yet, in spite of all, these fragments do give us an idea of the wide extent and respectable quality of Greek historical learning, miscellaneous, trivial, and pedantic as much of it was: the nature of most of the quotations may be as misleading to a general judgement as those from New Comedy. Jacoby has now given us most of them in their bare texts and contexts; we await his commentary. This he has already written; and it is to appear in two parts, on the Atthidographi, in English, and on the others. Thanks to the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation of New York and to various bodies in Oxford, whom he mentions, Dr. Jacoby has been given the opportunity to carry out this great work (which nobody else could have done) and to get this volume published—by unselfish publishers. It is excellent that Professor Herbert Bloch, now of Harvard, has undertaken to see, if possible, the remaining volumes through the press; but may Dr. Jacoby himself live to see the completion of the whole, as some reward for his unremitting and unrewarding labours.

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PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS

W. D. Ross: *Plato's Theory of Ideas*. Pp. 250. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Cloth, 18*s*. net.

READERS of *C.R.* will not be misled by the unsympathetic tenour of most of this review; they do not need to be told of the solidity of Sir David Ross's learning, or of the effectiveness of his methods in dealing with certain modern exponents of Plato to whose treatment they are appropriate. But it is open to question whether these methods are equally appropriate in dealing with the Platonic texts. It may be that Ross has caught from Aristotle something of the tone and the methods which Aristotle brought to the interpretation of Plato.

Ross's primary assumption is that the chronological order of the dialogues is the key to the development of Plato's thought. That is to say that Plato put all he knew into each dialogue as he wrote it. 'Anyone who is familiar with Plato's writings knows that he is *nothing if not explicit*.' (The italics in all quotations are mine.) But some have surely found that the order of the composition of the dialogues is in some degree an order of exposition rather than of discovery; and are willing to allow for the fact that the exposition was intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. Platonic reserve or economy is no mere fancy: the dramatic situation created by the youthfulness of some of his interlocutors makes it probable, and his views on the inadequacy of words, both written and spoken, explain the absence of any systematic treatise on the Ideas. Ross himself quotes the relevant passages of *Phaedrus* and *Ep.* vii; and departs from his standpoint by finding here and there in the dialogues significant 'hints' of later doctrines and even by 'reading between the lines' (p. 101). Nevertheless his standpoint creates difficulties which could be resolved (like those connected with the Cave and the Line) by recognizing what is '*implicit* in Plato's thought' (p. 71).

By this literal method Ross finds the Ideas to be at first purely immanent. The *Phaedo* on *anamnesis* exhibits for the first time 'a clear belief in the separate existence of Ideas' (p. 25), though (p. 35) were it not for Aristotle's evidence, it would be 'impossible to decide with certainty' that they are 'disembodied' even there. The 'beauty absolute, separate', etc., of *Symp.* (p. 21) is not thought evidential; this is not 'the language of philosophy' and it belongs to Diotima—as if 'Socrates' never soared, and as if Plato must never be credited with the views of his characters. Ross himself takes Socrates (the Burnet–Taylor theories no longer deserving consideration) and, later, Timaeus, etc., as mouthpieces of Plato.

But from *Rep.* onwards Plato stands for 'an extreme separation of the Ideas'; henceforward the language of immanence, which is still used, means merely that copies (and copies only) of the Ideas 'enter into and pass out of' the world of sensibles. (These copies are not the 'mathematicals', as will appear later.) Ross thinks Plato committed to the view that all general (and collective?) terms (except purely negative terms) imply, both logically and metaphysically, a corresponding Idea. If this is right, Cornford's remark that the Ideas would be 'indefinitely more numerous than the vocabulary of any language' (*T. of K.* p. 9) ought not to have been ignored; for it has important implications. On Ideas of artefacts Ross follows Robin's un-Platonic distinction between useful and imitative arts. The *Phaedrus* is said (p. 81) to mark the transition to the study of 'the hierarchy' which the Ideas form; later it is stressed that they do *not* form a hierarchy either in *Phaedrus* or in any later dialogue. The second part of *Parm.*, a 'wilderness of paradox' and of 'fallacies' (p. 95) (cf. Cornford), is thought to be 'an object-lesson in method' (p. 105)—should he not have said '*wrong* method', since so much of it is admittedly a demonstration of how *not* to conduct an argument? In *Phil.* the Forms are not assigned to any of the four classes into which 'phenomenal existence' is analysed; but the distinction between Limit and Unlimited is thought to prepare the way for the analysis of Forms into the One and the Dyad. There is no reference to Hackforth's commentary; hence, for example, Ross still follows Cornford's mistaken interpretation of *συναγωγή*—see *C.R.* lx. 30.

Ross accepts, with some drastic mitigations, the 'later metaphysic' of the

One and the Dyad. The theory is subsequent to 352 B.C. and Aristotle learned of it from Plato's oral teaching (against Cherniss). Did all the Forms become numbers at this stage? Ross now follows Robin: 'only the highest Forms' were numbers; and thinks that he took Aristotle 'too literally' in his edition of the *Metaphysics* (p. 218). The arbitrary procedures by which Taylor, Robin, Stenzel, etc., have tried to 'derive' these ideal numbers receive deservedly forthright treatment. Ross is of the opinion that the Dyad has been wrongly treated as the source of 'doubling'; for it is not two things but one, viz. 'indefinite plurality' (the great-and-small) upon which the One imposes definiteness. The numbers (but why only up to 10 in that case?) are thus the successive definite degrees of 'manyness'.

What then of the Forms which are not numbers? Do the One and the Dyad suffice to constitute the Forms of, for example, animal and fire? Ross's 'theory not unworthy of Plato' is that the doctrine refers only to the numerical aspect of such Forms; Plato classified them as monadic, dyadic, triadic, etc. This seems tantamount to abandoning the view (apparently attested by Aristotle) that the One and the Dyad were the sole constituent elements of the Forms. It should be added that for Ross none of the later developments involved any reduction in the number of Forms (against H. Jackson, etc.). He goes farther and denies that the 'later metaphysic' involved any 'fundamental change of view' (p. 242). But surely it would be a very sweeping change if the formerly *simple* ideas became metaphysical *composites*, each to be resolved into a system of at least two elements: the One and the Dyad (plus other 'aspects').

To return to the 'earlier' theory: Ross adopts a thoroughly Aristotelian attitude towards 'universals': the Idea must be, not 'a thing', but 'a characteristic of things'; otherwise the 'Third Man' would be fatal to the theory (p. 88). This attitude, however justifiable in itself, leads to some forcible translations of Platonic doctrine into Aristotelian terms. Plato, according to Ross, teaches that the Ideas are 'abstracted' from sensibles, that we get to know them by 'an effort of abstraction' (p. 220). But 'abstraction' is not the right term for those processes of recollection and illumination described by Plato. Cornford on *anamnesis* (*T. of K.*, p. 5) is right: 'we cannot extract' the Ideas 'from any sense-impressions'. Again, the 'higher' the Ideas the more 'abstract' they are for Ross, but for Plato the richer and the more comprehensive. It is not surprising that Ross finds the Form of Good so 'difficult', since he insists on treating it as a logical universal ('goodness'). He is certain that it cannot be identified with God; and, if it were a mere universal, he would of course be right. But it is a transcendent objective reality, the source of the being of the other Forms (which themselves transcend the phenomenal world), and therefore very unlike a mere abstraction.

Having given what seems to me an essentially conceptualist version of the relationship of the subordinate Forms to the Form of Good, Ross misunderstands the 'independence' of these lower Forms. I find their 'independence' clearly compatible in Plato with the fact that they derive their reality from the Form of Good. Their 'independence', therefore, does not mean that they are self-derived (existing *a se*), but that they are not affected in any way by sensible particulars. There is thus no force in Ross's argument that *Rep.* 597 d presents an 'impossible' relationship between God and the Ideas. If they can be generated by the Form of Good without prejudice to their 'independence', they can equally well be 'made' by God. His further argument, that since

εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο in 597 c 1 cannot, in his view, be seriously meant, the *whole passage* should be disregarded, does little justice either to logic or to the dramatic flow of the discussion—in particular to the repetition of the same verb (βουλόμενος) at d 1. A more sympathetic interpretation of the offending words is possible: (*a*) of the three *kinds* of beds (b 14) God 'chose' to create only one, the μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει; (*b*) this meant 'choosing' to create only one bed since there cannot be more than one 'natural' (ideal) bed. A similar verbal type of argument is used by Ross for establishing the 'movement from immanence to transcendence'. The terms which seem to him to imply the former (e.g. 'participation') and those which seem to imply the latter (e.g. 'imitation') are collected and contrasted. But he seems prepared to admit that the distinction is scarcely 'clear-cut'. For the value of the argument see further Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato*, etc., pp. 474 ff.

The most puzzling feature of the book is the treatment of the 'mathematicals'. 'Not explicitly brought out' in any dialogue (p. 61), not located in the Line in *Rep.* (p. 63) (which nevertheless led Plato 'in due course', p. 68, to the formulation of the theory), playing no part in the cosmology of *Tim.* (where such 'intermediates' as may be detected are 'sensible and generated', whereas the 'mathematicals' are eternal, pp. 61, 176, 224), or in the 'later' cosmology based on the One and the Dyad (p. 223), ignored in *Ep.* vii (p. 141), they do not receive explicit formulation till 'very near the end of Plato's life' (p. 62), when they formed an integral part of Plato's '*final* classification of the contents of the universe' (p. 68). But why do they play no part in *Tim.* or in the 'later' metaphysic? The answer is not what one would expect—that he had not explicitly thought of them yet, but that they 'disappear from view' (p. 223), for 'it seems highly probable that he had come to regard them as fictions . . . having no place in reality', and 'it is possible that even when he wrote the *Republic* he had come to think this' (p. 224). It is a strange fate for those 'eternal and unchangeable' entities of the 'later Metaphysics' (p. 176), especially as their function is to help to save Plato from making 'at any stage of his development' 'a complete bifurcation of the Universe into Ideas and sensible things' (p. 25). Though they fill so important a gap in Plato's universe they are mere fictions which begin to 'disappear from view' while they are still (in *Rep.*) lurking 'below the surface'. How then did Aristotle come to report them as part of Plato's 'later theory'? It looks as if Cherniss may be right after all.

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STUDIES IN PLATO'S *LAWS*

GERHARD MÜLLER: *Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi.* (Zetemata, Heft 3.) Pp. 194. Munich: Beck, 1951. Paper, DM. 15.

THIS work was originally presented as a *Habilitationsschrift* to the Faculty of Philosophy in Kiel at the end of 1946. It comprises three investigations, each leading to essentially the same conclusion. The author had published in 1934 a Königsberg dissertation, *Der Aufbau der Bücher II und VII von Platons Gesetzen*, in which he had argued for a unitary educational theory in those two books. Further study of the *Laws* as a whole has led him to very different results.

Taking as a starting-point Wilamowitz's description of the *Laws* as a *wunderliches Chaos*, Müller finds that this chaos extends deeply into the whole fabric of thought throughout the work. It is in fact so fundamental that it cannot be explained by supposing that the work was left unfinished at Plato's death, or that it was hastily written and published without revision, or that it has suffered from disturbances caused by an editor.

The first study is concerned with the treatment of moral and metaphysical concepts. Here the significant fact is said to be not so much departures from what Plato said in earlier dialogues, but rather the lack of any unified system of thought underlying what is found in the *Laws* itself. This leads to a comparison with the *Epinomis*. Müller accepts the contentions of Fr. Müller, *Stilistische Untersuchungen der Epinomis*, 1928, and others, that the *Epinomis* is completely different both in style and content from the main body of the Platonic writings. But he would find exactly the same features in the *Laws*. Consequently there is no reason to suppose that the two works are by different authors. The second study is devoted to a detailed consideration of the style of the *Laws* and *Epinomis*—the style is found to be indistinguishable, but a deep gulf separates these works from any other work of Plato. The third study is concerned with the political ideal of the *Laws* compared with that of the *Republic* and *Politicus*. Not only is there found to be a world of difference between the *Laws* and the earlier dialogues, but even where the same doctrines reappear, they seem not to have been properly understood by the author of the *Laws*.

This leads to the final conclusion of the present studies, which is a complete *aporia*. All the evidence seems to show that the *Laws* and *Epinomis* are not works of Plato, and this was indeed once maintained by Zeller. But Müller recognizes that Aristotle's testimony as to the *Laws* is inescapable, and he concludes that we must simply stand at an impasse—none of the traditional explanations of the special characteristics of the *Laws* can be accepted, and no new explanation is put forward.

A proper appraisal of Müller's contentions would involve a re-analysis of considerable parts of the argument in the *Laws*. It is clear that this is needed, but it cannot be attempted here. However, there are many features in Müller's work which must provoke doubts. First, the contrast between the positions maintained in the *Laws* and in the rest of Plato's work, considerable as it clearly is, does not seem to go as deep as Müller would maintain. So, in the case of the *Republic*, Müller holds that Plato never meant the Ideal State to have any practical application—it belonged to the world of Ideas only. In arguing this contention he does not hesitate to claim that *Republic* 540 d–541 b is an interpolation, and is prepared to argue likewise for 389 b–d, 402 a–c, 464 c–466 d, parts of the discussion of Dialectic in 531 d–535 a, and the Seventh Letter. Secondly, Müller admits at the beginning of his first study that the *Laws* is not concerned with the theory of virtue but rather with its importance in the framing and conduct of political life. If this is the case, it is perhaps not surprising that when we seek we cannot find any fully co-ordinated theory of virtue in the *Laws*. Müller seems satisfied that Plato even in old age must at least have had a scheme in his mind, even if it was not his purpose at the moment to give expression to it. But might not the deliberate adoption of an empirical approach have involved also the deliberate laying aside of anything which metaphysics might contribute to the solution of the problems in hand? Thirdly, great importance is attached to the fact that when some of the major Platonic doctrines do occur

in the *Laws* the references are vague and apparently a little muddled. But the vagueness can be explained by a difference of approach, and if there is muddle —a matter about which it is very difficult to be certain—even a certain rustiness in metaphysics due to old age would be easier to accept than the impasse to which Müller would lead us.

What does seem to emerge very clearly is the need for much further detailed and analytic work on the structure and sequence of thought in the *Laws*, and the present studies will have justified themselves if they call forth such work in due course. In the meantime one may perhaps be forgiven for suspecting that, as so often elsewhere in Plato, what appears to be chaos in thought is, in part at least, undetected order.

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THE BUDÉ PLATO

PLATON: Tome XI (I^re^ et 2^e^ parties): *Les Lois* (livres 1–6). Texte établi et traduit par ÉDOUARD DES PLACES; introduction de AUGUSTE DIÈS et LOUIS GERNET. 2 vols. Pp. ccxxi+(double) 70; (double) 154. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1951. Paper.

THE Budé edition of the Platonic corpus is nearly complete. One volume only, xii, which will presumably contain the last six books of the *Laws* and the *Epinomis*, remains to be published. We have had to wait a considerable time for this latest addition to the series—Vol. ix, Part 2, the *Philebus* edited by A. Diès, appeared in 1941—but it does not disappoint our expectations, for in it the high standard of its predecessors is well maintained.

The present volume is in two parts, Part 1 containing an Introduction on the grand scale together with the text and translation of Books i and ii, and Part 2 comprising Books iii–vi. Three distinguished scholars, Messrs. A. Diès, L. Gernet, and E. des Places, have co-operated in its production: M. Diès contributes a general introduction to the whole dialogue; M. Gernet writes on the distinctively legal aspects; M. des Places is responsible for the text and translation. It will be convenient to say a few words about each of these contributions in turn.

M. Diès is well qualified to do justice to a work which E. B. England in a fine phrase has called a 'treasury of pregnant truths'. Long familiarity with the dialogues has given him an enviable insight into the deepest springs of Platonism, and he writes with grace and authority. If one misses something of the fire and intensity of *Autour de Platon*, that is doubtless because the commentary is on the *Laws*, not the *Phaedo* or the *Republic*. Of Plato in the *Laws* one might say, as Longinus said of Homer in the *Odyssey*, that he is like the setting sun *οὗ δίχα τῆς σφοδρότητος παραμένει τὸ μέγεθος*.

Space forbids more than the briefest mention of some of the salient points in Diès's introduction. Though he accepts the tradition that Philip of Opus 'edited' the *Laws*, it is clear that he looks upon the dialogue as a unified and systematic work which comes to us substantially as it left the pen of Plato. Books i–iii he regards as a general introduction to the main theme. His treatment of detailed historical matters in Book iii is especially interesting and

acute. Of Book x, probably the most important philosophically, he writes at considerable length, analysing its doctrine of Soul as the source of movement, and explaining the relation between Soul and Intellect. His general theme is the solidarity of the *Laws*, *at its own level*, with the more metaphysical dialogues. He refuses to see in the non-mention of the Ideas a tacit rejection of them as the ultimate realities.

The second part of the Introduction, by L. Gernet, is entitled *Les Lois et le droit positif*. In this very thorough résumé, Gernet, by drawing together Plato's scattered remarks, has succeeded in presenting a succinct and systematic account of Platonic jurisprudence. At every turn he points an instructive contrast between Plato's laws and the laws of Greece in general and Athens in particular. It has long been realized that the *Laws* is one of the most important sources for Athenian legal history. Now, thanks to the work of Gernet, it is possible to trace the full extent of Plato's obligations to the laws of his native city. We can see how familiar Plato was with the details of Attic law, and how much thought he had given to its modification and improvement. The eminently practical turn of his thought becomes abundantly clear. As Gernet well says (p. cc): 'Lorsque Platon déborde le droit de sa patrie, c'est plutôt en réformateur qu'en utopiste.'

To M. des Places we owe both the text and the translation, and the text as here established is probably the most significant feature of the work. The recension marks a considerable advance on that of Burnet. Des Places has personally collated all the leading manuscripts both of the *Laws* and also of Stobaeus and Eusebius. He has distinguished three separate hands at work in the correction of *codex Parisinus graecus* 1807 (A). Burnet's A^2 he differentiates into A^1 and A^2, and of A^3, which Burnet called *manus saeculi xii* (*ut videtur*), he is able to say *manus saec. X in.* (= *Arethae*, *ut vid.*). In addition, thanks to the work of L. A. Post and des Places himself, much more information is now available about the important manuscript *Vaticanus graecus* 1 (O), which 'disappeared' for a considerable time because of an alteration of its catalogue number in the Vatican Library. In the *Sigla* in vol. v of the Oxford Plato O appears as '*cod. Vaticanus* 796(?)'. Burnet supposed O to be comparatively late, but it is now certain that it dates from the late ninth or early tenth century and that for the first five books of the *Laws* it is of independent value. It is only from 746 b 8, where the ink changes, that O is copied from A. Since apart from A and its two copies all the manuscripts of the *Laws*, *Epinomis*, and *Letters* derive from O, its importance is obvious, and des Places cites its readings very fully. The affiliations of A and O, together with the difficult questions of the corrections and marginalia in these two manuscripts, are discussed in great detail in des Places's comparatively brief introduction to the text. In particular the extent of the editorial activity of Arethas is clearly stated. While owing much to previous workers in this field, a debt which he is careful to acknowledge, des Places is able to throw new light on a number of obscure points thanks to his thorough and painstaking collations.

The text is on the whole a conservative one, but I have noticed six places in the six books where des Places has ventured on a conjecture of his own. Worthy of special mention is his *ὑπ' εὐηθείας* in 630 d 9, where both A and O read *ὑπέρ γε θείας*. This suggestion is certainly neater and better than Burnet's *ὑπέρ γε ἀληθείας* quoted with approval by Taylor in his translation.

Des Places has worked as a translator of the Anthology and this probably

explains his knack of turning a neat and felicitous phrase. His rendering is close and accurate and yet seems to avoid that occasional roughness which has been remarked in some of the earlier volumes of the series. But of course it is with considerable diffidence that one ventures a stylistic judgement of this sort on a language other than one's own. Not infrequently the Greek is so crabbed and tortuous that a paraphrase or expansion is called for, and then des Places does not hesitate to give a good free translation of the sense as it appears to him. On most pages the translation is supplemented by short footnotes. It is perhaps worth remarking that in the note on the important passage at 716 a des Places appears more ready to see a reference to Orphic literature than is Diès in his Introduction (p. xxxviii).

In the hope and belief that a second edition will be called for, I append a list of misprints that I have noticed. All are in the Introduction, and most of them are of a trivial nature, i.e. those on p. xi, l. 5, p. xx, n. 3, l. 2, p. lxxx, para. 3, ll. 4–5, p. xcvi, n. 1, l. 3, p. ccvi, para. 2, l. 9, p. ccxii, para. 4, l. 9. The reference on p. xcv, para. 2, l. 11 should be 632 c and on p. ccxiii, l. 6 the first O^3 should be A^3. A cross-reference has been omitted on p. cxcii, n. 3.

But these are small matters. The work as a whole is one of sound and solid scholarship and makes a notable contribution towards the understanding of Plato's *Laws*.

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THE *POETICS* DISSECTED

DANIEL DE MONTMOLLIN: *La Poétique d'Aristotle. Texte primitif et additions ultérieures*. Pp. 374. Neuchâtel: Messeiller, 1951. Paper.

VARIOUS commentators, from Hermann onwards, have in their various degrees detected signs of revision in the *Poetics*. Even Bywater acknowledged the presence of 'afterthoughts'. More recently (*C.Q.* xxix, 1935, pp. 192 ff.) F. Solmsen sought to apply to this work the analytical method which W. Jaeger has made familiar. De Montmollin owes much to this article. He begins, however, by finding a series of short additions, ranging (unlike those assumed by Solmsen) from a few words to a few lines. At the cost of some grammatical or logical disturbance (the usual clue to their detection) these 'marginal notes' were, he thinks, incorporated in the text after Aristotle's death. Thus at 48^a28–$^b2$ the 'abnormal' separation of ποιούμενοι from its noun shows that Bywater's parenthesis is one of two later additions, the other running from οὗτοι to ἄστεως. Various places appear to indicate an alternation between a two-fold and a three-fold division of human character. The distinction between 'good' and 'bad' is pronounced original, and ὁ μεταξύ is a late intruder. Thus 48^a4–6 contains a 'marginal note' which 'contradicts' the τούτοις μόνοις of $^a3$. The complication that the intermediate character should be 'better rather than worse' (52^a17) is merely an attempt to take the edge off the 'contradiction'. I am not persuaded that the 'contradiction' is real; it is obvious enough that the 'intermediate' character will have 'intermediate' fortunes. The removal of ἢ ἕτερον—μεταβάλλοντα at 48^a21–23 is also unconvincing, since Homer is not always impersonating others. The 'additions' in the early chapters are

found to indicate the increasing interest of Aristotle in empirical fact: hence the remark intervening clumsily between οἷς and its antecedent ψόγους (48^{b}27–30), and the mention of the innovations of Aeschylus and Sophocles (49^{a}15–18). There is a late and 'useless' interruption on comedy at 49^{a}32–37. But it is argued that such insertions disprove the existence of a second book dealing with comedy, etc.; for why were they made if a fuller treatment were given elsewhere? 'Characterless' tragedies are an afterthought at 50^{a}23–24, which 'contradicts' 7–8, 13–14, on ἦθος as a necessary element in tragedy; the 'addition' of οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν in 50^{a}12 (which 'contradicts' 13–15) is a half-hearted attempt to smooth over the difficulty caused by the new argument. This is as if one were to object to 'episodic' (51^{b}33) on the ground that every tragedy contains episodes. Aristotle, unlike his dissectors, is not a slave to his vocabulary.

Why were such contradictions not completely ironed out? The answer offered is that this work was not intended either for the public or for Aristotle's students; it consists of his 'personal notes' for a 'course of lectures'. Why then find a difficulty in the use of ἁπλοῦς (51^{b}33) before its explanation? Lecture-notes do not necessarily advance in a straight line. Nor are they usually so explicit as most of the *Poetics*, which lapses into the 'inorganic' style only in the last chapter. If, as de Montmollin believes, the work was to be 'supplemented orally', the argument from verbal cruces loses most of its force. That the 'first' version was marked by 'great logical rigour', and that Aristotle cared less for consistency as he grew older, are only unproved hypotheses after all.

The longer additions are deduced from the 'plan' of the work, as set out especially in the definition of tragedy. When the definition was given, some of its contents had not yet been explicated; and some never were taken up at all. But on the strength of it de Montmollin regards as later additions c. 12 (except the 'spurious' last sentence), c. 13 (except the 'original' first sentence), and cc. 16, 17, and 18. Unlike the short 'notes' these 'additions' did not come from the margin; how they were preserved and embodied in the text de Montmollin does not conjecture, beyond assuming that there was an 'arranger'—'lazy' and 'unintelligent' as the awkwardness of his sutures indicates—who did his work within the nine centuries subsequent to Aristotle's death. We are mercifully not asked to believe in more than two strata, both composed by Aristotle himself after Plato's death, the first before, the second after, his return to Athens in 335. In other words, de Montmollin refrains, though tempted, from detecting marginal notes inside the longer additions.

One important passage—55^{b}32–56^{a}3—has been made the starting-point for very different conclusions by M. K. Lienhard, *Zur Entstehung und Geschichte von Aristoteles' Poetik*, 1950. De Montmollin (rightly, I believe) regards the fourth εἶδος of tragedy as ἡ ἁπλῆ. But what then of the four μέρη? He is right again (I think) in taking them as the six 'qualitative parts', minus ὄψις and μελοποιία which are 'not essential'. The words τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη thus record mere 'numerical equality', and do not assert a 'relation of cause and effect'. So p. 149; I give the reference because it has been strangely omitted in various places, even in the notes to the text of the *Poetics* which is printed as an appendix.

In spite of the kind of criticism to which this book is open it is nevertheless a most useful and promising work. The author is compelled by his thesis to attempt the disentangling of the sequence of thought in most of the really

difficult passages; and in this task he shows himself no mere Gelehrter but a man of sound and vigorous judgement. His arguments for the early date of the περὶ ποιητῶν, for the existence of a lost πραγματεῖα (or students' handbook) περὶ ποιητικῆς (referred to in *Rhet.* and *Pol.*), and, in particular, against Rostagni's exaggerated picture of a polemic against Plato and overestimate of the influence of the *Poetics* on the *Ars Poetica* of Horace are all excellently conducted.

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CHION OF HERACLEA

INGEMAR DÜRING: *Chion of Heraclea, A Novel in Letters.* Edited with Introduction and Commentary. Pp. 123. Gothenburg: Wettergren & Kerber, 1951. Paper, Kr. 15.

THESE letters form a continuous story telling how Chion, a young nobleman from Heraclea, went to study philosophy under Plato at Athens and, inspired by his master's teaching, returned home to meet his death in freeing his city from the tyranny of Clearchus. It is usual to dismiss these letters as rhetorical exercises of little literary or artistic merit. Dr. Düring makes a good case for estimating them rather more highly. The story is, as he says, well told and the letters are blended together into a coherent whole with considerable skill. As regards their authorship he argues convincingly, mainly on linguistic grounds, that they could not possibly have been written by the historical Chion and must be dated later than the beginning of the Christian era. His attempts to establish a *terminus ante quem* are less convincing, and the confidence with which he assigns them to the second half of the first century A.D. is hardly justified by his evidence.

Düring has evidently studied the manuscripts with great care and thoroughness and has himself collated thirty-three. He divides them into five groups, the chief representative of each being Vaticanus 1461, Vaticanus 1309, Vaticanus 1353, Vaticanus 1354, and Mutinensis 54. There is a full and well-reasoned discussion of the merits and characteristics of each group and an attempt to date individual manuscripts. He concludes that the group represented by Vaticanus 1309 is unquestionably superior to the rest and bases his own text almost entirely on this manuscript supported by another of the same group, Laurentianus 57.12. Variants from other groups are given in the apparatus. He wisely rejects nearly all Hercher's numerous emendations. Hercher seems to emend merely to make his text conform with Attic usage, which the writer of these letters had obviously mastered imperfectly. Düring introduces seven conjectures of his own, for most of which he makes a good case.

By far the least satisfactory part of this edition is the translation. In the first place it is unnecessarily free, especially as it is presumably meant to supplement the commentary. Why, for instance, translate ἤδη μέντοι . . . βουλοίμην ἄν σε ἀποστέλλειν in 6 'as I told you, I expected you to send'? Why translate ὁμοίας ἀρχάς in 7. 1 'various professions', when the meaning 'similar' has particular point (i.e. it implies vulgar occupations like that of ταμίας)? Why translate προαναγομένῳ in 7. 2 'who will bring it to you', when its proper meaning (i.e. 'who is sailing before him') adds substantially to the sense?

Significant words and sometimes whole phrases in the Greek are completely disregarded. There are numerous mistakes, including some really bad blunders. The following are only a selection: 4. 2 *ὡς δὲ τριάκοντά που σταδίους ἀπ' αὐτῆς προεκόψαμεν* means 'when we had progressed about four miles from Selymbria', not 'when we had come within about four miles of Selymbria'; 7. 2 *εἰ δὴ τοῦτο μόνον ἑαυτῷ προσήκειν λελόγισται* means 'if he thinks this is the only profession which suits him', not 'for that is the only profession that is generally considered to suit him', and *πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ φανταζόμενον μετεωρίζεται* means 'he is buoyed up by the fancy of the moment', not 'he is always buoyed up by false hopes'; 9 *φαύλως ἔχειν περὶ τὴν φιλίαν* means 'be indifferent as regards friendship', not 'have a low opinion of friendship'; 10 *τοῖς χαριεστάτοις Ἀθήνησιν* means 'to the most accomplished men at Athens', not 'to noble Athenians'; 14. 5 *ἀρχήν* means 'at all', not 'first'; 16. 4 *τὴν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν φιλίαν* means 'regard for myself', not 'bonds of friendship'; 16. 6 *θνητῆς* means 'mortal', not 'godlike' (this slip has unfortunate results on the rest of the sentence); 16. 8 *ἀπολειφθείην* means 'fall short of', not 'be deprived of'. It is difficult to reconcile the inaccuracy of the translation with the scholarship and sound judgement shown elsewhere in the book.

The commentary is primarily critical and linguistic. The vocabulary and syntax of the letters are well illustrated by examples from classical and later Greek or noted as peculiarities of the author. Objection could be made to some statements. On *Ep.* 1 it is stated that if *μή* were taken with *λυπούμενοι* the sense would be 'by ceasing to grieve'. *μή* surely must go with *λυπούμενοι*, but the sense is 'if you are not grieving'. On *Ep.* 8 it is said that *κέρδος* is used here and in *Ep.* 10 'in a somewhat faded sense, not recorded in the dictionaries'. In both letters it has the ordinary meaning of 'gain' (not 'good deed' or 'good turn' as it is rendered in the translation). Reminiscences of Plato are pointed out which support the contention of the Introduction that the anonymous author derived most of his philosophical ideas from a superficial reading of Plato.

The book ends with a well-arranged list giving examples of the writer's linguistic characteristics, and indexes of Greek words and proper names. It is a curiously uneven work, but the good outweighs the bad.

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AN UMBRIAN EZRA POUND?

GIULIANO BONAZZI: *Propertius Resartus*. Elegiarum libri a diuturna interpolatione redempti. Pp. xx+369. Rome: Bretschneider, 1951. Paper.

IN 1939 Bonazzi published an edition of Propertius based on Codex Palatino-Vaticanus 910, which E. A. Barber reviewed in *C.R.* liv. 29–30. He has now withdrawn it in favour of the work under review, but the new version is just as deplorable.

Bonazzi accepts the story that Pontanus found, about 1440, a faded manuscript of Propertius of great antiquity. He has discovered a descendant—to wit, Pal. Vat. 910 (R), which he believes a trustworthy guide, and on which he reconstitutes the text.

So be it: the editor still has a double duty—to reproduce the text which he considers Pontanus' codex to have had, and to show that it is superior to the vulgate. Bonazzi has fulfilled neither part. His text is not based on R; it is the vulgate, tricked out with many of R's readings (frequently the worst), with a few corruptions from F, and with over 400 corrections and conjectures of his own. Nor does he prove that R is worthy of attention; his critical apparatus shows it to be what it is known to be—a conflated manuscript showing little not already known from NAFDVL, and nothing that cannot be recovered by emendation. It omits words, lines, and passages, imports new corruptions, and never preserves a corrupt reading in its earliest stage. That he may keep himself in ignorance of its nature, Bonazzi compares it only with six minor manuscripts, apart from N and F.

To Bonazzi its corruptions are fundamental; he considers what Tyrrell termed 'sescenta illa menda plane leuidensia quae libris omnibus inolescunt' as of the highest critical significance, and admires the integrity of a scribe who could confuse *c, t, r*; *i, l, m, n, u*; *ss–x*; *limen–lumen*; *crimen–carmen*; and so forth. He delights in altering *in* to *ut* (e.g. *restat et ut meritas*, ii. 25. 18) or to *ab* (*gaudeat ab puero*, ii. 4. 18), *domus* to *dolus* (*excultum quid sit abire dolum*, i. 5. 20), or *primus* to *priuus* (*hoc erat ut priuo*, ii. 24. 17). R's omissions show him that the scribe knew better than to copy corruptions; into these gaps Bonazzi pours his conjectures—an example is *demonstrant astra fragores* (iii. 16. 15)—but not consistently, for he often fills them from other manuscripts, not always disclosing the source.

His corrections and selection of readings are governed by a new system of accidence, syntax, metre, and language. He offers *respondĕre* (iii. 19. 9), *lacis* (iii. 23. 14), *conitis* (iii. 2. 15 al.), *deprensitus* (i. 3. 11); *neu* with indicative (ii. 28. 36), *ni* with infinitive (iii. 14. 20), *si* with imperative (ii. 32. 61); *ex* governs an infinitive (*e uiolasse*, i. 7. 16) or an adverb (*ex nunc*, ii. 21. 7); the passive voice is active (*praelata est*, ii. 1. 55); a verb preceding a plural subject may be singular ('quid releuat uariis serica textilibus?' i. 14. 22). He writes *paruā . . . exsequiā* (ii. 13. 24), *nae tŭ quid . . .*? (iii. 7. 17), *non egĕt nec . . .* (ii. 4. 11); *uōluit* (F) (ii. 6. 30), *rŭret* (ii. 34. 78), *mŏtus* (iii. 19. 4), *ŏbīcĕrĕ* (iv. 1. 71), and *sŏlitas* (= *solitudo*, i. 20. 48). *Insula* (iv. 9. 9) and *pondus* (ii. 29. 1) are adjectives; *heroas* (iii. 11. 27) is feminine; *ternis . . . Coronis* (ii. 34. 59) means 'the three Graces'; *alterius . . . recentis* 'an inexperienced rival', (i. 10. 17), and ii. 23. 15 appears as 'quoi saepe ab mundo sacra conteritur uia sicco'—'in quest for whom the Sacred Way is often trodden by a well-dressed sober man'.

He quarries words from the glossaries, or coins them. Such are *denimio* (ii. 18. 21), *gramias* (i. 16. 13), *scytalinis . . . carminibus* (i. 1. 24: 'charms written on Laconian cypher-rolls'), *scantiniam* (= 'incestabo', ii. 20. 12), *hostitio* (i. 3. 28), *lama* (for *Bactra*, iii. 11. 26), *magma* (for *magnes*, iv. 5. 9), *iniuita* (perfect active participle, ii. 34. 93), and the interjection *eh*.

The whole text is of this kind; I find a few good points only. His *pepla* at ii. 28. 11 is reasonable, but cannot match Alton's *planta*; *Tmolus ab* at i. 14. 6 recognizes a difficulty, but he could not know that *Caucasus* is right; *tabesceret* at ii. 18. 5 is attractive, and may be right.

The translation might have been worth publishing separately; the rest is the merest word-salad. Bonazzi has clearly fared no better in our time than did Gebhard in his generation.

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THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE *TRISTIA*

THEODORUS JACOBUS DE JONGE: Publii Ovidii Nasonis *Tristium liber IV* commentario exegetico instructus. Pp. 226. Groningen: de Waal, 1951. Paper, $2.50.

IF for no other reason, the fourth book of Ovid's *Tristia* is of particular interest for the full autobiography (or should we, from the opening words, say self-obituary?) of the poet in iv. 10. Every other book of the *Tristia* has been separately edited, and as regards annotation this doctoral thesis well fills the gap. The latinity is correct and clear, though one tires of the too frequent *adstipulor*; at p. 40, l. 27 *quod* should be *quae*, on p. 65 *Ovidius* should be *-ium*.

There is a bibliography and a brief index, but no apparatus criticus; and the preface and introduction, apart from references to other scholars, are confined to a few remarks on metre and verbal innovation and to an eleven-page discussion on the causes of Ovid's banishment. The short account of metre and prosody on p. 3 is the weakest part of the book: §1 should mention iv. 10. 2; §§ 2, 3 refer to what is common Ovidian usage and cannot be called 'memorabilia'; § 4, or the notes, should mention *erŏ* 10. 130, unique in Ovid; § 6 can refer only to 2. 54, if we disregard elision before *est*; § 7 is not true of Book iv; the scansion of *dissoluantur* 8. 18 might be noted. On Ovid's *relegatio* de Jonge concludes (*a*) that the *error*, not the *carmen*, was the principal reason, (*b*) that this consisted of some implication in the doings of the younger Iulia. Of the quotations on p. 6, *Pont.* ii. 9. 73 is badly punctuated, while in *Tr.* ii. 542 the best readings are *praeterii* and *inrequietus*.

The text is mainly based on Owen's Oxford text, changes from which are noted. At 3. 84 *lata*, Owen's reading, has poor manuscript support compared with *magna*, which de Jonge does not mention. At 6. 13 he reads *removentis* (*K*, Goldbacher), but it is doubtful if *terras removere* can mean 'turn the soil over'. Other changes are 1. 103 *ita*, 3. 74 *vadit*, 4. 4. *nervis* (rightly), 4. 64 *pascitur*, 4. 79 *sermonum*, 5. 29 *te* (misprint in Owen and Loeb), 6. 38 *quam*, 7. 12 *anguineis*, 9. 10 *istuc*, 10. 26 *scribere* (*dicere* has better manuscript support than de Jonge accords it).

The notes occupy 183 pages, and give numerous *loci similes* quoted in full; wrong references are notably absent. 1. 9 *lentos*, 3. 41 *per te*, and other passages seem correctly explained against earlier interpretations. Cross-reference would be easier if 'Elegia I', etc., were repeated on each page. Sometimes, as on 3. 1–2, the quantity of quotation seems excessive; if the edition is not for the learner, we need not (p. 46) be told all about Orpheus and Eurydice; if it is, then the order of words in 10. 10 should be elucidated, and at 10. 63–64 it should be explained that the first quotation refers to the *Metamorphoses*.

1. 15–16: oblique cases of *Achilles* occur elsewhere than in the sixth foot: cf. *Met.* xiii. 107; *Pont.* i. 3. 74, iii. 3. 43; Prop. iv. 11. 40; Hor. *Sat.* ii. 3. 193; Stat. *Ach.* i. 474. 1. 25 '*aequa* (sc. *est*)': hardly with the punctuation adopted. 1. 34: this *-que* is a metrical device used only in the second half of the pentameter (*Fast.* ii. 258 simply avoids *adque*). 1. 42 *exululata*: akin to, not derived from, ἐξολολύζω; the participle could be passive (neut. pl.), if we allow Ovid *stupeo* with acc. 1. 66: *vidi AGHPV*, plurimi codd. dett. 2 introd. (p. 74): a note on what we know of Tiberius' German campaign would be desirable. 2. 29: *in humo* is a rarity (Kühner, II. i. 485). 2. 35: *illo . . . ministro* abl. abs.

rather than abl. of agent without *ab*. 2. 53: the passages quoted hardly support the reading *canente*. 3. 20: although in *Her*. x. 75 *si modo vivit* is not literal, the same need not apply here; cf. *Tr*. v. 7. 3. 3. 34 *fores*: a note on the subjunctive would be in place. 3. 53–54: examples of *se iactare* with abl. would be more appropriate than examples with dat. 3. 68: *ambitiosa* in *Fast*. v. 298 is surely 'passive'. 4 introd.: the correct form is probably M. Valerius Messalla Messallinus. 5. 13: cannot *titulus* be a superscription to the poem? 5. 14 *raram . . . fidem*: cf. Hor. *Od*. i. 35. 21. 7. 1: the note here says 'nostra elegia scripta est initio anni 11 p. Chr.', whereas that on 7. 2 implies A.D. 10. 7. 24 '*rara* h.l. idem valet atque *non*': hardly. 9. 22 *Hesperiae*: why not 'meae, quae hominis est Itali' (Delph.)? 10. 13: the note on Quinquatrus is helpful, but might have mentioned the Q. Minusculae; see also Bailey on *Fast*. iii. 809–48. 10. 41: *illīŭs* (before vowel) occurs once in Ovid, *Met*. vi. 323. 10. 77–78: no note on *lustrum* here; on 10. 95–96 it should be added that in *Fast*. iii. 165 *lustrum* denotes a period of four years. 10. 96 *eques*: the *O.C.D*. should be quoted, if at all, s.v. 'Horse and Chariot Races', and Gardiner rather in his *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals*. There is little use in giving the modern reader references such as (p. 101) *Festschr. d. Königl. Gymnas. zu Schneeberg* [1891].

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SUETONIUS' *LIFE OF AUGUSTUS*

MARIO ATTILIO LEVI: C. Suetoni Tranquilli *Divus Augustus*. Testo, introduzione, note e appendice. Pp. lxiv+200. 'La Nuova Italia', Florence. 1951. Paper, *L*. 1600.

THIS volume is intended to serve a mainly historical purpose, supplementing the author's *Il Tempo di Augusto* published at the same time. It contains (1) an introductory essay; (2) the text and the commentary (printed as footnotes); (3) appendixes, including an essay on the composition of the *Res Gestae*, the Latin text of the *Res Gestae*, genealogical trees, two maps, a chronological table, and a full index.

The introduction, largely a reprint from *Rivista di Filologia*, 1937, begins with the reasonable plea that we are mainly dependent on Suetonius for a picture of the real personality of Augustus. The rest is a discussion of the biography as an historical source. Levi goes through it pointing out where Suetonius' version differs from others, and elucidating what he feels to be the attitude of the author or his sources, in the successive divisions of the work, to the character and acts of Augustus. He concludes that Suetonius was not an erudite collector of facts, but the purposeful creator of a type of historical work new to Roman literature, the psychological and moral biography in the Hellenistic tradition. He probably used no original documents, but relied on existing works of an annalistic character, in which the preliminary labour of research had already been done. He seems to have used two such sources, distinguishable by their attitude to Augustus: one, frankly hostile, supplied the material for cc. 9–16, dealing with the period 44–36 B.C.; the other, more favourable to Augustus but independent of the laudatory official tradition, underlies the rest. The former writer may have been Cremutius Cordus: the latter is harder to identify.

Levi's discussion seems scholarly and well informed. But, though he may well be right in asserting that Suetonius used this type of source, I do not feel this marked distinction of tone between cc. 9–16 and the rest. Indeed, Levi contradicts his own commentary, which on 10. 3 and 4 remarks that the source used at this point is not hostile to Octavian, but independent of the official version; while on 27. 3 he comments on the hostility of the source 'of all this part'. Further, it is absurd on the one hand to contend (p. lv) that Suetonius' aim was to produce a psychological and moral unity, and on the other to suppose him at the mercy of his sources, judging Augustus differently according to the author he is following. In fact, what appears to Levi a change of tone is simply the change in Octavian's situation: the party-leader struggling for mastery was more exposed to criticism than the securely seated Princeps, and this criticism naturally found its way into the pages of Suetonius. Admittedly Levi puts the change of source before, not after, the civil war with Antonius; admittedly c. 17 includes some favourable remarks and puts the blame on Antonius (§ 1): but this contradicts nothing in cc. 9–16; Antonius is never there praised, though his criticisms of Octavian are cited. Incidentally, Levi's view that the source of cc. 9–16 was favourable to Antonius ill suits his identification of the writer with the convinced Republican Cremutius Cordus.

The text is Ihm's, with minor alterations—we are not told where. Indeed, there is no apparatus criticus at all. The commentary contains much useful information: it would have been gratifying to add that it is methodical and accurate. Levi acknowledges the assistance of three scholars in the correction of mistakes, but an astonishing number eluded their united vigilance. Up to c. 37, at which point the reviewer judged that he might be excused further labour, there are at least twenty wrong references to ancient writers, twice as many errors of fact, and a still larger number of omissions and faults of method generally. Worse than this, not a few of the mistakes (e.g. on 3. 1 f., 10. 2, 12 (*bis*), 13. 2, 17. 2) can be traced to Shuckburgh, whom Levi does not claim to have used. It would be tedious to multiply examples of error: let it suffice to refer to 26. 1–3 (the consulships of Augustus), 27. 5 (his tribunician and censorial powers), and 35. 1 (his *lectiones senatus*)—the commentary on which passages furnishes a sufficient number. Whatever virtues this commentary may possess (and more could certainly be said, by way of praise as well as blame), it is vitiated by this gross unreliability.

The essay on the *Res Gestae* seems also to have been reprinted from *Rivista di Filologia* (1947), though in this case without acknowledgement. In it Levi shows that a simple division of the contents into *res gestae*, *honores*, and *impensae* cannot be upheld. These subjects seem indeed to be queerly intermingled. Unity is supplied by the predominating theme: the exceptional character of everything connected with Augustus—his achievements, honours, largesses, the benefits he conferred on mankind, and the divine favour exerted on his behalf. Here Levi has made a valid point: but I am still far from perceiving the rhythm (p. 135) or pattern (p. 146) which he claims the contents exhibit; and do not feel that the unity of the theme altogether explains their order.

The Latin text of the *Res Gestae* is E. Malcovati's. Levi does not reproduce her thicker type for the Antiochene fragments: it would therefore have been better if, like Ehrenberg and Jones, he had enclosed in square brackets only what is missing from both surviving Latin copies.

I refrain from commenting on the maps, tables, and index, since enough has been said to show that this is a disappointing and not very useful production.

University of Edinburgh T. J. CADOUX

THE *DE REBUS BELLICIS*

E. A. THOMPSON: *A Roman Reformer and Inventor*, being a new text of the Treatise *De Rebus Bellicis* with a Translation and Introduction. Pp. xii+132; 13 plates. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. Cloth, 15*s*. net.

THE lost codex Spirensis, in which the *Notitia Dignitatum* was preserved until the Renaissance, included among its minor items a short text entitled *De Rebus Bellicis*. The anonymous author makes a number of suggestions for the reform of the Roman Empire, and in particular for the reorganization and re-equipment of the army. Under this last head he describes certain inventions of his own, ranging from a new type of ballista and two varieties of scythed chariot to a paddle-boat driven by oxen. Illustrations of these machines were appended by the author to the text, and their descendants are found in several of the extant manuscripts. Leonardo da Vinci, it seems, was familiar with the text and its illustrations, and some of his designs recently on exhibition in London may have been inspired by them.

Professor Thompson has given us a critical text of the *De Rebus Bellicis*, a translation, reproductions of the illustrations in the Oxford manuscript (Cod. Canon. lat. misc. 378), and 89 pages of introduction, in which he not only deals with the history of the text and provides a more accurate description of the manuscripts than will be found elsewhere, but gives a detailed and penetrating historical commentary on many passages. Miss Barbara Flower has compiled an 'Index Vocabulorum et Locutionum Notabiliorum' which is welcome, as many of the locutions of this strange writer are notable in the extreme.

For the first time we have a text of the *De Rebus Bellicis* resting on firm foundations. As late as 1908 Schneider contented himself with reprinting Gelenius' text of 1552. Reinach for his 1922 text collated only one manuscript, and that somewhat carelessly. In comparison with Reinach's text that of Thompson is conservative: the only conjectures of his own which he prints—apart from mere orthographica—are in 15. 1 *inducto* and 19. 1 *ducem*, together with P. Maas's *recte* in *praef.* 4.

The *De Rebus Bellicis* has provoked the most various reactions from its readers. Seeck called it 'die Denkschrift eines verrückten Projectenmachers', while Piganiol speaks of it as 'plus lourd de réflexions audacieuses et sages, de promesses de progrès, de confiance dans la pensée, plus plein d'avenir que toute la législation d'un Valentinien, pour qui l'empire n'est qu'une immense prison'.

Today scholars of the late Roman Empire are agreed that it is an important source for the social and economic history of the time. It is therefore not surprising that while Professor Thompson was writing his book in Nottingham Professor S. Mazzarino was busy in Catania on his *Aspetti Sociali del Quarto Secolo*, the kernel of which is a study of the *De Rebus Bellicis*. Unfortunately

space does not permit the reviewer to compare the two books in any detail. On the whole, Mazzarino has a surer touch in economic matters. For instance, he is more to the point than Thompson in his discussion of 2. 1 'Constantini temporibus profusa largitio aurum pro aere, quod antea magni pretii habebatur, vilibus commerciis assignavit', with its allusion to the new régime of gold prices superseding Diocletian's price system; and he understands better the play of differential tariffs of *adaeratio* underlying the *iudicum pravitas* of ch. 4. Thompson, on the other hand, in his sections on 'Scientific Enquiry in the Late Empire' and 'The Inventions' (pp. 44–68), guides the reader through territory virtually unexplored by Mazzarino or by anyone else. And his analysis of the position in society whose view the author reflects is sharper than that of Mazzarino, who tends to see taxpayers and officials as two homogeneous and opposed classes.

Thompson accepts Seeck's dating of the work in 366–75, while Mazzarino argues at great length for a date at the end of the reign of Constantius II. Perhaps an additional argument for Seeck's date is furnished by 2. 3, where the emperor is told that *afflicta paupertas*, after running through the gamut of crime, lends its support to 'tyrannos, quos ad gloriam virtutis tuae produxit magis quam succendit audacia'. Thompson (pp. 33–34) casts about unsuccessfully for a usurper whom these words would fit, for he sees that they cannot be mere generalities. Surely they apply admirably to Procopius—or to Procopius and Marcellus. They were supported by 'cuppediarum vilium mercatores' (Amm. Marcell. xxvi. 7. 1), by 'ex vulgari faece nonnulli, desperatione consiliisque ductantibus caecis' (ibid. 7. 4), by 'pauci, quos vilitas et desperatio trudebat in scelus' (ibid. 10. 3), and by slaves (Zosimus iv. 5. 5): they are compared by Themistius with Crixus and Spartacus (*Or.* 7. 86 c), while their propaganda proclaimed *χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, γῆς ἀναδασμούς* (ibid. 91 c).

Be that as it may, Professor Thompson has done a most useful service in publishing a sound text of the *De Rebus Bellicis* and a stimulating discussion of its problems, which are all in one way or another aspects of a bigger problem—perhaps the biggest with which students of the ancient world have to deal—that of the collapse of the Greco-Roman world. It will easily be understood, therefore, that the last word has not been said on the *De Rebus Bellicis*.

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LATIN DIMINUTIVES

REINO HAKAMIES: *Étude sur l'origine et l'évolution du diminutif latin et sa survie dans les langues romanes* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae ser. B, tom. 71. 1.) Pp. 148. Helsinki: Finish Academy of Science, 1951. Paper, 400 Mk.

DR. HAKAMIES's study is presented, at least by implication, as a *travail d'ensemble*, covering the whole range of the Latin diminutive in *-(cu)lo/ā-* including both form and meaning. The work is clearly too short to do full justice to so extensive a theme, but it contains many shrewd observations and judgements. The problem of origin is treated in a short introduction, where the author rightly stresses the fact that Indo-European had apparently no suffix specialized for the

formation of diminutives, and that the Latin diminutive suffixes, like those of other I.-E. languages, denoted primitively relation and resemblance, of which the diminutive sense is a secondary and special development. He is thus led to see the original use of the suffix in many words which have usually been thought to be semantically weakened diminutives. It is noteworthy that most of these pseudo-diminutives denote instruments; attention could well have been drawn to a similar association of instrumental and diminutive meanings in some suffixes of other languages—e.g. Fr. *-et(te)*. Similarly rejecting the explanation of diminutive adjectives as the result of attraction to or contamination with an accompanying diminutive substantive, he derives them from the same notion of relation, approximate likeness (especially marked in words like *albulus*) from which the diminutive sense has arisen as an attenuation of the meaning of the primitive. As parallels more apt than his Romance examples he could have quoted the English adjectives in *-ish* such as *reddish*, *biggish*. Again he finds some survivals of the primitive use of the suffix, among them *uetulus*, 'non pas un diminutif, mais un dénominatif, dérivé du substantif **wetos* "an"'. As a parallel for the semantic development he quotes from Meyer-Lübke the O.Portuguese *annelho* 'old' from *anniculus*. The Portuguese dictionaries that the reviewer has been able to consult unanimously ignore this meaning, giving only 'a year old (of animals)'. *uetulus* is very probably no diminutive in origin, but is not therefore bound to be a derivative from **wetos*, since it may well be a formation in *-lo/ā-* from an adjectival **wetu-*, parallel to that in *-so/ā-* attested by Slav. *vetъchъ*.

The sections dealing with the expressive and affective aspects of the diminutive are neither long enough nor sufficiently illustrated with citations for a subject so interesting in itself and so important for the history of the form. Hakamies does not clearly bring out that often the use of diminutives is due not to the speaker's (writer's) attitude to the objects denoted by them, but to his feeling for the whole situation, including especially the person addressed. These aspects of the diminutive make it as proper an object of stylistic as of linguistic study. Though his concern is with the latter, Hakamies has some interesting points to make about the former, e.g. on Cicero's use of diminutive adjectives and his fondness for forms in *-tiuncula*, from which it is shown that the presence in a text of diminutives is not always a sign of colloquial or popular language. He puts forward the interesting suggestion that the expressive-affective element in the meaning of the diminutive even went so far as to make the form unsuitable for the mere expression of smallness, except in emotionally neutral styles such as those of technology or philosophy. But the weakness of his Chapter III is that it hesitates between linguistic and stylistic and is too short to make a substantial contribution to either.

Considerably the greater part of the book is devoted to showing that, contrary to the usual belief, the history of later Latin and Romance presents no general tendency for diminutives to supplant the words from which they derive. The fondness for diminutives manifested by some later Latin authors is to be attributed to a stylistic affectation, not to a settled trend in the development of the language. For Romance the evidence consists of the diminutives appearing in Meyer–Lübke, which Hakamies has usefully rearranged in semantic groups. He could have gleaned a few more specimens from Latin and Romance loanwords in other languages: Welsh, for example, attests (among others) **disculus*, **cauella*, **stabellum*, forms not elsewhere found (though Souter has *stabellarius*).

However, even without such additional material, he can present figures to show that in most cases where the diminutive survives in Romance the primitive also survives, and that even where the diminutive alone survives, it does so for reasons which have nothing to do with any general tendency to supplant the primitive. Here one or two observations, not explicitly made by the author, emerge from his material. For example, *cerebrum* is replaced in Romance by its diminutive *cerebellum*. Now, as Hakamies, following the *Thesaurus*, points out, the latter had become specialized as a culinary term. One may then venture further to suggest that its supplanting of *cerebrum* belongs semantically with the substitution of *ficatum* for *iecur*.

It is a pity that Hakamies did not write a longer study while he was about it, in which his views, interesting and plausible as they are, might have appeared to better advantage against a richer background of detailed illustration and comment.

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ATHENIAN LAW OF PROPERTY

JOHN V. A. FINE: *HOROI.* Studies in Mortgage, Real Security, and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens. (Hesperia, Supplement IX.) Pp. x+216; 7 plates. American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951. Paper, $7.50.

THIS is a work of great importance and value to Greek legal studies, progress in which has been one of the major achievements of classical scholarship in this century: it is deplorable that the number of scholars in Great Britain now interested in these matters barely attains even the most exiguous plurality. There is here no room for a detailed review, but with due apologies to the author (and to those with whom he differs) it may at once be said quite summarily that, in general, in the controversies and perplexities that beset most of his pages I find myself on his side.

Chapters I and II contain a corpus of about 192 horos mortgage stones from Attica and about 22 from Aegean islands: 35 (all but 2 from the Athenian agora) are recent discoveries, here edited for the first time. Chapter III discusses the use and physical characteristics of these mortgage stones, and the mysterious lack of any belonging to the fifth and sixth centuries B.C.—a problem taken up again in chapter VIII.

In chapter IV (p. 61) begins the examination of some Attic legal institutions about which accepted ideas have recently been challenged by U. E. Paoli; and the rest of the book is largely concerned with controverting his theories. According to the traditional view, Athenian law recognized three forms of real security—*ἐνέχυρον*, *ὑποθήκη*, and *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει*. In the first, on the formation of the contract the creditor at once got possession of the object tendered as security. In the second, the debtor retained possession until payment fell due, when, upon default, the creditor could appropriate the security. In the third, the title of ownership passed at once to the creditor, subject to the debtor's (rather ill-defined) right to redeem, but possession would pass or rest according to the terms of each contract. Of these three the second has long been the most subject to controversy. At the outset we are reminded that apart from contracts

of marine insurance the Attic Orators never use the word *ὑποθήκη*. 'This does not mean, of course, that the hypothec' of land 'did not exist in fourth-century Athens, but . . . it is certainly hazardous to claim without question as a hypothec every contract referred to by the verbs *ὑποτιθέναι* and *ὑποκεῖσθαι*' (p. 62). With this salutary caution the author proceeds to scrutinize, and reject, the evidence on which Paoli maintains that real security, if given, must be in the creditor's possession and subject to a perpetual right of redemption. The investigation constantly emphasizes 'how difficult it often is to classify with certainty the contracts referred to in the sources. This difficulty is caused in part by a lack of precision in the legal language of the Athenians, but the evolutionary nature of the system of real security and the consequent divergences from the norm are also contributory factors. These considerations suggest the danger inherent in establishing too schematic a definition of the Athenian system of real security' (p. 90). This acutely diagnoses a defect not uncommon in some modern work on Greek law, especially by jurists native to the Civil Law: English Law has its own warnings for the over-schematic Procrustes.

Chapter V analyses *μίσθωσις οἴκου*, a contract by which guardians often saved themselves the trouble of administering an orphan's estate. Against Paoli's theory that this was applicable only to a patrimony wholly or mainly consisting of movables the author cites, *inter alia*, Isae. 11. 34, where more than half was in land. The lessee gave *ἀποτίμημα*, security in land up to the value of his holding of the orphan's property. Here again the author deals (in my view, successfully) with Paoli's evidence on the point of possession. Then follows, in chapter VI, a similar treatment of *ἀποτίμημα προικός*, usually given at the betrothal by the bridegroom to secure restitution of the dowry when legally required, e.g. on divorce. In chapter VII, on the redemptive contract somewhat resembling English legal mortgage (before 1926), the author examines the recent theory of I. A. Meletopoulos that it did not pass the title to the creditor thereby secured. Here, as elsewhere, the argument is too technical and complicated to summarize: but I think the author vindicates the usual interpretation of the formula *πεπραμένου ἐπὶ λύσει* as signifying conveyance of ownership.

In chapter VIII the author argues that the reason why we have found no mortgage horoi of the fifth or sixth century B.C. is that neither law nor (even if the legality be conceded) practice permitted the sale of land in Attica until the Peloponnesian War, and the plague had effected a revolution in the Athenian way of life. Since he allows that mortgage was known at the time of Pherekrates' *Ἰπνός*, I waste no words on his theory that *ὑπώβολον* in the fragment cited (p. 175) means 'worth about an obol'. The importance of economic no less than political and legal history in the period *c.* 411–403 B.C. is rightly stressed: but on the point of law the author's argument is no less unsatisfying than most of the theories he here adopts or disputes. I agree that Solon's testamentary law—which was not confined to land—did nothing to introduce power to sell land: but I hold that, as often (I am tempted to say, regularly) elsewhere, land in Attica was much earlier alienable *inter vivos* than by testamentary devise (a form which Scots Law, for example, made applicable to land only after A.D. 1868). Among other difficulties, I find it hard to believe that, if the case had been otherwise in Solon's day or later, Aristotle could have failed to know and mention it in discrediting the slanders he relates and takes

pains to deny in *Ath. Pol.* 6. 2 f., or that such a change in law, if made under or after Solon, could have passed unnoted in all our sources. Nor can I accept the author's treatment of Solon's ὅροι and other inconvenient evidence which, be it said, is very fully and fairly stated. The chapter, however, is admittedly speculative and does not, in my opinion, materially affect the main business or the distinguished merit of this book.

P. B. R. FORBES

THE ROMAN MAGISTRATES

T. R. S. Broughton: *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic.* Volume I: 509 B.C.–100 B.C. (Philological Monographs, XV.) Pp. xix+578. New York: American Philological Association (to be ordered through Blackwell, Oxford). 1951. Cloth.

This is the first of two volumes designed to do 'in our time . . . something of what Atticus accomplished for the major magistrates of Rome in his *Liber Annalis* in the age of Cicero' (p. viii). Under each year are listed the Consuls, Dictator, Master of Horse, and Censors, followed by Praetors, Aediles, *iudex quaestionis*, Tribunes of the Plebs, Quaestors, Promagistrates, Military Tribunes, and Legati (these divided into ambassadors, envoys, and lieutenants); and finally Prefects, Special Commissioners, and *triumviri capitales*. Volume i goes down to 100 B.C., the period 218–201 B.C. being the work of Miss Marcia Patterson, a pupil of Professor Broughton. Volume ii is to carry the list down to 31 B.C., and will contain a full index. A final judgement on the work will depend in part on the fullness and accuracy of this.

The need for a reference book of this kind has long been apparent. For any work on the historical tradition of the early republic the lists of magistrates are the foundation; and one's view of the tradition must depend largely on one's conclusions about the credibility of these lists. Moreover, since the pioneer work of Münzer, students of the middle and late republic have increasingly directed their attention to prosopographical study as an instrument of political history. Schur's work on Scipio, Syme's analysis of the role of the dynastic families in the making of the Roman revolution of the first century, and more recently Scullard's study of Roman politics in the Polybian era all utilize prosopography to illuminate the coalitions and feuds of the noble houses, the rise and fall of rival *gentes*, and the importance of the possession of priesthoods and magistracies in an oligarchic society. For anyone engaging in work of this kind it is a great help to be able to see at a glance for any particular year the evidence of the Capitoline *Fasti*, the triumph lists, the municipal *Fasti*, and the literary tradition of Livy, Diodorus, and the chronographers. For this we have hitherto had to rely on the separate collections listed in Broughton's introduction. Since 1937, it is true, these collections have been supplemented by the *Elogia*, and since 1947 by the *Fasti* of Degrassi's magnificent edition in the *Inscriptiones Italiae*;[1] and Degrassi's compilation was from many points of view a prerequisite for the present volume. Broughton's object is very different from Degrassi's, however; he offers at once much less and much more, and it is as a

[1] For a useful assessment of this work see L. R. Taylor, *C.P.* xlv, 1950, pp. 84–95.

book of reference and a tool of scholarship that this manual is primarily to be judged.

Its merits can best be illustrated by a sketch of the system on which it is arranged. The editor has sought the greatest clarity and simplicity in his references, and clearly he has given long thought to achieving this. Each name is recorded in the fullest reasonably well-attested form: additional titles, e.g. *cognomina*, are added in brackets. A number following the name refers to the appropriate article in *R.E.* (or, with an asterisk, to the early Pauly). Where a person has reached the higher offices, the dates of his consulships and praetorships are appended; 'Pat.' indicates a patrician (a useful piece of information for the early republic, and often for the later period too). Spelling is regularized, since this is a work for historians, not for students of early Latin (but why Publicola on p. 2 and Poplicola on p. 5?). At the end of each year notes in smaller type deal with controversial matters, doubtful identifications, false attributions, variants in the sources or manuscripts, together with a sparing reference to recent literature, and occasionally the editor's own views.

Chronology presented a special problem. The Varronian system has been adopted, including the anarchy of 375–371 B.C. (as given by Livy and, apparently, the Capitoline *Fasti*), and the four 'Dictator years' (333, 324, 309, and 301 B.C.), which appear in the Capitoline *Fasti*, but not in our other sources (though Livy takes them into account in his chronological calculations). That the resultant chronology is an artificial attempt to reconcile the *Fasti* with some outside date is generally agreed; and clearly Varro and Atticus must have adopted some similar device, though we cannot say with certainty what this was. Certainly it can by no means be assumed that Varro's chronology was exactly identical with that of the Capitoline *Fasti*; indeed in one respect we know it was not, for the years A.U.C. given in the margin of the *Fasti* are one year below those of Varro (e.g. 463 B.C. = 291 A.U.C. Varro = 290 A.U.C. *Fast. Cap.*), and this discrepancy was due to the reduction of the period of the kings in the *Fasti* from 244 to 243 years. Therefore what Broughton gives is really the Capitoline list adapted to Varro's dates. Over forty years ago De Sanctis sanctioned such a compromise with the pronouncement that 'nell' incertezza è meglio adottare le date dei fasti capitolini che abbandonare la cronologia all' arbitrio individuale degli studiosi'; and this conservative practice is undoubtedly right and proper in a book of reference. One cannot but note, however, an element of inconsistency in a procedure which accepts Professor Lily Ross Taylor's dictum that Livy's 'history and not the gleaming marble of these inscribed stones (*sc.* the Capitoline *Fasti*) is the "shining monument" of republican annals' (*C.P.* xl, 1946, p. 11), yet gives the title of 'The Magistrates of the Roman Republic' to what, if the same scholar is to be believed, may well be the fruit of the antiquarian knowledge and propagandist skill exercised by M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus about the year 18/17 B.C. In these matters caution and conservatism mean accepting what is increasingly coming to look like the official legend of the Augustan revolution.[1]

The editor has done his work extremely well. Wherever the reviewer has tested his lists they have proved accurate and reliable. Nor does their least merit lie in the sensible comments contained in the notes, which bring to bear

[1] See in particular L. R. Taylor and T. R. S. Broughton, *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, xix, 1949, pp. 3–14, on Augustan adjustments in the setting out of the consuls, so as to favour or detract from the repute of certain *gentes*.

upon special problems a judgement strengthened by long study of the lists as a whole. In his introduction Broughton looks forward to an eventual *Prosopographia liberae rei publicae*, to match *P.I.R.* This present work shows that Bryn Mawr College would be the proper centre from which to organize such a vast and fruitful undertaking.

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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE

SANTO MAZZARINO: *Aspetti Sociali del Quarto Secolo*. Ricerche di Storia tardo-Romana. Pp. 440. Rome: l'Erma di Bretschneider, 1951. Paper, *L.* 4000.

THIS is an interesting and important book, which ranges over many of the major social and economic problems of the later Roman Empire—the currency, population, slavery, military recruitment, tax collection, and in particular the oscillation between a monetary economy and transactions in kind. The author's approach is fresh and original, and he makes many shrewd observations both on the wider issues and on points of specific detail. If in what follows the reviewer seems to concentrate on points on which he disagrees, it is because he thinks Professor Mazzarino's views are important and deserve thorough scrutiny.

The discussion hangs on two fundamental texts, the *Anonymus de Rebus Bellicis* and the *Historia Augusta*. The former he dates earlier than did Seeck, on the ground that it is addressed to a senior emperor (of two or more), who has recently suppressed two or more usurpers. Constantius II, after the defeat of Magnentius and Decentius, while he had Gallus and Julian as his successive Caesars, will alone, he claims, answer these requirements. But, if *tyranni* be allowed to be a rhetorical plural, will not Valentinian after the defeat of Firmus also fill the bill? For the *Historia Augusta* he postulates a first edition of perhaps Constantinian date and a final redaction about 400. His arguments here are less convincing, but the precise date does not greatly affect his general theme.

He has a rather exaggerated respect for the *Anonymus*, to whom he attributes a perspicacious grasp of contemporary problems which that worthy man has certainly not succeeded in expressing in intelligible Latin. He suggests, for instance, that he has at any rate an inkling of the quantity theory of money; but surely when he writes 'cum aeris ipsius . . . enormis iam et gravis erogatio videretur, nihilominus tamen a caecitate quadam, ex auro, quod pretiosius habetur, profusior erogandi diligentia fuit', he is merely expressing the simple-minded view that as gold is dearer than copper, expenditure in gold coin is greater than that in copper. Again he argues that the *Anonymus* advocated a short-service army in order to check the drain on agricultural man-power caused by calling up peasants for twenty years. The *Anonymus* quite clearly states that his motive is financial, to save the State the high rates of pay (or rather *annonae*) earned by senior soldiers, and he does not suggest that soldiers after five years' service should return to their old farms, but that when they

reached such seniority as to earn 5 *annonae* (which would take longer than five years) they should be allotted lands on frontiers. The effect of his proposals would have been to build up the peasant population of the frontiers, but at the same time to drain the provinces which supplied recruits even more rapidly of their agricultural man-power—not that he seems to have considered that problem at all.

The currency, the author rightly emphasizes, was still, under Diocletian, based on the *denarius*, in which troops and officials were paid. He cites the Edict on Prices and the case of Eumenius, who as *magister memoriae* still received 300,000 *nummi*; one may add that the same conditions prevailed in the last decade of Constantine's reign, when a *praepositus* received a *stipendium* of 36,000 *denarii* (*P.Oxy.* 1047). Unfortunately he adopts Dr. Mattingly's suggestion that the price of gold in the Edict (50,000 *denarii* per lb.) should be read as 10,000, and argues on this basis that 300,000 *nummi* (= 75,000 *denarii*) was worth $7\frac{1}{2}$ lb. gold—quite a good salary, if modest compared with its second-century value of $66\frac{2}{3}$ lb. gold. The stone has been re-examined, and the figure is indubitably 50,000. The fact that χρυσὸς ἐνηγμένος is priced at 12,000 per lb. remains a difficulty, and it may be that one or other figure (we cannot tell which) is an engraver's error, though more probably χρυσὸς ἐνηγμένος is a trade term for a low alloy of gold as opposed to pure gold 'in bar or coin'. Be that as it may, the real value of Eumenius' salary is to be reckoned not by its equivalent in gold, but by its purchasing power, and to judge by the price of wheat the debased *denarius communis* of Diocletian would buy about a two-hundredth part of what a second-century *denarius* would command. Salaries appear to have remained at the same nominal figure as before the inflation, and as they sank in real value had to be supplemented with payments in kind—*annona*, *capitus*, and *vestis*. The subsequent history of the *denarius* is obscure, but the reviewer sees no reason to think that the headlong inflation depicted by the papyri did not prevail throughout the Empire. Gold prices, on the other hand, seem to have remained steady from the middle of the fourth century, when the *solidus* had come into full circulation. Symmachus' statement (*Rel.* 29) 'auri enormitate crescente' refers to the price of *solidi* in *denarii*, and is therefore evidence of the continued inflation of the *denarius*, and not, as the author supposes, of a general fall in gold prices or a deflation of gold.

On military conscription the author gives an illuminating analysis of the system as revealed by the documents. Here the reviewer would make one minor correction only: the *capitularius* who provided the recruit in *Cod. Theod.* VII. xiii. 7, did not also make money payment to the treasury. In a *capitulum* consisting of five persons, A, B, C, D, and E, assessed at 7, 12, 5, 8, and 4 units respectively, A, when it was his turn to furnish a recruit, would collect 12, 5, 8, and 4 *solidi* from B, C, D, and E. He would thus lose the recruit, valued at 30 *solidi*, and 6 *solidi* for his uniform and expenses, and recover 29 *solidi* from his colleagues, thus paying net 7 *solidi*, his proper share. On the *limitanei* the author clearly demonstrates the important point that in the fourth century at any rate these were not, as is commonly supposed, a kind of peasant Home Guard, but full-time regulars who received *annonae* and were allotted lands only on discharge like the *comitatenses*; it may be added that even the *fundi limitotrophi* of Theod. *Nov.* v. 2 (439) seem to be not lands cultivated by *limitanei*, but estates charged with supplying the *limitanei* with rations and services (cf. Theod. *Nov.* v. 3 and *Cod. Iust.* XI. lx. 1).

On the population of Rome the author ingeniously deduces from *Cod. Theod.* XIV. iv. 10 that the number of persons entitled to pork rations was 120,000 in 419. From Val. *Nov.* 36 (452) he wrongly deduces a figure of over 140,000, forgetting the *duae decumae* which the *suarii* took for their expenses; if this be reckoned as 20 per cent. of the meat allocated for rations, the number of persons who received the ration works out at 120,600. From *Cod. Theod.* XIV. iv. 4 he extracts the number 317,333 for A.D. 367, but his interpretation of that law (the text of which is in the reviewer's opinion corrupt) is highly disputable.

Professor Mazzarino subjects Mickwitz's thesis, that the taxpayers preferred *adaeratio* and the recipients payment in kind, to a searching analysis and demonstrates that it greatly oversimplifies the issue. If they could so fix the price as to make the transaction profitable, soldiers and officials preferred *adaeratio*; on the other hand, taxpayers disliked delivery in kind when this involved expensive transport charges or when the goods required were scarce. He traces fluctuations in government policy, which oscillated between fixing low prices for *adaeratio* and insisting on receipt in kind. With *adaeratio* he closely links *coemptio*, which he demonstrates was practised earlier than is generally supposed. He exaggerates its importance, however, even interpreting 'exuberare capitationis calculum ad commeatuum necessariorum adparatus' (Amm. Marc. XVII. iii. 4) as meaning that the taxes (converted into cash) were ample for the purchase (taking *adparatus* to be synonymous with *comparatio*) of the supplies needed.

In so original a book, covering so wide a range of important and controversial topics, it is easy to pick small holes. The reviewer would therefore wish to emphasize in conclusion that he profited enormously by reading the book and recommends it heartily to all students of the period.

Jesus College, Cambridge A. H. M. JONES

SHORT REVIEWS

D. L. PAGE: *A New Chapter in the History of Greek Tragedy*. Pp. 46. Cambridge: University Press, 1951. Paper, 2*s*. net.

FRAGMENTS of a previously unknown Greek tragedy dealing with the story of Gyges, to which reference was made in *C.R.* lxiv (1950), p. 81, offered Professor Page an admirable theme for his Inaugural Lecture as Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. Those who, like the reviewer, heard the lecture will have awaited with great interest its publication with the documentation which was properly excluded when it was delivered. Others whose appetite was whetted by the text and admittedly tentative remarks published by Mr. Lobel will welcome Professor Page's masterly appreciation of the literary and dramatic quality of the fragments and survey of the problems which they raise.

Professor Page, like Mr. Lobel, believes that the fragments belong to a play which was pre-Sophoclean; but (since two actors would have been needed) not pre-Aeschylean, if the introduction of the second actor is rightly ascribed to Aeschylus. He bases his belief partly on the versification, partly on the style, and partly on the relation which he sees between the apparent dramatic setting and the story of Gyges as told by Herodotus. These points had already been noticed by Mr. Lobel. Professor Page now shows that the differences between the play and Herodotus, to which Mr. Lobel calls attention, are really unimportant, and in any case no more than it would be reasonable to expect if a prose writer set out to relate in a few paragraphs a story which had been told in enough

detail to fill a whole tragedy. Much more significant than the differences is the similarity; for Herodotus and the tragic fragments imply the same version of the Gyges story—a version which is, however, irreconcilable with the version ascribed to the historian Xanthus at the end of the fifth century, or with the version of Plato.

Professor Page also removes the misgivings which were at first felt by the reviewer about admitting the possibility of the use of such a theme by an early tragic poet. Actually, as he points out, both extant plays and the titles of many plays now lost indicate that early Attic drama was preoccupied with the non-Hellenic world, and it is not difficult to conceive of a trilogy concerned with the rise and fall of the Lydian dynasty. The first play of such a trilogy would naturally deal with the usurpation of power by Gyges, the second and third with the inevitable consequences of this 'original sin'. To postulate an unrecorded trilogy to account for a few lines preserved on a papyrus roll of the late second or early third century A.D. may seem to be rash. It is indeed strange that a trilogy written in the first half of the fifth century B.C., and surviving at least until the end of the second century A.D., one play of which dealt with the well-known story of Gyges and Candaules in a form which was also used by Herodotus, should pass entirely without mention in antiquity (for the relevance of the passage in Achilles Tatius to which Mr. Lobel refers is, to say the least of it, dubious). But the fact remains that a tragedy on this subject was written, and Professor Page is fully justified in saying that an attempt to place it late would raise more difficulties than it would solve. Professor Page does not pretend to have done more than suggest lines of approach, but he makes no assertion that can be refuted, and in the absence of fresh evidence it is difficult to see what further progress can be made.

R. M. Rattenbury

Trinity College, Cambridge

F. Kinchin Smith: *The Trojan Women of Euripides*. A new dramatic translation. Pp. xii+50; London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1951. Paper, 3*s*. 6*d*. net (cloth, 5*s*. net).

The translator states that he has 'sought the nearest equivalent in straightforward English to the original'. This may be largely true, but very considerable liberties of omission have been taken, and it would have been well to explain the principles followed more fully. For instance at 135 the number of Priam's children, apt to raise a smile from a modern audience, is left out; so is the colourless couplet of the Chorus-Leader at 406–7, and the characteristic concluding generalization at 1165–6. But anyone who has tried to translate Euripides knows how his sense and his clauses can straggle in such a way that it is scarcely possible to put them into natural, speakable English, and Mr. Kinchin Smith has put his self-allowed licence to good use in writing short and manageable sentences. Sometimes the Greek is a little heightened: 'he loves her more because she is—god's child', 255; sometimes it is rewritten or misconstrued: 'and before that you knew me', 237, and the light of the torch is attributed to Hecate, i.e. the moon, at 323. 'Some who died had never seen their children', 377, is sense, but hardly the right sense. But what matters most is that the rendering is easily intelligible and reasonably dignified.

It is remarkable that illustrations should be included in a work published at this price, but an engraving of the Rieti statuette is ill calculated to give a true impression of the appearance of a Euripidean actor, especially as the projections beneath the feet intended to fit sockets in the pedestal look like the bottom half of gigantic buskins.

D. W. Lucas

King's College, Cambridge

Hérodote: *Histoires*, Livre VII. Texte établi et traduit par P. E. Legrand. (Collection Budé.) Pp. 12+235 (double). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1951. Paper.

In the complex unity of the last three books of Herodotus, the limits of which artificially interrupt the coherence and dramatic subdivisions of 'Xerxès contre la Grèce', Legrand's detailed expository *Notices* become even more valuable. The translation is careful and sound, scrupulous in avoiding (as advocated in the introductory volume of 1932) both archaic grandeur and undue modernization. An occasional loss of emphasis therefrom may perhaps be overlooked. The editor's contributions to the text include the printing of a lacuna after *πρυτανήιον* in 197. 14, with the bold suggestion that the words *ὡς θύεται . . . ἐξαχθείς* should be inserted earlier after *θύσεσθαι μέλλῃ* (l. 10). In 139. 24 *τοῦτο* ⟨*ἑλόμενοι*⟩ is not unattractive. But in 180. 5 *εἶναι* (*καί codd.*) seems unhelpful and ignores the disputed meaning of *δια-*

δέξιον. τί 37. 11 (τὸ *codd.*) and ὅτε 169. 6 (ὅτι *codd.*) appear no more necessary than φέρουσα 5. 14 for φέρει τὰ *codd.*, with εἴη preceding in the same ὡς-clause, since such combination of moods is not unparalleled in Herodotus. At 214. 10 ἀνήρ τις (Ὀνήτης *codd.*) is proposed in the apparatus. The latter though reasonably full shows occasional gaps; e.g. at 167. 6 nothing is said on ἐθύετο καὶ ἐκαλλιερέετο; at 170. 15 οἰκίσαι (not οἰκίσκι as printed) Schaefer and at 194. 15 περιέσεσθαι Reiske take no account of Powell's comments in *C.R.* lii. 58. On 35. 11 θολερῷ Eldick (*sic*) see Markland on Eur. *Suppl.* 222. καὶ ἐσσοῦτο Paap might be added at 166. 7–8. At 96. 5 [αὐτῶν] lacks attribution (Stein), and at 20. 6 μήτε τῶν Σκυθέων (μ. τὸν Σκυθικὸν *codd.*) is unexplained. Misprints and small errors are not lacking, especially in *Notices*, footnotes, and apparatus. In the text, correct 86. 2 ὡσαύτως, 86. 8 αὔτως (αὖτως), 104. 16 ἀλέες, and 167. 13 πόσῃσι (πάσῃσι). But it is gratifying that, in the longest book of Herodotus with which the editor has to deal, the general standard of accuracy has risen very far above that of some of the earlier volumes.

G. Clement Whittick

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W. Hamilton: *The Symposium of Plato.* A new translation. Pp. 122. West Drayton, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1951. Paper, 2*s.* net.

The *Symposium* is the first work of Plato to appear in the series of Penguin translations, and it is to be hoped that it will not be the last. The choice is a wise one. Less well known to non-classical readers than the *Phaedo* and the *Apology*, the *Symposium* presents a portrait of Socrates which is in some ways more human and less coldly intellectual than in any other work of Plato, and a fundamental doctrine of Platonism is expounded against the brilliantly drawn background of high society at Athens.

The translation by the Headmaster of Westminster School is very good, and follows something of a middle way between the formalized Victorian translation which is now often a barrier to the appreciation of the classics, and an idiom so modern that it is hard to imagine anyone but a person of the present day using it. The introduction of some twenty pages deals with the *mise-en-scène*, the content of the conversation and the character of Socrates. A widely held view is repeated, that the speech of Eryximachus 'is poor stuff and meant to be so'. But is it not rather the case that what is to us obsolete scientific speculation had its own fascination for Greeks of the fourth century B.C.? In the translation the following points may be mentioned: 175 e Socrates' wisdom ἀμφισβητήσιμος ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὖσα does not mean 'has little more reality than a dream' (p. 38); 182 c φρονήματα μεγάλα does not mean 'a generous spirit' (p. 48); 202 e πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ should not be translated 'everything that is of the nature of a spirit is half-god and half-man (p. 81); p. 41 'That the god should be one of the most ancient of all beings is a title of honour' is correct but awkward.

G. B. Kerferd

University of Manchester

Xenophon, *Anabasis*, door P. K. Huibregtse, met illustraties van A. A. Tadema. Pp. 260. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1951. Cloth, f. 5.90.

Considerable use of this book by a pupil and myself suggests that the best way of making Greek texts easy and interesting is to stimulate the imagination of the reader instead of encumbering him with too much help in the form of notes and translations. Here are no helps except the erect Greek type, very clear and very black, in which the text (Hude's for the most part) is printed, summary 'headlines' in the margins, a short life of Xenophon, a business-like explanation of the technical terms for the equipment and organization of the Greek army, and, most effective of all, the numerous illustrations. Apart from a sufficiency of pictures of arms, and of plans and maps of the most probable route followed by the Greeks, there are more than fifty graphic illustrations presenting, against a background of authentic landscapes, many of the incidents described in the narrative. If it was a defect of Xenophon's that he saw scenery only as a succession of military problems, that defect is here handsomely compensated. The book can be warmly recommended to those who wish to read Xenophon as he should be read—swiftly and in large doses.

J. Tate

University of Sheffield

Julián Marías: Aristóteles, *Politica.* Edición, traducción, introducción y notas. Pp. lxxii+281 (of which 266

double). Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1951. Paper, 150 ptas.

This is a translation, in the style of the Loeb and the Budé series, of Aristotle's *Politics*, with the Greek text on one side and the Spanish version opposite. The Greek text is that of W. L. Newman (and the order of the books of the *Politics* is Newman's order): the Spanish version is succinct and bare, and its author notes that he has used only 66 words to render the 55 words of the original Greek of the first section of the first chapter. The rendering, so far as the reviewer is able to judge, is accurate; but it will not greatly help a reader unversed in Greek. The notes, which are packed together at the end of the volume, are sparse: they occupy only 8 pages, and they are mainly a matter of references and brief explanation of historical allusions. The index, of 5 pages, is simply an index of proper names. The book must thus be judged in the main by the Introduction, of some 70 pages, written by Señor Julián Marías. He is a scholar who has written a *Historia de la Filosofía* (5th edition 1950), and an 'Introduction to Plato' in an edition of the *Phaedrus* printed at Buenos Aires in 1948. He is acquainted with the work of modern scholars, both English and German; and his preface is of interest both for its general view and for its indications of contemporary Spanish views on politics. It deals first with the social (or historical) and the intellectual background of the *Politics*: it then turns to the metaphysical bases of Aristotle's theory; and it finally proceeds to a study of the programme of the *Politics*, and to essays on 'the reality of the Polis', the relation of 'Polis and Politeia', and Aristotle's handling of the theme of 'Security'. The author detects in Aristotle a dislike for 'the frivolity of constitutional theorists and jurists', and a deep feeling for the value of *usus* or ἔθος, issuing in an equally deep desire for ἀσφάλεια: 'Aristóteles, en la hora vespertina de la *polis*, está de vuelta de todos los reformismos' . . . We find in Aristotle what we seek; and a Spaniard naturally finds something different from an Englishman.

It should be added, in justice to the classical scholarship of Spain and to the Spanish Institute of Political Studies, that the volume belongs to a series in which a three-volume translation of the *Republic* and a translation of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία have already appeared, and which is to include in the future translations of the *Gorgias* and *Protagoras* and of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It should also be added that the translation of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία is a necessary complement to the present volume, since its introduction deals with Aristotle's treatment of political science, and with his life and his school.

ERNEST BARKER

JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ: *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*. Pp. xii+142. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Cloth, 15*s*. net.

In this book we have one of the masters of twentieth-century logic expounding and criticizing and developing part of Aristotle's logic, with the greatest sympathy and insight, and with complete understanding of the Greek. It is therefore a most novel and valuable work; and will probably put an end to those tiresome chapters in recent textbooks of logic, where the author triumphantly tramples on Aristotle's four types of proposition from an alien and unsympathetic point of view, to the boredom of the mature student and the bewilderment of the beginner.

The interpretation of and comment on the text of the *Analytics* are illuminating and convincing. 'Throughout the whole *Prior Analytics* . . . there exists not one psychological term. Aristotle knows with an intuitive sureness what belongs to logic' (13). The book is also illuminating as history of logic; for example, it gives a quite new and yet very convincing explanation of the tradition that Galen invented the fourth figure. Professor Łukasiewicz produces and interprets a text to show that what Galen did was not to invent the fourth figure of Aristotelian syllogism, but to expound the four different figures that can be made with compound syllogisms having four terms instead of Aristotle's three.

The book is fascinating, thirdly, for its development of Aristotle's logic. Łukasiewicz shows us Aristotle's reduction of the other figures to the first figure as an early form of axiomatization. He expounds his own set of four axioms for the syllogistic, and does away with the muddled notion that it can all be derived from a single axiom called the 'dictum de omni et nullo'. He introduces the notion of rejection: as true propositions of the syllogistic are to be demonstrated, so false ones are to be rejected; and he finds axioms and rules for this procedure. Finally, he asks whether we can decide the truth-value of all possible sentences of the Aristotelian syllogistic, and gives an argument that we can do so if we add to the rules of rejection one suggested by his pupil Słupecki.

These are only a few examples of the many ways in which he illuminates and enlivens Aristotle's theory. The effect is to make Prantl's and Maier's accounts of syllogistic look like bad dreams from which we have now mercifully awakened, and whose former empire over us is no longer intelligible.

The only major defect of this admirable book is that Łukasiewicz's unusual insight into logical matters has betrayed him into a contemptuous attitude towards more ordinary students. He uses the words 'philologists' and 'philosophers' as terms of abuse. And this unsuitable emotion once seduces even him into an illogicality, namely, when he writes: 'All this was entirely unknown to philosophers of the nineteenth century. To this day they seem to have no idea of the logic of propositions' (49). Philosophers of the nineteenth century have no idea of anything today, because they are dead.

The last statement on p. 90 is false. It can be made true by interchanging the *a* and the *c*.

Oriel College, Oxford RICHARD ROBINSON

KENELM FOSTER and SILVESTER HUMPHRIES: Aristotle's *De Anima* in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Pp. 504. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951. Cloth, £2. 2*s*. net.

THIS is a very readable translation, presented in a volume beautifully printed and bound. The text used both for William of Moerbeke's version and for St. Thomas's commentary is that of Pirotta (Turin, 1925) with some alterations which are noted, but the commentary has been much compressed and shortened; one wishes there were more indication of this, though St. Thomas's meaning does not seem to have suffered. An introduction by Fr. Ivo Thomas discusses the date of the commentary, St. Thomas's attack on the Averroists in his *De Unitate Intellectus* (*c.* 1270), the treatment of definition in Aristotle and St. Thomas, and a few crucial passages (including iii. 430^{a}20–25). There are some notes, mostly giving references to the text of Aristotle and noting Moerbeke's deviations from the standard text and interpretation, and an index.

Moerbeke's text is not of great importance for the text of the *De Anima*, and the introduction barely touches on it. For a discussion of the versions, of which Moerbeke's was not the first, it is necessary to turn to Lacombe's *Aristoteles Latinus*, and to hope for a full critical edition in that series—the Teubner text (Biehl-Apelt) uses the Parma edition of St. Thomas (1866). (At i. 404^{b}14 the interpretation perhaps points to *ἄδηλον* (less probably *κίβδηλον*) in the quotation from Empedocles (fr. 109 Diels), but Moerbeke's unfamiliarity with *ἀΐδηλος* may be a sufficient explanation.)

The date of the commentary is discussed in some detail, in the light of recent investigations by the Belgian scholars Verbeke (1947) and Mansion (1948), from which it appears that St. Thomas used throughout a translation of the paraphrase of Themistius made by Moerbeke in 1267; on the other hand, the commentary seems unlikely to be later than 1272, and Fr. Thomas concludes tentatively for 1271. Only for Books ii and iii does it seem that we have St. Thomas's own text; for Book i it is necessary to rely on the *reportatio* of his companion Reginald of Piperno.

It is good that English readers now have easy access to St. Thomas's classic interpretation of *De An.* iii. 4–6; his commentary always repays study, not least where it provides more than mere exposition, as at §§ 387–98 (on ii. 418^{a}20–25), where it introduces (§§ 395–8) the idea of knowledge by natural instinct (*vis aestimativa*) (cf. § 635); and at several points the amplification is considerable. As the introduction notes, St. Thomas is much less tentative and much more systematic than his master. There are frequent references to other works of Aristotle, especially the *Metaphysics* (19 times) and the *Physics* (17 times), and Chalcidius' version of the *Timaeus* is employed at §§ 46–47 and 92 (on i. 404^{b}16 and 406^{b}28 ff.). § 133 (on i. 407^{b}27) rather curiously couples Democritus with Empedocles as the two early philosophers who came nearest to the idea of a formal cause. § 134 attributes the theory of the soul as a harmony to 'Dynarchus, Simiates and Empedocles'; 'Simiates' is presumably the Simmias of the *Phaedo*, and 'Dynarchus' the orator Dinarchus, who was familiar with the Peripatos of the generation after Aristotle.

The introduction mentions (pp. 18–19) Hicks and Maritain on the active intellect, but says nothing of the long Averroistic exposition of Nuyens. P. 33 speaks of Aristotle's treatment of the soul in the '*Euthedemus*', for which read '*Eudemus*', and for the 'exoteric discourses' see Jaeger's *Aristotle*. 'Indivisibility' would be preferable to 'indivision' at § 92. 'Samius, 190' in the index seems to have no correlate in the text.

University College, Bangor D. A. REES

Dio Chrysostom. With an English translation by H. Lamar Crosby. Vol. V: Discourses lxi–lxxx. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. vi+504. London: Heinemann, 1951. Cloth, 15*s*. net.

The final volume of the Loeb Dio Chrysostom contains the last twenty speeches, the *Encomium on Hair* preserved by Synesius, the *Fragments*, the *Letters* sometimes ascribed to D.C., select *Testimonia*, and an English index to all five volumes.

The text is much nearer to De Budé's than von Arnim's. It is more conservative than either and some emendations which seem necessary have not been adopted, e.g. 61. 18 Emperius's ὄντως for πάντως and 73. 8 Wilamowitz's γε σωθῆναι for γεγηθέναι. On the other hand, new emendations are sometimes introduced needlessly; e.g. in 70. 7, although the simple genitive after μακράν is well attested, Capps inserts the preposition and in 71. 4, although the phrase εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων is found elsewhere with a singular subject (e.g. Demosth. 21. 154), Capps emends to ἐκ παιδός. Of the more attractive new emendations the following may be mentioned: 65. 9 Crosby's τὸ ἀεί, 69. 8 Capps's εὐδοκῶν, 72. 14 Post's ἄρτι τότ' ἤδη, 80. 3 Crosby's ἐρῶντες. οὐδεὶς δ'. The critical notes are highly selective and their brevity sometimes misleads. Some readings are attributed without qualification to von Arnim which are only tentative suggestions in his apparatus (e.g. in 66. 5 and 74. 15). Sometimes emendations are introduced into the text without their author or the manuscript reading being mentioned (e.g. in 67. 2 and 68. 5). It is stated that ἀδιαβάτους in 64. 21 is 'deleted by Arnim', but the fact that it is also omitted in every manuscript except one is not mentioned.

Apart from occasional lapses the translation reads well. There are, however, a number of mistakes. The following will serve as examples: 67. 3 'sometimes concerning great matters popular opinion is small and concerning small matters great' should be 'sometimes big things seem small and small things big'; 68. 2 ἀρχήν means 'at all' not 'to begin with'; 72. 6 δυσωποῦνται means 'fight shy of', not 'look upon with veneration'; 77/8. 12 τοὺς ἱκανούς means 'those who are competent', not 'a considerable number'; and in 80. 4 both grammar and sense are violated by making 'freedom' instead of 'slavery' the subject of εἰσίοι.

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Folco Martinazzoli: *La 'Successio' di Marco Aurelio.* Struttura e Spirito del Primo Libro dei 'Pensieri'. Pp. 211. Bari: Adriatica Editrice, 1951. Paper.

It has been generally recognized that the first book of the *Meditations* differs in form and character from the other eleven. The author of this work believes that Marcus Aurelius wrote this book after the rest when he was moved by the desire to lay bare his soul before death, and that in it he is not only describing his inheritance from his predecessors but also his bequest to posterity. Most of this work is devoted to an analysis of the language and style of the first book. Two characteristics in particular are discussed at length, to which the author applies the Latin terms *concinnitas* and *inconcinnitas*. By these he means uniformity and variety respectively in the use of forms and constructions. Several examples are given to show that both qualities characterize the Greek of Marcus Aurelius. To illustrate *concinnitas* in this book particular stress is laid on the repeated use of the substantival adjective and the substantival infinitive, and two chapters are, somewhat irrelevantly, taken up with an account of the development of these usages in Greek literature from Homer onwards. To illustrate *inconcinnitas* it is shown how three different factors influenced Marcus Aurelius' Greek—Latin, Attic, and the *koine*.

The account of this alternation between uniformity and variety introduces many interesting points, but far too much is made of it. Owing to the 'catalogue' form of the first book a certain uniformity is inevitable, while the nature of the *Meditations* and the circumstances in which they were composed would naturally lead to variety and irregularity of expression. The author is much too ready to see a special significance in choice of words and constructions and to suppose that there is conscious artistry behind it. Many features which he finds peculiar to the Greek of Marcus Aurelius could easily be paralleled in other writers of the period. Sometimes a quite unwarranted significance is attached to perfectly normal usage; e.g. much is made of the fact that both the second aorist form εἶπον and the first aorist form εἶπας are used (p. 161 and p. 184); the author appears to be unaware that these are the two forms regularly used in Attic Greek.

H. Ll. Hudson-Williams
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A. THIERFELDER: (1) T. Maccius Plautus, *Rudens*. Pp. 132 (text) + 32 (vocabulary). (2) P. Terentius Afer, *Andria*. Pp. 121 (text) + 26 (vocabulary). Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle, 1951. Paper, DM. (1) 4.80, (2) 3.90.

PRESUMABLY both these texts in the series Heidelberger Texte are intended for school use, with acting especially in mind. Thus not only is the would-be producer of the *Rudens* furnished with a full list of properties (p. 53), but all initiative on his part is forestalled by extensive stage-directions in German, while his *grex* must stomach lines printed like:

numqui minus hasce esse oportet liberas?
LA. kreischt entrüstet Quid? liberas?
(*Rud.* 736)

Where so much is done to smooth the actor's path, it seems curious that Thierfelder, accepting apparently (p. 39) Seyffert's hypothesis of *verba corusca* in lines 526 ff., does not print, for example, ⟨*al*⟩*-algeo*, but contents himself with marks of hiatus.

The *Rudens* is set out, rightly, as 35 *Auftritte* (traditional act and scene numbers are given in parenthesis), and the text, based on Leo, shows few novelties, none arresting.[1] Thierfelder resuscitates old readings discarded by Leo in places;[2] he is ill advised, however, in 732, where it seems highly doubtful, in spite of the note on p. 38, that Plautus elided the termination of *iuncis*; if the emendation *iunci* or *iunco* is unacceptable, metre can be mended by deleting *ego*. A separate vocabulary is issued, by way of substitute, one gathers, for a commentary; actually it is the fairly full treatment of language (pp. 12–26) and style (pp. 26–32) in the introduction that to some extent compensates. On matters of prolegomena the doctrine put forward is mostly reputable, but, owing to lack of space, explanation of, for example, *brevis brevians* comes down to little more than a list of examples, while sometimes the editor is led into statements that go beyond the evidence: thus it is dangerous to say of Roman Comedy (*Rudens*, p. 3, repeated *Andria*, p. 1) 'es wurde ohne Maske gespielt'[3] or that a 'Prämiierung' took place after Roman dramatic festivals; here Thierfelder has been misled, one suspects, by *Trin.* 706.

Otherwise this is an unambitious but blameless opuscule.

The edition of the *Andria* is somewhat more substantial. Suetonius' *Vita* is given in full in a text that improves in places on Wessner's, followed by some useful remarks on Terence himself. The citation of the relevant literary fragments of the Greek originals,[1] together with Donatus' notes on the question of relationship, is handy and shows well the nature of this evidence. The play's three central problems (all too easily lost sight of) are succinctly posed on p. 24, and select but up-to-date references to modern criticism are provided.

Language and style occupy the next 25 pages; again it is these rather than the separate vocabulary that serve for commentary, although too much trivial matter has, in my opinion, been included. I note one loose statement (p. 42): '625 *credibile est ut* in place of Acc. and Inf., Cicero similarly has the construction *verisimile est ut*.' He has indeed, but only in negative (e.g. *Rosc. Am.* 121) or interrogative contexts; *Andr.* 625 is of course part of a question, but from this information a schoolboy could well mistake the proper scope of this idiom. I also miss a remark on the use of *ne* (= *vai*, *Andr.* 772); the vocabulary has 'Beteuerungspartikel (nur vor Pronomen): Wahrlich.' This usage needs more precise formulation.

The text, as in the *Rudens*, is liberally spangled with stage-directions; it departs only in details from Lindsay-Kauer, mainly by revival of old readings (e.g. Schopen's *aegre* in 434) and transposition or redivision of words between speakers: only one such (383/4) is claimed by the editor.

Though containing nothing significantly original, this work is to be commended for its convenient and careful presentation of useful material.

JOHN G. GRIFFITH
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Pliny: *Natural History*. Volume VI (Books XX–XXIII). With an English translation by W. H. S. JONES. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. xxv+532. London: Heinemann, 1951. Cloth, 15*s*. net.

DR. JONES takes up the Loeb Pliny where the late Mr. Rackham left it, at a point where

[1] See 415, 422, 877, 927 (based on Marx), 1003 (Löfstedt), 1072, 1259, 1345, 1393 (*meom* for *tuom*, O. Skutsch in a letter to Thierfelder).

[2] e.g. 304, 317, 468, 636, 715, 999, 1101.

[3] See, for example, Beare's discussion, *The Roman Stage*, pp. 184 ff.

[1] Oxy. Pap. 855 is mentioned but not quoted *in extenso*.

Pliny is at his most trying both for the editor and for the translator. Much of his *materia medica* is a dull and uncritical catalogue in which everything seems to be a cure for anything, and the mistakes which he is found making in the use of his Greek sources (applying to the plant iris, for example, a statement made by Theophrastus about the rainbow, or taking *παρὰ τὴν ἄκανθαν* as 'along the spine' when it means 'in addition to the spine') are such that when the text is nonsense it may nevertheless be what he wrote. Dr. Jones's translation is both accurate and readable. A few points may be noted: xx. 178 'convulsions' can hardly represent *convulsa* (rightly translated 'sprains' at xx. 54); xx. 145 *substratum* is not 'spread out'; xxii. 94 *lentior* is 'viscous', not 'flimsy', and *spuma* is probably nominative; xxii. 143 *ad id* does not mean 'at this point' but is anticipatory of *ne*, 'just to prevent'. In his text Dr. Jones is much more cautious than his predecessor, and his own suggestions are few and sensible. At xx. 185 his *bibitur* is tempting (as is Mr. Warmington's *cribro* at xxii. 140); *radix* at xx. 109, *tritis* at xx. 171, *mobiles stabilit* at xxiii. 124 also call for mention. In dealing with the proposals of others he shows good judgement, but he seems rash in printing Detlefsen's *lact* at xx. 58.

C. J. Fordyce
University of Glasgow

Wolf Steidle: *Sueton und die antike Biographie.* (Zetemata: Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 1.) Pp. viii+188. Munich: Beck, 1951. Paper.

The purpose of this writer is excellent, and his subject interesting to the student of history and literature alike. He sets out to correct a widely held estimate of the significance and literary status of Suetonius in his *Lives of the Caesars*. Steidle is not concerned with the sources Suetonius may have used, but with the literary form which constitutes the framework of the *Lives*. Does this series of biographies represent at best merely a *gelehrte Stoffsammlung*, at worst, as another writer has put it, 'a *chronique scandaleuse* based upon tittle-tattle about the emperors and compiled by a literary man with the muckrake, too keen upon petty and prurient detail to produce a scientific account of his subject', or has Suetonius followed a scheme of treatment which makes this apparent hotchpotch of material into an organized whole, with a uniting purpose, the delineation of a many-sided character?

To show that Suetonius has been wronged and misunderstood, Steidle proceeds to analyse selected *Lives*: that of Divus Iulius (which is given by far the fullest treatment, as the work in which he discovers the nature of Suetonius' principles of composition), Caligula (in which he tests the conclusions won from *Divus Iulius*), Nero, Domitian, Claudius, Vespasian, singly and in that order, and finally Galba, Vitellius, Titus, and Germanicus as a group. *Divus Augustus* is conspicuous by its unexplained absence. The analysis of selected *Lives* is followed by an elucidation of the peculiarly Roman element in them, and by an exposition of their *Formgeschichte*, which seems a valuable contribution to the history of ancient biography. There is an appendix which treats of the nature of the *Res Gestae*; there should perhaps have been another on the *Agricola*.

Steidle's conclusions are conveniently summed up in pp. 175–7. There are, he claims, two noteworthy elements in the *Lives*: first a system or disposition of material, which is not original but based on developments already present in ancient biography, and, second, a 'Roman approach' to the detail, which Steidle seeks to analyse in Section III (Historische Einordnung, I. Das Römische). In this *Römertum* (one of those terms seemingly destined to bedevil German thought and writing) lies Suetonius' originality. By reason of this quality Suetonius should be esteemed more highly than he has been so far by modern scholars '. . . dass er im Stofflichen den Gegebenheiten des römischen Lebens Rechnung trägt, dass seine Darstellung durch ihre Beschränkung auf das Äussere, Faktische und Einzelne sowie durch ihren nüchternen Realismus römische Art verkörpert . . .' (cf. ibid. 118–19, and the contrast with Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, which is a contrast in the two languages known to every schoolboy).

This is all well argued, if a little laboriously, with many valuable considerations of detail; it might carry all the more weight if it were not for Steidle's invincible determination to find a justification for everything wherein Suetonius' treatment may be criticized, even the reporting of good and evil traits of character by categories (p. 76). Indeed, like the criticism of Suetonius elsewhere, so here the justification is overdone. Steidle claims for his work 'eine neue und höhere Wertung der Leistung Suetons'. Surely however much there is a scheme, or however Roman is the desire for vivid and personal detail, these do not dispose of the main criticism directed against Suetonius. Ultimately our judgement will depend on

the sort of information Suetonius has given us, considering his opportunities, not on his arrangement or on the Roman love of the concrete in characterization.

This is an interesting book, and well got up; it will be a pity if the peculiarly involved and at times obscure German (cf. pp. 10–11: '. . . Die Vorderung . . . unverständlich wäre . . .') limits its use as a contribution to the study of Roman biography.

R. J. Hopper

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M. Lavarenne: Prudence. Tome IV: *Le Livre des Couronnes, Dittochaeon, Épilogue*. Texte établi et traduit. (Collection Budé.) Pp. 233. Paris: 'Les Belles Lettres', 1951. Paper.

This volume marks the completion of the Budé Prudentius. The bulk of it consists of the poet's 'Book of Martyrs', a work in which, in spite of an occasional poetic line, he is not seen at his best, but which is interesting because it exhibits the cult of the Martyrs as it had developed by the end of the fourth century. There follow the quatrains of the *Dittochaeon* (the *Tituli Historiarum* of Bergman's edition), which were probably intended for inscription under a series of Biblical pictures or mosaics in a church, a form of decoration for which there is other evidence, both literary and archaeological; and finally the *Epilogue* to the whole collection of the poet's works.

The text is naturally in the main that of Bergman, but Lavarenne has rightly rejected some of Bergman's new readings; at one place (*Perist.* ii. 567) he has introduced a conjecture of his own. A sufficient apparatus criticus is supplied. The translation is plain and faithful; if one would sometimes disagree with it, that is generally at places where Prudentius is obscure and his meaning uncertain. There is a useful introduction to the *Peristephanon Liber* as a whole, as well as separate introductions to the several Hymns. Notes partly at the foot of the page and partly at the end of the book supply necessary explanations. The note on *Perist.* x. 385, 'furorne summus ultima et dementia est, | . . . homines fuisse cum scias quos consecras, | urnas reorum morticinas lambere?' says that the reference is probably to the deification of emperors, some of whom were guilty of crimes. In that case it is unfortunate that Lavarenne cites Caligula and Nero as examples, since they were not deified. It seems more likely that Prudentius has in mind the theory which he develops in detail with reference to Jupiter and other gods in *Contra Symmachum* i, that they were originally powerful mortals of immoral character. On *Ditt.* xiv, *septenas decies palmas*, Lavarenne remarks on the 'fondness' of Latin poets for expressing compound numbers by means of such periphrases; he takes no account of the exigencies of metre.

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Stefan Oświecimski: *De scriptorum Romanorum vestigiis apud Tertullianum obviis questiones selectae*. Pp. 96. Cracow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1951. Paper, zł. 25.

This book comprises three distinct but connected studies on Tertullian. In chapters 1 to 3 Dr. Oświecimski discusses Tertullian's attitude to literature in general and to pagan Roman literature in particular. This section is most interesting, and as a collection of material very valuable. But one wonders whether the author has not made Tertullian too self-consistent. A man who is convinced that all art is the work of the devil (*De idol.* 3), and yet is a member of a society whose self-consciousness largely depends on the possession of a common literary and educational tradition, is likely to swing now to this side and now to that in seeking to resolve the contradiction. The problem of what to do with the cultural heritage of the past is one which always faces human communities at moments of rapid and decisive change. Tertullian did not and could not work out the definitive solution of the Christian Church, but the varying ways in which he reflects the problem are not the least interesting feature of his work.

Chapter 4 treats of Tertullian's debt to Cato the Censor. The first section, which seeks to show the general similarity of the two men's outlook, is somewhat thin and schematic. The second examines five passages (*De pall.* 3–5, *de cult. fem.* 2. 7, *apol.* 6. 3–4, 6. 2, 6. 4–5) in which Tertullian may be dependent on Cato. Only in the last of these is there any likelihood that Tertullian had the actual text of Cato in mind, and even here it seems more probable that his immediate source was Pliny, *N.H.* xiv. 89–90.

In chapter 5 the author discusses the value of Tertullian's *De Spectaculis* for the reconstruction of Suetonius' *Historia Ludicra*. He concludes that it was only for the early history of the theatre and the games that Tertullian turned to Suetonius, and that

therefore many of Reifferscheid's reconstructions from *De Spectaculis* 4–12 do not belong to Suetonius at all. Yet he does not go so far as Roth in scepticism. This is the most satisfactory section of the book.

There are many interesting contributions to the interpretation of Tertullian: in particular the vindication of the manuscript reading against Reifferscheid's conjecture in *De Idololatria* 10. The Latin is simple and lucid, marred only by a dative *quoque* on p. 66.

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EINAR LÖFSTEDT: *Coniectanea.* Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der antiken und mittelalterlichen Latinität. Erste Reihe. Pp. 144. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1951. Paper.

IN this series of studies Dr. Löfstedt selects from classical and later Latin some texts which have been questioned or misunderstood and elucidates them by analysis and comparison. In his own phrase, he has run some cross-sections through Latinity to show, using material from fifteen centuries, how classical, late, and medieval idioms throw light on one another and on the development of what was, throughout these centuries, the same language. To take a few examples from a wide variety, we see words acquiring new functions (*nam* becoming adversative, *suscipere* intransitive, *extrinsecus* an adjective, *sequens* an adverb) or new meanings (*nomen* 'a person', *transigere* 'break off'); we see the working of analogy in the use of *necesse* with the ablative or in the genitive *talius*; we see the interchange of similar words, *regere* and *gerere*, *inusitatus* and *invisitatus*, *levis* and *lenis* and *lentus*. We observe *nisi* supplanting *non nisi*, and are reminded that English *but* has had the same development; we are made aware that *plena* in Prop. i. 16. 23 may be linked, through a long history, with English *plenty*. These studies have the clarity and freshness of all Dr. Löfstedt's writing and show his usual ease in drawing on a vast material and acuteness in interpreting it. The young scholar could have no more useful or more attractive introduction to the methods of linguistic study; the older will gain new light on many problems and see new lines of exploration to pursue. We look forward to the promised second series.

University of Glasgow C. J. FORDYCE

LOUIS SÉCHAN: *Le Mythe de Prométhée.* (Mythes et Religions, No. 28.) Pp. 132. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951. Paper, 300 fr.

THE author has condensed into eighty-five small pages, written in the easy, lucid style of a cultured Frenchman, an amazing amount of information about Prometheus and the handling of his story in literature, particularly by Hesiod and Aeschylus. Inevitably there are omissions; it might have been worth mentioning that originally Prometheus, in popular belief, seems to have been the superhuman counterpart of the human master-thief, much like the familiar figure of the Trickster in American mythology. But these are few, and all that is most important is there. The rest of the monograph consists of notes, very condensed but containing a vast number of useful references to authors ancient and modern, and a bibliography of fifty-four selected works 'qui nous ont particulièrement servi', says the author. Séchan seems to have missed Malten's article on Hephaistos in Pauly–Wissowa, which would have been of use to him, but not much else that is really important.

Since half of what he, or anyone else, has to say about Prometheus in Aeschylus is highly controversial, some readers will disagree with his conclusions (he favours the existence of a Prometheus-trilogy and the development of Zeus from a tyrant into an experienced and merciful god), but they will find other opinions briefly but fairly stated in text or notes. The general tone is one of moderation and good sense, examples of the rejection of various wild theories being frequent; among these is the recurrent attempt to prove the *Prometheus Vinctus* spurious. A few small details need correction or modification. It is too much to say (p. 2) that the θεοὶ ἐφέστιοι were 'prés du Foyer, ou confondus avec lui'. Hesiod, *Theog.* 563 (p. 34), refers to firesticks, not thunderbolts. It is most improbable that a catasterism of Herakles was mentioned by Aeschylus (p. 74). I can see no reason for calling *Od.* xv. 403 ff. a 'pastiche ironique' of the myth of the Golden Age (p. 100, n. 35). These are not important.

University of St. Andrews H. J. ROSE

J. L. M. DE LEPPER: *De Godsdienst der Romeinen.* Pp. 204; 20 plates. Roermond: Romen en Zonen, 1950. Cloth.

THIS well-printed and handsome volume is one of a series entitled *De Godsdiensten der Mensheid* (The Religions of Mankind), and is the work, not of a specialist, but of an

intelligent man who has read the principal books on the subject; if he had paid more attention to the periodical literature also, he would have been saved some errors and antiquated ideas (as pp. 49 ff., where he takes too narrow a view of Mars; p. 52, he does not realize that there are two Pales, not one; p. 67, that a god 'is' *numen* is not true of pre-Augustan Latin; p. 71, Diana as a moon-goddess may be left to well-earned rest; p. 73, he is somewhat uncritical about the Etruscan equivalents of the Capitoline triad; p. 115, he falls into the recurrent error about the fetial's spear, which was not bloody, but made of cornel-wood; and, oddest of all, he acquiesces, p. 34, in Wissowa's quaint aberration of identifying the Vestals with the housewife instead of the daughters of the house). Slips of this sort, and an occasional carelessness (p. 47, he uses the unclassical singular *feria*) are more than compensated for by the lively style and the many flashes of real insight, as, for instance, in chapter v, where he realizes the position of Iuppiter as a true high god of early date.

For the most part, the book deals with facts perfectly well known to serious students of ancient cult, but unfamiliar to the public for which the series is evidently intended, the non-specialist cultivated reader. Originality is neither sought for nor wanted; assured results are given with a very small proportion of error, and doubtful points are set down as such. An introduction which reasonably asks to what extent it is true that the Romans ever had *a* religion is followed by an excellent chapter on 'Ancient Data and Modern Theories' and then by a series of other chapters which tell the story of Roman religious development down to the eventual triumph of Christianity. The weakest parts are perhaps those which deal with the complicated philosophical and semi-philosophical movements of later antiquity. Here the author has tried to cram too much into too little space and the result may here and there be misleading to an uninformed reader.

The illustrations are well chosen, excellently reproduced, and accompanied by clear explanatory captions.

H. J. Rose

University of St. Andrews

W. W. Tarn: *The Greeks in Bactria and Media.* Second edition. Pp. xxiv+561; 1 plate, 3 maps. Cambridge: University Press, 1951. Cloth, 50*s.* net.

It is evidence both of the value of this book and of a wide interest in the Ancient East that a second edition should have appeared within fifteen years. Very wisely the text of the first edition has been reprinted with only the addition of a brief preface, some additional abbreviations (xvii–xviii), and a few pages of Addenda (541–2). That these are so few is most creditable, and most of them are of only a couple of lines; others deal with recent travels, excavations, and finds of coins; the 'Median' Hydaspes (p. 100), the foundations of Demetrius (p. 142), and some views of Altheim (pp. 195–7), Bailey (p. 414), Bikermann (p. 426), Rostovtzeff, and Zograph (p. 505). All are most welcome.

John L. Myres

Oxford

Alberto Gitti: *Alessandro Magno all' Oasi di Siwah.* Il Problema delle Fonti. Pp. xii+210. Bari: Adriatica Editrice, 1951. Paper, *L.* 1400.

In this book of some 60,000 words, Signor Gitti examines the problem of the origins and transmission of our histories of Alexander, in the light of a meticulous examination of all the available literature on one salient episode. If this method has its obvious limitations, it has also its uses. The whole body of the extant sources on the Ammon episode is not too large to be fresh in the memory at one time; and the subject is one on which our usual sources are reinforced by an account from the sensible and level-headed Strabo.

Gitti's conclusions are, on the whole, conservative. The earliest written account, that of Callisthenes, had already, it is clear, a romantic and propagandist colouring ('leggero, fatuo, popolare' says Gitti, p. 163); and it was soon supplemented by 'l'attività volgare' (p. 158)—Tarn's 'mass of floating traditions', derived at first, second, or tenth hand from witnesses, or from simple imagination, and presently influenced by the anti-Alexandrian tradition of the Peripatetics and other philosophers. Gitti believes this 'specie di Ur-Vulgata' to have been 'fixed' at a fairly early date by a popular literary work, which, while holding certainty to be unobtainable, he still believes may have been that of Clitarchus (pp. 175–85). Against Tarn's argument that Clitarchus borrowed from Patrocles (after 280 B.C.) he maintains that the borrowing could have been the other way: 'Uomini di guerra e di mare . . . non erano alieni di servirsi di opere fantastiche anche più di quella di Clitarco; Alessandro ad esempio non disdegnava Ctesia' (p. 177). Finally, Gitti believes both the

authors of our 'good' tradition, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, to have written in their old age in conscious reaction against the fatuities and inaccuracies of the vulgate (pp. 161–2).

The chief value of this book, however, is not in its conclusions, even if we agree with them, but in the reasoning and scholarship on which they are based. With its bibliography and references to over a hundred books and articles, the book is indeed no bad introduction to the scattered literature of Alexandrian *Quellenforschung*; and, studied with the texts, it should be particularly useful to scholars making a first approach to this apparently inexhaustible subject.

University of Glasgow A. R. Burn

Émile Mireaux: *La reine Bérénice.* Pp. 252; map. Paris: Albin Michel, 1951. Paper, 420 fr.

The subject of this biography is Iulia Berenice, the daughter of Herod Agrippa, and Titus' mistress. She is the *Βερενείκη βασίλισσα μεγάλη* of an Athenian dedication (*I.G.* iii. 556). Mommsen dubbed her *Kleopatra im kleinen*, and it has recently been suggested that she was the centre of a political struggle at Rome which ended only with her final dismissal by Titus (J. A. Crook, *A.J.P.* 1951, pp. 162–75). She therefore merits study. But M. Mireaux's biography is not primarily a scholar's book. For this, wider reading and a more rigorous assessment of sources would have been essential. It is unfortunate (but unavoidable) that so much turns on Suetonius, avid for gossip, Tacitus, the master of innuendo, and Josephus, never scrupulous, and in the *Antiquities* displaying rancour against his former patrons. In this situation uncertainties are not to be resolved by filling the gaps with hypotheses, imaginative reconstruction, and *suggestio veri* (or *falsi*) in the form of rhetorical questions.

An example is the story of Berenice's incestuous relationship with her brother Agrippa, known only to Josephus and Juvenal, yet not inherently unplausible in the context of Hellenistic monarchy. A safe verdict is *non liquet*: but a series of *non liquets* offers little delectation. Mireaux accepts the story, and assumes that Berenice interpreted Leviticus xviii. 9 (with its reference to the male offender alone) in a strictly literal sense, which 'throws interesting light on the quality of Berenice's soul'. So it would, if there were the slightest evidence that Berenice had given Leviticus xviii. 9 a thought in this connexion (and if we could assume that she had stopped reading at xviii. 9 and not continued as far as xx. 17). This kind of reconstruction is well enough in its place; but that place is the historical novel.

Three appendixes discuss the date of Herod Antipas' marriage to Herodias, the composition of the Acts, and the date of the Apocalypse (A.D. 70). I have no room here for detailed criticism. But if Herodias married Antipas in 32/33 and John the Baptist's death was in 34, it follows that Salome (in the gospels a *κοράσιον*) danced before Herod as a widow; cf., too, *Ant. Iud.* 18. 136 *Σαλώμη . . . μεθ' ἧς τὰς γόνας Ἡρωδίας γαμεῖται* (Antipas), which rather suggests that the eloping Herodias took Salome as an infant along with her. A caveat should also be entered against the view that *concubinatus* was 'un mariage authentique': its offspring were illegitimate, and in fact no one ever suggests that Berenice was Titus' wife except the author of the *Epit. de Caes.*, who calls her *uxor* in a dubious passage, and then contradicts this a few lines later.

Despite these serious faults, the book is vividly written and contains some acute suggestions, for instance its development of Renan's thesis associating the book of Judith with the fall of Jerusalem, and the possibility that the killing of Holophernes is intended as direct criticism of the renegade Berenice, mistress of the butcher Titus. A final chapter surveys Berenice's resurrection in French literature from Magnon to Magnard. It is presumably for a public familiar with the classical drama of Racine and Corneille that this biography has been written. For the serious student of Jewish or Roman history it will provide pleasant relaxation.

University of Liverpool F. W. Walbank

Georges Lopuszanski: *La date de la capture de Valérien et la chronologie des empereurs gaulois.* (Cahiers de l'Institut d'Études Polonaises en Belgique, 9.) Pp. vi+79. Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Institut d'Études Polonaises en Belgique, 1951. Paper.

This, the first monograph in the field of ancient history to be published by the Institute of Polish Studies in Belgium, is a useful contribution to the chronological problems of the capture and death of Valerian and the dating of the Gallic usurpers. Dr. Lopuszanski has a scheme for the latter identical in essentials with those of Bolin and Elmer: Postumus' first *tribunicia potestas* ends on 9 December 259, his last is in 267–8, and this year is also the first *tribunicia potestas* of

Victorinus. Victorinus' accession is therefore in 268, which fits the synchronism with the Alemannic victory of Claudius II near Lake Garda given in *Epit. de Caes.* 34. 2. Postumus' revolt is accordingly advanced to 259, when it follows the capture of Valerian, and coincides with the murder of Saloninus (not the younger Valerian).

This scheme is not easily reconciled with the statement in the *Epit. de Caes.* 33. 3 attributing a common reign of seven years to Gallienus and Valerian, which brings one down to September 260. Moreover, Stein's dating of Postumus' first tribunician power to 259–60 is more easily brought into relation with the fact that coins and papyri from Egypt continue to record the name of Saloninus down to September 260, and with the existence of coins of Valerian dating from 259/60. C. H. Turner has also argued convincingly for placing the election of Pope Dionysius (following on Valerian's capture) in 260, and Lopuszanski does not attempt to answer his argument.

To smooth over these discrepancies Lopuszanski calls in the aid of Bolin's hypothesis of a distinction between Valerian's capture and the legal termination of his reign; and he assumes that Saloninus may have resisted Postumus (thus postponing his murder) for several months. To the present reviewer his case is not wholly convincing; but it is always well reasoned, and some may find his arguments cogent. A final section dealing with the legionary coins of Gallienus and attempts to relate these to Gallienus' victories or imperial acclamations is inconclusive.

The brochure is in typescript and contains a good many misprints; on p. 30, line 13, for 'troisième' read 'deuxième'; and in the previous line 'devenu . . . tribun' is a loose expression. This looks like being a useful series which deserves to be better known.

F. W. WALBANK

University of Liverpool

M. L. W. LAISTNER: *Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire*, together with an English Translation of John Chrysostom's *Address on Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to bring up their Children*. Pp. x+145. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1951. Cloth, 20*s*. net.

As the title indicates, Professor Laistner's book has two main parts. The first part gives the text of the Richard Lectures for 1950 at the University of Virginia: the second is a translation of Chrysostom's *Address* with an introduction and notes. The object of the lectures is to present a fair picture of 'the old established pagan theory and practice' of education on the one hand, and of the early Christian ideals of training and character formation on the other; and then to show how the triumph of Christianity involved the adoption by the new religion of much of the educational discipline of the old order. For example, the first systematic manual of Christian ethics, the *De officiis ministrorum* of St. Ambrose, is heavily indebted to the *De officiis* of Cicero. The result was that 'in a new and wholly Christian world the pagan or classical heritage, precariously at first, then with ever-growing vigor, lived on' (p. 24). The strength of the Christian community rested on two things: its admirable organization, and its careful scrutiny and thorough instruction of candidates for membership. And it was the latter that was the secret of the inner cohesion and solidarity of the community. The way in which conquered paganism gave laws to this conquering Church is traced in Chapter III, leading to the final conclusion (p. 73) that 'the Carolingian age, which was the heir of classical antiquity, marks the culmination of the first stage in the long intellectual history of medieval and modern Europe'. The story is clearly and arrestingly told, and is a real contribution to the history of education.

The work of Chrysostom on vainglory and the upbringing of children has an attractiveness of its own; and Dr. Laistner's English version is welcome, the more so as the Greek text is not readily accessible. We are also indebted to him for an introduction and some brief but valuable notes on the text.

T. W. MANSON

University of Manchester

WALTER RAYMOND AGARD: *Classical Myths in Sculpture*. Pp. xvi+203; 97 figs. in text. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951. Cloth, $5.00.

THE limits of this study are a little artificial. Its theme is the varying but persistent influence of Greek sculpture, but not in style so much as in certain subjects—a female nude becomes relevant if labelled 'Venus', not if 'Eve'. So the survey of Western sculpture is rather intermittent. Agard first considers the popularity of mythological subjects, and summarizes the phases of ancient sculpture. Then, after a few pages on the

Middle Ages, he gives a chapter apiece to the Renaissance; Baroque sculpture; French classicism; the neoclassicism of Canova, Thorvaldsen, Flaxman, and others; the later eclectic schools of France and Germany; English and American classicism; and some recent trends. The text is carefully illustrated with numerous figures, all from photographs, and there are appended a useful bibliography and a concise 'Who's Who' of gods and heroes.

Agard has done well the task he set himself. He has wide knowledge, unprejudiced taste, and sane judgement. His exposition is clear and detached and his style is simple; there is none of the condescension or defensiveness that spoils many popular works by classical scholars. The choice of illustrations is apt and pleasantly unhackneyed, but some of the photography is poor. The printing and appearance of the book are good. Altogether this is a sensible and enjoyable essay, though not very profound; it should interest a wide public, but $5 is—anyhow in this country—a high price.

R. M. Cook

Cambridge

J. D. Beazley: *The Development of Attic Black-Figure.* (Sather Classical Lectures, 1951.) Pp. xiv+127; 49 plates. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (London: Cambridge University Press), 1951. Cloth, 45*s.* net.

Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters was esoteric. This is exoteric, but *Attic Black-figure Vase-painters*, we are told, 'is well advanced'. In time our thirst to become acquainted with the Towry White painter, the Whitworth painter, and others who appear tantalizingly in footnotes will be slaked. Here even old friends like the Affecter and Elbows Out have succumbed to streamlining. We have, however, a simple story starting with Geometric and ending with the last of the Panathenaic prize amphorae in the second century B.C. The pictures are admirable and beautifully reproduced; if many of them are old friends, it is good to have them collected together. Bibliography of vases and vase-groups, further instances of scenes and gestures, and other details are given in the notes. In the text the vases are described and interpreted as only Sir John Beazley knows how to interpret.

In the early stages mythological pictures are particularly interesting. Beazley says that there are a few mythological scenes in the Geometric period but only specifies Kunze's Fight for the Tripod (*Neue Meisterwerke griechischer Kunst aus Olympia*, figs. 4–5); but can Apollo and Herakles be helmeted? He thinks that the Berlin Proto-Attic (here pl. 3) represents the death of Aegisthus and does not note Rumpf's view (*Ph. W.* 1940, 27) that it represents transportation of prisoners, which accounts for 'Clytemnestra's' lack of interest; I think she may be Iole. The same vase has under the handle 'a kind of proto-satyr or proto-Silenos'; compare *pilosus Robertsonianus* (*B.S.A.* xliii. 21 f., No. 52). Another proto-Attic vase takes the story of the young Achilles eating the inwards of lions, etc., back from Statius and Apollodorus probably to the *Cypria*. On a third Beazley sees a scene from the Argonaut story. Achilles and Cheiron appear again on a sixth-century cup by the Heidelberg painter, who anticipates Pindar in introducing the 'holy daughters of the Centaur'. Of Exekias let us notice in passing the amphora in Philadelphia with the death of Antilochos and the death of Achilles, 'the Antilochos episode occupying one side and half of the other, the Achilles episode the remaining half'. Late black-figure is discussed in a single chapter, and the many painters of small vases who carried the style into the fifth century are omitted. A final chapter treats the prize vases and has much of incidental interest about Greek athletics.

T. B. L. Webster

University College, London

Robert L. Scranton: *Corinth.* Vol. I, Part III: *Monuments in the Lower Agora and North of the Archaic Temple.* Pp. xv+200. 76 plates, 83 figs., 15 large plans and architectural drawings. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951. Cloth, $10.

This dry but useful report completes the publication of the Roman Lower Agora at Corinth—most of the north side has been published already in *Corinth*, i. 1 and 2, and the Julian Basilica at the east and various pre-Roman remains are reserved for later volumes—and adds the 'North buildings' on the other side of the archaic temple.

The Agora spread over an irregular site of about 200×125 metres, rising towards the south and traversed by a valley from its south-west corner (pp. 134–5, 74–76, 5). The pre-Roman periods are still little known. In the southern part there were Geometric

graves and Classical houses and shops; these were cleared away when the Agora was extended in the fourth or third century B.C. and the hollows were gradually filled in (pp. 134, 74–77, 5, 8). After the Roman refounding of Corinth the area was quickly levelled into two terraces—the Upper and Lower Agoras—with a third and smaller terrace at the west end[1], the big South Stoa and the North-west Shops were restored, and various small buildings were erected. During the first century A.D. the Agora reached more or less the form familiar to modern visitors and readers; in the late second century some alterations were made; and about the end of the fourth the shops on each side of the Bema, which unobtrusively divided Upper and Lower Agora, were replaced by a hurried but grandiose line of steps. The final destruction occurred about the sixth century. The main interest of the Roman Lower Agora is in the ingenious harmonization of an unsymmetrical plan; but some of the buildings described here deserve notice—particularly the imposing Bema, the circular Corinthian pleasantry of Babbius, and the original temple D ('Hermes') with its probably Tuscan order. Pausanias proves a disappointingly unsatisfactory guide.

The last chapter describes and discusses some partially excavated structures at the north foot of the Temple Hill. These are the simple two-storied North Stoa of the fourth century B.C.—it had one or two predecessors and was perhaps an arsenal; the related Painted Building, possibly a military bath-house; and, largely obliterating its ruins, the rectangular North Market of the mid first century A.D., which, altered and damaged, survived into Byzantine times.

The plans and illustrations give all that is required. The text is generally lucid. This volume maintains the high standard of careful excavation and conscientious reporting that the Americans have established at Corinth.

R. M. Cook

Cambridge

Carl Roebuck: *Corinth.* Vol. XIV: *The Asklepieion and Lerna.* Pp. xi+183. 69 plates, 5 large plans, 34 figs. in text. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951. Cloth, $10.

The site here published lies 400 metres due north of the theatre at Corinth, on the edge of the plateau against the city wall. Because of its position most day visitors to Corinth do not reach it; there is compensation in this volume. Roebuck, who was commissioned to write the report twelve years after the end of excavations (1929–34), has done his work well; it does credit also to the system of recording maintained by the American School in Corinth.

The area examined measures about 100 × 60 metres. The eastern part, on the plateau, was a sanctuary of Asclepius, identified by inscriptions of the later classical period. On the west a hollow eroded in the scarp provides a spring which is probably the Lerna of Pausanias, though his description does not tally very well with the buildings of his time. Over much of the site there was little depth of earth, so that Hellenistic and other activity cleared away most positive remains of earlier periods; but there remain numerous cuttings in the rock and clay, which are skilfully interpreted with the help of small deposits of datable material.

Pockets in the rock have produced a little Early Helladic pottery and there were a few Geometric sherds, but the history of the site begins in the early sixth century B.C. After that we find a small shrine, containing apparently a baldachino, and probably later an irregular 'oikos'. Towards the end of the fourth century the site was developed monumentally in connexion with the new city wall. A larger, prostyle temple replaced the earlier structures; along the north of the sanctuary a colonnade abutted on the city wall; and to the west a large building, the 'Abaton', was constructed over the slope down to Lerna, which was connected with the Asklepieion by an attractive ramp to the south. Lerna itself was levelled to make a sunken square court surrounded by colonnades; to the south were a spring-house and reservoirs; on the east, behind the colonnade, were three dining-rooms of eleven couches each—some of the couches and the slots for tables are well preserved. Roebuck's suggestion that the Abaton was extended back above the dining-rooms cannot be proved, but is reasonable. Not long afterwards shallow colonnades were added on the west and south sides of the sanctuary (and, it may be guessed, on the east) and a fountain house was built beside the top of the ramp. In 146 B.C. Corinth was sacked and Lerna became derelict. During the century

[1] This West Terrace was soon occupied by small prostyle temples and the like. These temples are distinguished by letters in the plans, but—irritatingly—by their dubious identifications in the text: the key is on p. 3, n. 2.

after the refounding the temple, the Abaton, and the north colonnade of the sanctuary were restored; the ramp was blocked and built over; at Lerna the water-supply, the court, and probably the north colonnade were put in order. This restoration seems to have lasted till the end of the fourth century A.D., presumably till Alaric's invasion in A.D. 396. After that the site was robbed and for a century and a half used for a Christian cemetery. Later still are remains of Byzantine chapels, and in modern times the site received the treasures of some Greek notable.

The small finds were not numerous. The pottery and lamps are useful for dating, the figurines not much better. More interesting, but artistically negligible, are the terracotta votive models of parts of the body, by their contexts mostly of the late fifth and fourth centuries B.C.: they make the largest collection found in Greece, though comparable deposits have long been known—or rather, since they are still unpublished, known of—in Italy. There are also a few pieces of sculpture and some architectural fragments. The publication of the inscriptions of the early Christian cemetery has generously been surrendered to the *Corpus der griechisch-christlichen Inschriften von Hellas*. Roebuck has added a short chapter on the cult of Asclepius at Corinth, surmising that it was introduced about the end of the fifth century and supplanted an earlier healing cult of Apollo to whom a krater of the early sixth century had been dedicated.

This is a straightforward and efficient report, of special interest to students of Asclepius, architectural planning, water systems, and early Hellenistic history. It is fully illustrated, though some of the photographs of the site are not clear and the symbols on some plans might have been explained. Occasionally the description of buildings is obscure, the material of blocks is not always given, and more dates might have been risked in the catalogues. But there is little cause for complaint.

R. M. Cook

Cambridge

Annales Gandenses. Edited with text, translation, introduction and notes by Hilda Johnstone. Pp. xxix+105. London and Edinburgh: Nelson, 1951. Cloth, 15*s*. net.

This new volume in the 'Medieval Classics' series is the first that deals with a country other than England. About the beginning of 1308 an unknown friar in the Franciscan convent at Ghent, having a supply of parchment and little to do, resolved to write down, partly from his own personal experience and partly from information given by eyewitnesses, the remarkable events of his own time, making his starting-point the year 1296, when Guy, Count of Flanders, with Edward I of England as his ally, renounced his homage to the King of France. The many years of strife that followed have been described with a good deal of skill, and readers, even if they have no special interest in Flemish history, will appreciate the accounts of great events, like the battle of Courtrai, and small incidents which give the atmosphere of the period. Professor Johnstone has produced a very competent edition, basing her text on Funck-Brentano. The introduction provides a clear picture of the historical background, which may be unfamiliar to most readers. The translation, like the introduction, is very pleasantly written, and marred only by a few slips—for example, *suburbium satis magnum concremantes* (p. 55) does not mean 'the suburb was in large part consumed by fire' and *caput Wilhelmi a corpore suo invento abscissum* (p. 74) does not mean 'William's head, found severed from his body'. The series has done well to make more accessible an interesting and little-known work.

K. R. Potter

University of Edinburgh

Gerard Blanken: *Les Grecs de Cargèse (Corse)*. Recherches sur leur langue et sur leur histoire. Tome I: Partie linguistique. Pp. xix+322. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1951. Paper, fl. 17.

Of this book pp. 1–86, the introductory matter and the phonetics of the dialect, were first published in 1947; to this the present volume adds the morphology, valuable remarks on the vocabulary, and texts and documents of various sorts. A second volume on the history of Cargèse will complete the work.

In 1675 a colony of Greeks left the Mani peninsula in the Peloponnese and finally settled at Cargèse in Corsica, where a village was built to receive them. For a couple of centuries they maintained their Greek speech; then it began to pass out of use and it has now practically disappeared. Dr. Blanken found only one family still speaking Greek. Of this dying form of speech he has gathered together every surviving fragment, and from his book we can learn all that will ever be known of the Greek of Cargèse. The dialect is worth this trouble, and for two reasons. A comparison with the Greek now

spoken in Mani throws light on the process of diverging development in what was at first one dialect, and any light thrown on the Mani dialect is valuable because of its interesting position in the general field of Modern Greek. It belongs to those dialects which fringe the Peloponnese all round from Kymi to Aigina and Megara, and so even to the Ionian Islands; their existence raises all sorts of questions hardly yet resolved. For this full use of Dr. Blanken's book it is plain that it should be read in conjunction with Professor Mirambel's book on the dialect of Mani. I do not know any recent book on a Greek dialect better done than this one, and it must remain always the best record of this dying, or we may now say dead, form of Greek speech.

R. M. DAWKINS

Exeter College, Oxford

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editors of the CLASSICAL REVIEW,

Gentlemen:

Several years ago Professor Hackforth published an article in your periodical (*C.R.* lxiv [1950], pp. 43–45) in which he argued from *Symposium* 208 a–b that Plato when he wrote the *Symposium* had dropped the claim that soul, collective or individual, is imperishable. When in the last issue of *C.R.* (N.S. ii [1952], pp. 135–7) I observed that J. V. Luce had replied to this article, I expected to find some reference to the passage which by itself proves the invalidity of Professor Hackforth's inference. I had been puzzled by Professor Hackforth's failure to mention that passage; but I am still more puzzled by the absence of any reference to it in Mr. Luce's reply, the more so since I felt that it must have been trembling on the point of his pen when he wrote: 'in the *Symposium* attention is focused on the immortality of *ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις*' (p. 140). The passage occurs at 721 b–c in the *Laws*: *γαμεῖν . . . διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύσει τινὶ μετείληφεν ἀθανασίας . . .· γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν τι συμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, ὃ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ συνέπεται καὶ συνέψεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀεί, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι.* (Cf. also 773 e 5 ff.) Both Hackforth and Luce refer to the *Laws* for Plato's emphatic reassertion of the immortality of the soul; yet neither one mentions the fact that in this dialogue there is also the statement at 721 c, a clear parallel to the passage of the *Symposium* that they are debating. Their failure to mention it is the more puzzling because the parallel is not only recognized by commentators on the *Laws* but is also duly recorded by Robin in his edition of the *Symposium*.

Yours sincerely,

HAROLD CHERNISS

Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

MR. LUCE *writes*:

Professor Cherniss implies that he is in agreement with the main contention of my article, and his support is very gratifying to me. I venture, however, to submit that his assertion that *Laws* 721 b–c 'by itself proves the invalidity of Professor Hackforth's inference' is a little too sweeping. The passage is undoubtedly a significant parallel to *Symp.* 207 c 8–208 b 6, and is recorded by most of the editors of the *Symposium* from Stallbaum on. I had it in mind (as Professor Cherniss divines) when forming my views on mortal *φύσις* and divine *ψυχή*, and perhaps I should have cited it as an illustrative reference in addition to *Tim.* 90. I do not, however, regard it as quite the 'killing blow' that Professor Cherniss would have it to be. I may well have underestimated its importance, but the following points occur to me: (*a*) the immortality of the *soul*, my primary concern, is not mentioned in it; (*b*) statements by Plato in the *Laws* do not necessarily have any bearing on the main point at issue between Professor Hackforth and myself, viz. Plato's alleged '*temporary* (italics mine) relapse into scepticism' between the writing of the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*. I readily allow, and I am grateful to Professor Cherniss for making the point, that the passage, *if taken in conjunction* with the argument of *Laws* bk. 10, does afford a strong presumption that Plato in his old age did not feel it to be inconsistent to maintain simultaneously the *vicarious* immortality of the human organism and the immortality *per se* of the human soul. To this extent *Laws* 721 b–c corroborates my contention that Plato's thought, at the time when the *Symposium* was written, was 'fluid enough to hold the two kinds of immortality in solution'. But I beg leave to doubt whether the passage proves my thesis 'by itself'.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

XLVIII. 1: January 1953

J. P. Elder, *Horace, Carmina 1. 7*: the connexion of thought is: 'The world has many notable places, but happiness is not tied to any one place (1–14); do not dwell on your troubles but accept the present (better days will come) (15–21), as Teucer did (21–32).' If the date is immediately after Actium, the cause of Plancus' *tristitia* may have been that, in view of his questionable past, Augustus was keeping him on foreign service. Carl Roebuck, *The Economic Development of Ionia*: Ionian development shows a similar rhythm to that of Old Greece; the significant period is the last quarter of the seventh century, the significant factors sea-power and sea-communications. C. A. Lynch on *Anth. Pal.* 11. 146 emphasizes the point of *ἀριθμῷ* ('for you to count'), *μέτρῳ* ('for you to measure'). W. T. Avery, *Mentem mortalia tangunt*: notes resemblance between *Aen.* 1. 462 and *Agam.* 432. A. F. Norman, *Philostratus and Libanius*: L.'s *Oration* 1 shows a number of reminiscences of P. which suggest that he is deliberately adapting his own situation to those described in the *Lives*. R. E. Carter, *Cyprian δοϝέναι and δυϝάνοι*: *δοϝέναι* should be analysed as *δο-ϝέναι*, with suffix *-wen-*; *δυϝάνοι* is *δο-* (unaccented *o* being written *υ* in Cypr.) with suffix *-αν-* and the *ϝ*-glide common in Cypr. inscriptions; neither form gives evidence for an I.E. **dōw-*. F. R. Walton, *Kinsmen of the Gods*: [Pl.] *Axioch.* 371 d *γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν* is explained by Dem. 57. 67. *Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου καὶ Διὸς ἑρκείου γεννῆται*; the emphasis is on membership of a group, not on relationship, and the *μεμνημένοι* are represented as a *γένος* distinguished by participation in certain rites.

MNEMOSYNE

4th Series V (1952), Fasc. iii

A. D. Nock, *Hellenistic Mysteries and Christian Sacraments*: discusses Eleusinian, Lemnian, Samothracian, and Dionysiac mysteries, Hellenistic mysteries, and the contemporary meaning of *μυστήρια* and *τελετή*, Philo's use of metaphors from mysteries, the conception in St. Paul and the Fourth Gospel of baptism (an 'emergency measure') and the Eucharist as *dona data*, and mystery terminology down to the fourth century A.D.; the gradual elaboration of the Eucharist owed nothing essential to pagan ritual, but the Orthodox Easter greeting and other features show some recrudescence of the old spirit. B. A. van Groningen, *Eschyle Fr. 281 N².*: in this passage from the *Oreithyia*, *σχῶσι* = 'have', *ἑστιοῦχον* = 'man who keeps up fires'; *πλεκτάνη* is a metaphor from the tentacles of an octopus; Boreas will insinuate his cold wind and, unless all fires are put out, cause a conflagration. G. Italie, *Ad Aeschyli Sept. 217*: *οὐκοῦν τάδ' ἔσται πρὸς θεῶν*, 'spero equidem deorum auxilio ita fore', belongs to Eteocles, as if saying Amen to a prayer by the chorus (cf. 216). B. A. van Groningen, *Ps.-Longini de Sublimitate viii 2 corrigitur*: read *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ⟨ἦν⟩ωσέν τι ταῦτ' ἄμφω* κτλ. W. C. Helmbold, *Atakta*: suggestions for remedying *A.P.* v. 139. 2 Stadtm. (*κάλλει ἔφ' ἡνιοχῶν*), v. 181. 6 (repunctuates), ix. 15. 1 (*αὖ τοι ὁ πῦρ* κτλ.); Eur. *Phoen.* 999 (*αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οἳ μέν* κτλ.); Plat. *Apol.* 39 b 3 (*ἅτε δὴ νέοι* for Berlage's *ἅτε νέοι*), *Phaedr.* 254 d 4 (*del. ἕλκων*) and other Platonic passages; Thuc. i. 11. 1; Juv. viii. 158 ff. (161 ⟨*et*⟩ *dominum*, 162 *iam cum*). H. G. Viljoen, *Note on Lyra Graeca*: in *Carm. Pop.*, Fr. 38, *δάους δ' ἰλάσκετο* for *ἂν ἐκλελάσκετο*. D. Holwerda, *De novo Chamaeleontis studiorum testimonio*: adduces the evidence from schol. cod. Estensis on Ar. *Nub.* 967 as to the authorship and context of *Παλλάδα περσέπολιν δεινάν*, and compares it with Musurus' schol. and *Ox. Pap.* xiii. 1611. 160–76; discusses Chamaeleon's views on the quotation. B. A. van Groningen, *Νωίτερος* = *ἡμέτερος*? in Euphorion fr. 95 Scheidw., 9 Powell, for *νωιτέρης* suggests *νειοτέρης* (Hesych. *νειότατον· κατώτατον*). O. Skutsch, *Emendationum trias Propertiana*: at i. 6. 33 f. suggests *remige carpes, ibis . . .* for *carpere remis ibis . . .*; at iii. 7. 47 *noluit haec* for *non tulit haec*; at iii. 25. 12 *curva senecta* for *ruga sinistra*. H. Wagenvoort, *Ad Stat. Silv. l. i praefationem*: would read (l. 5) *quid enim ⟨est audacius quam hos⟩ quoque auctoritate editionis onerare, quom adhuc . . .*. C. A. van Rooy, *Livy vii. 2 and Valerius Maximus ii. 4. 4*: in their much-discussed accounts of the evolution of Roman drama, Livy seems certainly to be following Varro, Valerius probably to be following Varro only, not Varro and Livy.

RHEINISCHES MUSEUM

VC. 3: 1952

H. Rosenfeld, *Schrift und lateinische Sprachkenntnis bei den Germanen vor der christlichen Mission*: the words *Buch* (= writing-tablets of beechwood, originally) and *schreiben* (from *scribere*) prove that the reading and writing of Latin were known to the Rhine tribes from their earliest contact with the Romans. H. H. Scullard, *Rome's Declaration of War on Carthage in 218 B.C.*: the Romans declared war early in 218, when they suspected that Hannibal proposed to cross the Ebro; at that time they could only complain about the capture of Saguntum—an incident which they would otherwise have ignored. H. J. Kraus, H. Schmidt, W. Kranz, *Ein neues Hesiodfragment*: the fragment hitherto assigned to Anaxagoras (59 B 20 in *Fragm. d. Vorsokr.* ii.[6] 41) is from Hesiod's *Astronomia*. W. Schmid, *Terenz als Menander Latinus*: Caesar's verses quoted in Suet. *vit. Ter.* are a criticism of Cicero's treating Terence as *alter Menander* on the ground of his diction: Caesar agrees as far as diction is concerned but objects that Terence is only *dimidiatus Menander* in that he lacks *vis comica*. R. Helm, *Properz i 21*: deletes *ut* in l. 5 and compares *te servato* with *te sospite* in Hor. *C.* i. 28. 27. E. Bickel, *Nachtrag zum Denkmal der Varusschlacht*, maintains his readings and interpretation against H. v. Petrikovits in *Bonn. Jahrb.* cli, 1951, 116–18. V. Pisani, *Noch einmal die Spottmünze auf Commodus*: sees a reference to ῥαφανίδωσις in the coin studied by Derichs, p. 48 sq. R. Merkelbach, *Zu Herodot i 77*: reads [οὐ] σῦκα in 3.

NOTES AND NEWS

We have received a copy of the prize-winning entries in the third Certamen Capitolinum organized by the Istituto di Studi Romani for compositions in Latin prose. There were fifty Italian competitors, three French, two American, one Austrian, one British; in view of these proportions it is not surprising that the two prizes and the three honourable mentions all go to Italians. The composition which receives the first prize (a silver statuette of the Wolf) is an account of a holiday at Fiuggi. It is a fluent piece of writing, with some happy turns of phrase, an Apuleian exuberance of vocabulary (there is an amusing description of a turnstile and the author is not daunted by beauty queens or loudspeakers, sky-signs, lifts, or girls in shorts), and lively descriptions of a street café, of the spa and its customers, of a fashionable hotel dinner; at the last, confronted with vermicelli (*io*, *ὦ*, *vermiculata!* cries the impassioned author), 'ridenda ridet virgo sicco corpore Britanna quod apud nos non sint macerata totam noctem in aqua frigida prius quam demittantur in ebullientem' (*ridenda* is presumably meant as nom. sing.: what about taking it as acc. plur.?). But the author uses far too many tags, and blatantly metrical tags at that, to be convincing (two of the first four sentences end with *caderent de montibus umbrae* and *laeto clamore salutant*), and one is disturbed by *haematites* appearing as an accusative, by *uva bimasta* used twice and (what is worse) imputed to Virgil, by a dog which *gannit* while it wags its tail to greet its master. Why he should use the barbarous *Phygis* for a place which still preserves, with a couple of regular mutations, its Latin name of *Fluvii*, it is hard to see.

Under the title of *Corpus Christianorum* a new edition of the whole of Christian Latin literature, from the origins of Western Christianity down to the Carolingian renaissance, has been undertaken by the Belgian community of Steenbrugge. It will include not only theological literature from Tertullian to Bede but also the poets, the grammarians, the chroniclers, documents of canon law and liturgy, papal acts and letters, and inscriptions. Where a good critical edition exists, its text and apparatus will be reprinted with revision and correction; where there is no such edition, new critical editions will be prepared.

The whole series is planned to consist of 175 volumes of 600–800 pages each and it is hoped to produce ten volumes a year; the publishers are Messrs. Brepols of Turnhout. The price will be 500 Belgian francs a volume (or 600 B.fr. bound), and subscribers to the whole series will benefit by a discount of 10 per cent.; the volumes will also be sold separately. Volume I, Part i, which has just appeared and will be reviewed in due course, is the first instalment of Tertullian, containing the *Ad Martyras* in a new edition by Dom E. Dekkers and the *Ad Nationes* in an edition by Professor J. W. P. Borleffs, a revision of that which he published in 1929. We look for a worthy successor to the great monuments of monastic scholarship.

Two parts of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* are to appear this year—vol. v. 2 (E), fasc. 13 (the last) and vol. vii. 1 (I), fasc. 10: Pauly-Wissowa will be completed in two volumes, 22 and 8A. Other announcements from continental publishers are:

Teubner: Menander II (fragments: Körte-Thierfelder); Pindar (Snell); Aesop i. 2 (Hausrath-Haas); Thucydides (Luschnat); Cicero, *De Re Pub.* (Ziegler[3]); Lucretius (Martin[2]); Propertius (Schuster); Sallust (Kurfess).

Winter, Heidelberg: Veller, *Handbuch d. italischen Dialecte*; Niedermann, *Hist. Lautlehre d. Lateinischen*[3].

Kerle, Heidelberg: Heidelberger Texte—Roman Elegy (Till); Tacitus, *Agr.* (Haas); Tacitus, *Ann.* (Drexler); Catullus (Poschl); Augustine, *C.D.* (Zepf).

Beck, Munich: *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum*, 10 (Heidelberg); Friedrich, *Euripides u. Diphilos*; Händel, *Technik d. Apoll. Rhodios.*

Klostermann, Frankfurt: Altheim, *Röm. Geschichte*, ii (to 338 B.C.).

Reinhardt, Basel: Gigon, Commentary on Xen. *Memorabilia.*

Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna: *C.S.E.L.*—Ambrose, vii (Faller).

BOOKS RECEIVED

Excerpts or extracts from periodicals and collections are not included unless they are also published separately.

Alexander (W. H.) The Tacitean 'Non Liquet' on Seneca. (Publications in Classical Philology, Vol. 14, No. 8.) Pp. 118. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952. Paper, $1.25.

Bradner (L.) and *Lynch* (C. A.) The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More. Edited with Translations and Notes. Pp. xliv+255. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Cloth, $7.50.

Brink (C. O.) Imagination and Imitation. (Inaugural Lecture.) Pp. 22. Liverpool: University Press, 1953. Paper, 2*s.* net.

Broughton (T. R. S.) The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. Vol. II: 509 B.C.–100 B.C. (Philological Monographs, XV. 2.) Pp. ix+647. Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press (for the American Philological Association), 1951. Cloth.

Certamen Capitolinum III. Pp. 50. Rome: Istituto di Studi Romani, 1952. Paper, *L.* 500.

Chantraine (P.) Grammaire Homérique. Tome II: Syntaxe. Pp. 378. Paris: Klincksieck, 1953. Paper.

Dawkins (R. M.) Modern Greek Folktales. Pp. xxxviii+491. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953. Cloth, 50*s.* net.

Dekkers (E.), *Borleffs* (J. G. P.) Tertulliani Ad Martyras, Ad Nationes. (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, I. i.) Pp. xxv+75. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1953. Paper, 80 B.fr.

Eitrem (S.) Sokrates. [*In Norwegian.*] Pp. 214. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1952. Paper.

Ἑρμηνεία. Festschrift Otto Regenbogen zum 60. Geburtstag dargebracht von Schülern und Freunden. Pp. 182; 13 plates. Heidelberg: Winter, 1952. Cloth, DM. 24.

Evelyn (F. A.) Agrippina: Empress-Mother. A Play. Pp. 48. Privately printed (obtainable from the Rev. F. A. Evelyn, Strands Hotel, Nether Wasdale, Gosforth, Cumberland). Paper, 2*s.*

Gerevini (S.) Plutarco: Vita di Flaminino. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento. Pp. 103. Milan: Marzorati, 1952. Paper.

Gordon (A. E.) Quintus Veranius, Consul A.D. 49. A study based upon his recently identified sepulchral inscription. (Publications in Classical Archaeology, Vol. II, No. 5.) Pp. viii+122; 7 plates. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952. Paper, $1.75.

Gow (A. S. F.) The Greek Bucolic Poets: a Translation into English Prose. Pp. xxvii +156. Cambridge: University Press, 1952. Cloth, 18*s.* net.

Grant (M.) The Six Main Aes Coinages of Augustus. Controversial Studies. Pp. xix+178; 20 plates. Edinburgh: University Press, 1953. Cloth, 25*s.* net.

Greenwood (L. H. G.) Aspects of Euripidean Tragedy. Pp. vii+144. Cambridge: University Press, 18*s.* net.

Hagendahl (H.) La Correspondance de Ruricius. (Goteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, LVIII. 3.) Pp. 108. Gothenburg: Wettergren & Kerber, 1953. Paper, Kr. 10.

Halkin (L.) La supplication d'action de grâces chez les Romains. (Bibl. de la Fac. de Phil. et Lettres de l'Univ. de Liége, fasc. CXXVIII.) Pp. 136. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1953. Paper, 300 fr.

Herter (H.) Platons Akademie. Zweite Auflage. Pp. 40. Bonn: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei Scheur, 1952. Paper, DM. 2.40. [*See C.R. lxii (1948), 90.*]

Irigoin (J.) Recherches sur les mètres de la lyrique chorale grecque: la structure du vers. (Études et Commentaires, XVI.) Pp. 105. Paris: Klincksieck, 1953. Paper, 800 fr.

Janssen (H. H.) Historische Grammatica van het Latijn. (Servire's Encyclopaedie, B. 9a. 6.) Deel I: De Klanken. Pp. 120. The Hague: Servire, 1953. Cloth, fl. 3.90.

Janssens (E.) Oedipe-Roi, ou Le Péché d'Intelligence. Texte de Sophocle commenté. Pp. 115. Namur: Wesmael-Charlier, 1953. Paper.

Koestermann (E.) Taciti libri qui supersunt. Post C. Halm–G. Andresen septimum edidit E. K. Tom. I: Annales. (Bibl. Scr. Gr. et Rom. Teubneriana.) Pp. xxvii+435. Leipzig: Teubner, 1953. Cloth and boards, DM. 13.

Labourt (J.) Saint Jérôme: Lettres. Tome III (53–70). Texte établi et traduit. (Collection Budé.) Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1953. Paper.

Langlotz (E.) Perseus. (Sitz. der Heidelberger Akad. der Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl., 1951. 1.) Pp. 35; 6 plates. Heidelberg: Winter, 1951. Paper, DM. 5.70.

Lee (A. G.) P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon liber I. Pp. viii+162. Cambridge: University Press, 1953. Boards, 7*s.* 6*d.*

Le Gall (J.) Le Tibre, fleuve de Rome, dans l'antiquité. (Publications de l'Institut d'Art et d'Archéologie de l'Université de Paris, I.) Pp. 367; 34 plates. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. Paper, 2,500 fr.

Le Gall (J.) Recherches sur le culte du Tibre. (Publications de l'Institut d'Art et d'Archéologie de l'Université de Paris, II.) Pp. 124; 15 plates. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. Paper, 1,200 fr.

Lerat (L.) Les Locriens de l'Ouest. I: Topographie et Ruines. Pp. xix+235; 64 plates. II: Histoire, Institutions, Prosopographie. Pp. 244. (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 167.) Paris: De Boccard, 1952. Paper.

Levy (G. R.) The Sword from the Rock. An Investigation into the Origins of Epic Literature and the Development of the Hero. Pp. 236. London: Faber, 1953. Cloth, 30*s.* net.

Martin (E.) Essai sur les rythmes de la chanson grecque ancienne. (Études et Commentaires, XIV.) Pp. 366. Paris: Klincksieck, 1953. Paper, 1,600 fr.

Martin (E.) Trois documents de la musique grecque. (Études et Commentaires, XV.) Pp. 78. Paris: Klincksieck, 1953. Paper, 800 fr.

Mattingly (H.) The Imperial 'Vota'. Pp. 41. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. Paper, 5*s.* net.

Marzullo (B.) Il problema omerico. Pp. xvi+502. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1952. Paper, L. 3,300.

Mette (H. J.) Parateresis: Untersuchungen zur Sprachtheorie des Krates von Pergamon. Pp. 206. Halle: Niemeyer, 1952. Paper, DM. 24.

Momigliano (A.) George Grote and the Study of Greek History. (Inaugural Lecture.) Pp. 23. London: H. K. Lewis, 1952. Paper, 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

Myres (J. L.) Geographical History in Greek Lands. Pp. ix+381; 12 plates. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953. Cloth, 35*s*. net.

Niedermann (M.) Historische Lautlehre des Lateinischen. Dritte neubearbeitete Auflage. Pp. vii+214. Heidelberg: Winter, 1953. Paper, DM. 9.

Papanoutsos (E. E.) La Catharsis des Passions d'après Aristote. (Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes.) Pp. 41. Athens: Institut Français, 1953. Paper.

Paribeni (R.) Storia di Roma: L'Età di Cesare e di Augusto. Pp. 572; 22 plates. Rome: Istituto di Studi Romani (Bologna: Cappelli), 1950. Paper, L. 3,200.

Périphanakis (C. E.) Les Sophistes et le Droit. Pp. 66. Athens: Elefthéroudakis, 1953. Paper, 30,000 dr.

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Sarton (G.) Ancient Science through the Golden Age of Greece. Pp. xxvi+646; 103 figs. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1953. Cloth, 63*s*. net.

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Stillwell (A. N.) Corinth: Vol. XV, Part II. The Potters' Quarter: the Terracottas. Pp. xii+300; 60 plates. Princeton, N.J.: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1953. Cloth, $15.

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Symons (T.) Regularis Concordia. Edited with translation, introduction, and notes. (Nelson's Mediaeval Classics.) Pp. vii+77. Edinburgh and London: Nelson, 1953. Cloth, 15*s*. net.

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Webster (T. B. L.) Studies in Later Greek Comedy. Pp. viii+261. Manchester: University Press, 1953. Cloth, 25*s*. net.

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